نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.

2 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه معاصر، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی(ره)، قزوین، ایران.

10.22054/wph.2020.42610.1727

چکیده

در این نوشتار با مرور مؤلفه‌های اصلی فلسفۀ تامس کوهن خواهیم دید که او منتقد تمایز میان مقام گردآوری/داوری در روش‌شناسیِ علم است. دلایل کوهن عبارتند از: 1. موافقان صرفاً به تبیین جایگاه تمایز گردآوری/داوری در بستر آموزشی آن پرداخته‌اند که بر اساس آن تنها شواهد در جهت داوری یک فرضیۀ مؤثر تلقی می‌شوند. و در دیگر زمینه‌های مهمِ داوری مورد غفلت قرار می‌گیرد. 2. تمایز دو مقام مبتنی بر نگاه ساده‌انگارانه به روند تولید علم است که صرفاً به بیان نقاط قوت و نه ضعف نظریه‌ها می‌پردازد. 3. هیچ‌گونه تعیین‌کنندگیِ تجربی در مقام داوری وجود ندارد. 4. در فرآیند تولید علم، جنبه‌های توصیفی و تجویزی فرضیه‌ها انفکاک‌ناپذیر و درهم‌تنیده‌اند. 5. برخلاف موافقان این تمایز، واژگان ساختاریافته در مقام داوری، دارای پیامدهای ثابت و قطعی نیست بلکه، تحت تأثیر اصول پیشینِ نسبیت‌شدۀ کانتی، همواره دچار تغییر، تعدیل و اصلاح قرار می‌گیرند. کوهن پس از بیان این اِشکالات، از سوی موافقان تمایز گردآوری/داوری از چند جهت مورد نقد قرار گرفت: 1. اخذ تعمدی سبک مبهم‌نویسی در آثارش. 2. کاربست رویکرد دُورگونه در ارائۀ فهرستی از معیارهای معرفتی-واقع‌گرایانه و بازگشت دوباره به معیارهای غیرمعرفتی. 3. خلط میان «مقام تصمیم» و «مقام داوری» و توجه به «علت» به‌جای «دلیل». او برای فرار از این نقدها به دو نکته اشاره می‌کند: نخست، فهم نادرست دیدگاه‌هایش توسط این موافقان. دوم، ارائۀ معیارهایی در جهت حفظ عینیت علم متفاوت با موافقان این تمایز.
هدف این نوشتار، تحلیل، تکمیل و نقد اندیشه‌های کوهن درباره‌ی تمایز گردآوری/داوری است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Kuhn and the Distinction from Discovery/Justification

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ahmad Ebadi 1
  • Mohammad Emdadi Masouleh 2

1 Associate professor of philosophy ,University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.

2 PhD Candidate of Contemporary Philosophy, Imam Khomeini (R.A) International University, Qazvin, Iran;

چکیده [English]

In this paper, by reviewing the main components of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy it will become evident that he is a critic on the distinction between the context of discovery/justification in the methodology of science. His reasoning consists of: 1. his proponents have merely dealt with the context of discovery/justification in the educational realm, according to which only the evidence regarding the justification of a hypothesis is considered effective, and the other aspects of justification are ignored. 2. the distinction of two contents is based on oversimplification in process of producing science, which merely refers to the strong point of the theories, not the weakness. 3. there exists no empirical determination in the context of justification. 4. in the process of producing science the descriptive and prescriptive aspects, of the hypotheses, are inseparable and intertwined. 5. unlike the proponents of this distinction the structured lexicon in the context of justification has no fixed and definite consequences but is subject to Kant’s relativized a priori principles facing constant change, modification, and reparation. After pronouncing these problems, Kuhn was criticized by his proponents of distinction of discovery/justification in a few contexts: 1. adopting intention on ambiguous writing style in his works, 2. applying the cyclic approach in providing an epistemic-realistic criteria list and retrieval to the non-epistemic criteria, 3. confusion between the context of decision and context of justification and concerning cause instead of reason. To escape from these criticisms, he points to the following two issues: 1. misunderstanding of his views by sympathizers of the distinction and 2. providing criteria as to preserve the objectivity of science different from the proponents of the distinction. The objective of this paper is to analyze, complete, and criticize Kuhn’s thoughts regarding the distinction of discovery/justification.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Rational reconstruction
  • Methodology of Science
  • Relativism
  • Thomas Kuhn
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