Schopenhauer's moral philosophy faces a fundamental challenge: on the one hand, he emphasizes the immutability of character and the fundamental egoism of human beings, grounding them in the unitary and metaphysical will; on the other hand, he grounds his ethical system on compassion and altruism, which requires transcending the self and achieving unity with the other. These two propositions appear, at first glance, to be in contradiction with one another. The present study, employing an analytical-interpretive method and drawing upon Schopenhauer's primary texts, explores the relationship between egoism and altruism within his philosophical system. The findings indicate that three possible solutions—the cognitive solution (transformation of cognition, not character), the solution based on suffering, and the solution involving the distinction between two levels of character—though valuable in their own respects, cannot by themselves resolve the contradiction. The ultimate solution lies in the concept of the "denial of the will to life"—a denial that signifies not a transformation of character, but rather a liberation from character and a severance from the egoistic foundation of existence. In this exalted state, the individual transcends the framework of his immanent character and, through the cessation of willing, attains a state of tranquility and absolute peace in which the distinction between "self" and "other" ceases to hold meaning. This study demonstrates that the denial of the will offers an immanent solution to the apparent contradiction within Schopenhauer's moral system, ultimately leading to philosophical salvation.