نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 گروه فلسفه، دانشکده‌ی ادبیات و علوم انسانی دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

2 گروه فلسفه، دانشکده‌ی ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

ویتگنشتاین در سال 1928، در مقطعی کوتاه، طرحی را دنبال می‌کرد که خود از آن با عنوان «زبان پدیده‌شناختی» نام می‌بَرد. کشف برخی کاستی‌ها در کلیت رساله (از جمله «مسئلۀ ناسازگاری رنگ‌ها») او را بر آن داشته بود که با ارائۀ سمبولیسمی جدید این کاستی‌ها را رفع کند، اما او پس از مدتی از این طرح دست می‌کشد و آن را ناممکن یا دست‌کم غیرضروری می‌شمرد. در این مقاله سعی می‌کنیم به چند پرسش مهم در این باره پاسخ دهیم: این زبان پدیده‌شناختی چیست؟ خاستگاه آن کجاست؟ دلایل ارائه و طرد آن چیست؟ ویتگنشتاین به دو معنا از «زبان پدیده‌شناختی» سخن می‌گوید؛ یک بار به‌عنوان توصیف محضِ پدیده (در مقابل زبان فیزیکیِ متعارف) و دیگر بار به‌عنوان مطالعۀ امکان‌های معناداری. خاستگاهِ نخستین معنا را می‌توان به نظریه‌پردازان فیزیک بازگرداند. یکی از دلایل اصلی ویتگنشتاین برای طرح این زبان توضیحی قابل قبول دربارۀ مسئلۀ ناسازگاری رنگ‌ها بود، مسئله‌ای که منطقِ تابع- صدقی رساله را به خطر می‌انداخت. ویتگنشتاین در پی نشانه‌گذاری‌ای مکمل بود و گمان می‌کرد که راه‌حل در «پژوهش منطقی خود پدیده‌ها»ست. او پیشنهادهایی اولیه ارائه می‌کند (از جمله اینکه اعداد را در صورت گزاره وارد کنیم)، اما هر چه پیش‌تر می‌رود خود را از توسل به مفاهیم و واژه‌های زبان متعارف ناگزیرتر می‌بیند و سرانجام از این طرح دست می‌کشد. حال او از «تحلیل پدیده» به «تحلیل گرامر» روی می‌آورد که هدفش جداسازیِ وجوه ذاتی و غیرذاتی زبان از یکدیگر است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Wittgenstein’s “Phenomenological Language”; Its Nature, Origin, and Why Did he introduce and Relinquish it

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hassan Arab 1
  • Hosein Valeh 2

1 Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Letter and Human Sciences, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

2 Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Letter and Human Sciences, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

In 1928, Wittgenstein took on a project for a short time which he himself called “phenomenological language”. Discovering some flaws in Tractatus as a whole (including the problem of color-incompatibility), he begin to think of a new symbolism and thereby to remedy the flaws. However, after a while he gave up the project and considered it impossible or at least unnecessary. In this article, we try to answer some important questions in this regard: what was the phenomenological language? Where did it come from? Why did he address it and give it up? And what did he introduce for substitution of the old project? The claim is that Wittgenstein used “phenomenological language” in two senses; first as the mere description of a phenomenon (vs. physical ordinary language) and second as the study of possibilities of meaningfulness. The origin of the first one goes back to views of theoretical physicists. One of the main reasons to launch this project was that Wittgenstein wanted to explain the color-incompatibility problem threatening the truth-functional logic of Tractatus. Wittgenstein was seeking a complementary notation and thought that the solution lied in the “logical investigation of phenomena themselves”. He made some preliminary suggestions (e.g. importing numbers in the form of propositions), but the more he went on, the more he saw the use of terms and concepts of ordinary language as inevitable. Finally, he discarded the project. Instead of “analyzing phenomenon”, he now spoke of “analyzing grammar”, whose goal was to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Phenomenological Language
  • Ordinary Language
  • The Color-Incompatibility Problem
  • Visual Space
  • grammar
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