نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

2 دانشیار فلسفه، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران

چکیده

در سالهای اخیر توجه خاصی به مساله تکثرگرایی منطقی شده است؛ عمده این مباحث در عکسل العمل به نظریه بیل و رستال درباره چگونگی تحقق بیش از یک منطق بوده است. نظریه ایشان این است که عدم تعین معنای اعتبار منطقی فراتر از تمایز میان اعتبار استنتاجی و اعتبار استقرایی است. مفهوم اعتبار استنتاجی نیر نامتعین است. این عدم تعین ریشه در عدم تعین امر بنیادین دیگری است: عدم تعین حالت. حالتها همان صادق کننده مقدمات و نتیجه یک استدلال هستند. مثال روشن برای حالت، همان مدلهای تارسکی برای منطق کلاسیک است. ارتباط میان اعتبار استنتاجی و حالت چنین است: استدلالی معتبر است که در همه حالتها صدق-نگهدار باشد. حال، چون حالت امری نامتعین است، اعتبار منطقی نیز امری نامعین خواهد بود. در این مقاله استدلال خواهیم کرد که اگر نظریه بیل و رستال با تببینی درباره چگونگی جواز وقوع حالتهای هم-تراز تکمیل نگردد، چیزی بیش از توضیحی متعارف درباره چگونگی ساختن منطقهای مختلف نیست.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Logical Pluralism: Where the Conflict Really Lies

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammad Mohsen Haeri 1
  • Davood Hoseini 2

1 Tarbiat Modares University

2 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

Recent years have seen a surge of attention to the problem of logical pluralism; most of which has been a reaction to Beall and Restall’s account of logical pluralism as the existence of more than one equally correct semantic relation of logical consequence. The underlying thesis is that the indeterminacy of the notion of validity goes beyond what the inductive-deductive distinction can precisify. The notion of deductive validity itself is indeterminate as well and this indeterminacy has its roots in the indeterminacy of the more fundamental notion of case. Cases are what make the premisses and the conclusion of an argument true; the most notable example being the Tarskian models for classical logic. Deductive validity is the preservation of truth across all cases. This paper argues that unless this account of logical pluralism is supplemented with an argument in favor of the equal legitimacy of the purported cases it becomes merely a semi-controversial exposition of how different logics can be generated.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Logical Pluralism
  • Logical Consequence
  • Validity
  • Case
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