نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار فلسفه گروه فلسفه و منطق، دانشکده علومانسانی، دانشگاه تربیتمدرس، تهران، ایران.
2 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه، گروه فلسفه و منطق، دانشکده علومانسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
This study seeks to clarify the ground of moral obligation in Rawls’s theory of justice and to challenge purely contractual interpretations. It argues that Rawls’s theory must be understood within a two-level framework: the rational justification of the principles of justice in the original position, and the moral internalization of those principles through the sense of justice. The problem is framed through the debate between Leonard Choptiany and Jeffrey Reiman, which demonstrates that a rational contract alone cannot generate moral obligation. Using an explanatory-analytic method and a direct reading of Rawls, the article reconstructs Choptiany’s threefold critique (methodological, substantive, and inferential) and, through Rawls’s texts and Samuel Freeman’s Kantian interpretation, shows that moral obligation is not grounded in the contract but in the educative formation of the sense of justice. The article concludes that Rawls’s theory of justice is defensible only if the link between its contractual and moral levels is acknowledged; otherwise, Choptiany’s critique remains valid. Thus, education is not merely a consequence of justice but a condition of its possibility, since the stability of justice depends on the internalization of the value of fairness through public institutions.
کلیدواژهها English
