Research Paper
philosophy
Fatemeh Rezayi; Sara Asadpour; Morad Yari dehnavi
Abstract
Introduction
The issue of choice has long been of interest to philosophers and theologians. They have explained choice using the principles and factors of choice. Ibn Sina believes that in order to perform a choice, a person first imagines it and, by acknowledging its benefit and the emergence of ...
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Introduction
The issue of choice has long been of interest to philosophers and theologians. They have explained choice using the principles and factors of choice. Ibn Sina believes that in order to perform a choice, a person first imagines it and, by acknowledging its benefit and the emergence of desire, the will to perform that choice is created in him. Of course, human choice is a consequence of the essence of God and it is not the case that a person freely chooses to do an action; thus, the reason for the coercion of human choice according to Ibn Sina is causality. Ibn Sina claims that what causes the realization and performance of a choice, even if it is a voluntary act, is not itself voluntary and has not been realized voluntarily and voluntarily. An examination of Ibn Sina’s views on choice shows that he cannot justify human choice well and considers only God to have real choice. Mulla Sadra also believes that man is free and has a will; however, he believes that the will itself appears to man in a causal manner. That is, for a person to be free means to be a disciple; but the will itself is coercive and necessary. Thus, coercive factors also intervene in the foundations of voluntary action for Mulla Sadra. Therefore, Mulla Sadra emphasizes the coerciveness of the will and considers it to be the necessary result and effect of external causes and ultimately God.
It seems that Mulla Sadra’s view of voluntary action and the necessity of the will faces serious problems. Because man always acts under the influence of coercion and cannot escape the constraint of a necessary will. It seems that a link is missing in the chain of factors of voluntary action that Mulla Sadra did not address. Allama Jafari, in a broad view, examines voluntary action and the factors affecting its occurrence and mentions a factor called the self or human essence that has the ability to measure or resist the will and ultimately has control over the performance of the action. This factor can be strengthened with knowledge and awareness, and the greater its power of control and agency, the more desirable it can be to prove the will.
Allama Jafari, with a deeper and different approach, considers the voluntary act as an act in which the "I" can exercise control and mastery over himself (Jafari, B-A, p. 90). He considers the concept of "I" or "personality" to be very important in the manifestation of will and emphasizes the freedom of actions. This means that everyone plays a role in the emergence of will according to their personality and essence. Allama Jafari considers the division of will into free and forced to be incorrect and is among the thinkers who believe that a purely philosophical method is not enough in addressing this issue and that the results of scientific and laboratory research should also be used in this field. In stating the proof of free will, he points out that man has the ability to free himself from the influence of lower factors during the stages of development and, while being influenced by higher factors, to act in their shadow.
In order to express the role of the "I" in preferring one of the two parties to act or prevent action for an action, Allama Jafari states that although there is a preferring factor in every action, this preferring factor is not so binding that the "I" element cannot act against it. In any case, assuming that there is an agent for an action, there is still dominance and supervision on the part of the "I" to perform the action according to the preferring factor or to act contrary to that factor and perform the opposite action. This becomes clearer considering the fact that things are not done with 100% certainty and no factor in making a person do something creates 100% motivation in a person. So there is always a place for the "I" to enter and act.
Therefore, there is a factor within the individual that influences the will and is itself influenced by factors. This factor is weak in childhood, and therefore it can be said that human voluntary actions are more influenced by instincts and natural motives, and gradually, with the growth and greater agency of the ego and the human personality, the power to influence actions increases. Thus, if we attribute voluntary action to this factor of the human ego, we can say that with the growth of the human personality, his will and freedom increase both in terms of the scope of performance and in terms of the degree of influence and effect.
Literature Review
Mohammad Shafi'i and Najjarpourian (1401) in an article titled "Reasonable Life and Dimensions of Rational Education from the Perspective of Allama Mohammad Taqi Ja'fari (may Allah have mercy on him)" have examined the discussion of reasonable life and its relationship with rational education, but have not mentioned its relationship with predestination and free will.
Methodology
The present study uses an analytical-comparative method to examine the theoretical foundations of Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Jafari on will. Accordingly, the views of Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Jafari on will were briefly stated, and while briefly comparing their theoretical foundations, the difference between Allama Jafari's view and his different view was stated.
Conclusion
Considering the above, it can be said that Allama Jafari, in a broad view of will, has considered many factors to be involved in the occurrence of a voluntary act. Among them, paying attention to an agent called me or the human personality is a new view that can answer many of the problems related to determinism and free will. Also, paying attention to knowledge, awareness, and free conscience in exercising dominance and supervision of the agent me in voluntary acts is also a new matter that can justify the fact that although a person does not have much free will at the beginning of birth, he can strengthen his role in his destiny and life with increasing age and awareness.
Research Paper
philosophy
Asghar Vaezi; Parvin Izadi
Abstract
1. Introduction
This article elaborates on the concept of genre in Eric Hirsch's hermeneutical theory and explores how genre can be used as an interpretive guide to achieve the author's intended meaning. According to Hirsch, the decisive and determinative role of valid interpretation for all future ...
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1. Introduction
This article elaborates on the concept of genre in Eric Hirsch's hermeneutical theory and explores how genre can be used as an interpretive guide to achieve the author's intended meaning. According to Hirsch, the decisive and determinative role of valid interpretation for all future inferences in the humanities cannot be ignored, as all humanistic studies are based on the understanding and interpretation of texts. From this perspective, a valid interpretation requires a standard, meaning something that is stable and definite beyond its broad range of implications and applications. He introduces the author's intended meaning as the only normative concept with the characteristics of necessity and shareability, which can lend credibility to interpretation. For him, what is sought in reconstructive interpretation and should be the basis for all interpretive goals is the "literal meaning," which is why he focuses on language as a transmitter of meaning. Language, as a tool for conveying meaning, both creates and limits meaning. Hirsch emphasizes that understanding the author's intended meaning requires knowing the semantic horizon of words and genre. He introduces genre as a specific "type" of discourse that guides the meaning of the text. Hirsch examines the difference between language and speech using the concepts of Saussure and Wittgenstein. Saussure describes language as a system of potential meanings and speech as the actualization of those meanings. Based on this, Hirsch argues that meaning exists only in speech, and to determine the meaning of a text, it must be placed within a specific genre framework. Wittgenstein also emphasizes through the concept of language games that understanding a discourse requires knowing the rules of its language game. Hirsch uses this concept to explain the role of genre, stating that genre is a type that guides the meaning of the text and acts as a bridge between different meanings and the specific meaning intended by the author. Therefore, genre, as an interpretive guide, helps the interpreter discern the author's intended meaning among various meanings and interpretations and resolves the contradiction between the variability of interpretations and the constancy of the text's meaning.
Research Questions
1- How is genre conceptualized in Eric Hirsch's hermeneutical theory, and how does he use the concept of genre to defend the author's intent in text interpretation? 2- What role does genre play as a fundamental principle in Eric Hirsch's hermeneutical theory in achieving the author's intended meaning?
Methodology
This research was conducted fundamentally based on the study of library sources and articles published in international journals and internet sources.
Literature Review
Eric Hirsch defines genre in hermeneutical theory as a theory of difference, emphasizing genre agility over mastery, facilitated by semiotic, hermeneutic, and discursive agility within interdisciplinary research representation. (weedn, 2003) Eric Hirsch defines genre in hermeneutical theory as a crucial concept that highlights the importance of prior knowledge over formal skills for reading comprehension in education. (Clark, 2009) E. D. Hirsch's hermeneutic theory emphasizes that the meaning of a literary work is absolute and tied to the author's original intention, distinguishing between meaning and consciousness of meaning. (Moh’d Khair, 2024: Al Omar, 2024) Eric Hirsch defines genre in hermeneutical theory as a site of negotiation between subject and object, embodying conflicted states of consciousness, rather than just structural features or effects. (Rajan, 2000) Eric Hirsch defines genre in hermeneutical theory as a synthesis of needs, socially operative action schemes, and conventions, reflecting socio-historical specific structures and functions. ( Hauptmeier, 1987) E. D. Hirsch views genre in hermeneutical theory as a vague yet influential concept, often used as a magical talisman in various disciplines, including literary criticism and philosophy. (Emarth, 1981) Eric Hirsch defines genre in hermeneutical theory through traditional metaphors like genres as categories, forms, and rules, ultimately portraying genres as containers shaping reading practices. (Bastian, 2012)
Additionally, a search in the databases of the Jihad University Scientific Information Center (SID) and NoorMagzin did not yield any articles in Persian related to the concept of genre in Eric Hirsch's hermeneutical theory.
Conclusion
According to Hirsch, all humanities are based on the interpretation of texts. Therefore, the issue of interpretive validity is of utmost importance to him. He claims that attention to validity in text interpretation has been completely overlooked in the contemporary era because the very idea of absolutely valid interpretation has come under fundamental doubt. Hirsch considers the humanities deserving of claims to genuine and authentic knowledge, where authentic knowledge is that which has the highest likelihood of consensus. Even if a text appears ambiguous or its results are not definitive, this should not be an obstacle to reaching consensus and agreement in interpretation. According to Hirsch, ambiguity in knowledge does not mean that the knowledge itself is ambiguous, and validity does not require certainty and finality. Given Hirsch’s focus on contemporary advances in linguistics and philosophy of language, he addresses language as both a constructor and a limiter of meaning to defend his theory of achieving the author's intent. Hence, he attempts to link the text’s ability to convey multiple meanings with the unity of the author’s intended literal meaning through the concept of genre. Hirsch asserts that the meaning of a text is the meaning intended by the author and is shareable and transmissible. However, to achieve this intended meaning, a valid methodology is required. The idea of genre provides a framework that guides the interpreter in text interpretation. This framework essentially represents the interpreter’s system of expectations, which starts out as ambiguous and becomes clearer as the interpreter projects their expectations onto the entire text, guiding the interpretation process. In this way, the interpreter can achieve the meaning of the text or the author’s intent by projecting the genre onto the entire text. Hirsch introduces the concept of genre as an interpretive hypothesis that guides the interpreter in discovering the author’s intent. In Hirsch’s approach to text interpretation, a diligent interpreter seeking to hear a voice from afar must rely on language, which, despite its limiting nature, determines meaning, and concepts such as semantic type and genre serve as guides to reach the author’s intended meaning and valid interpretation.
Research Paper
philosophy
Mahdi Hafezi; Fereshteh Nabati
Abstract
Introduction
Kripke’s Naming and Necessity needs no introduction. In these lectures, he advanced significant critiques of the descriptive theory of names and semantic externalism. However, he deferred addressing the problem of empty names to a later work. This promise was fulfilled ...
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Introduction
Kripke’s Naming and Necessity needs no introduction. In these lectures, he advanced significant critiques of the descriptive theory of names and semantic externalism. However, he deferred addressing the problem of empty names to a later work. This promise was fulfilled in his subsequent lectures, Reference and Existence, where he examined the semantics of empty names and explored the relation between naming and ontology. In this paper, we analyze Kripke’s views on empty names, drawing primarily on these lectures and his article “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities.” We are confronted with these facts:
Natural language contains names that lack referents.
This referential absence does not impede communication among speakers.
Sentences containing such names are intuitively judged as having truth-value
If we uphold the principle of compositionality and assume that a name’s sole semantic content is its referent, empty names present a profound theoretical challenge.
Kripke, after critically evaluating the two dominant approaches to name semantics—direct and indirect reference theories—establishes the foundation for his own original and comprehensive account.
Literature Review
Although the official printed version of Reference and Existence was published in 2013, an unofficial version had long been available, read, and critiqued. In this section, we will discuss works we have reviewed on this subject. Numerous post-Kripkean philosophers—despite their disagreements on details—have advanced theories about language development and fictional entities. Notable contributions include those by Van Inwagen (1977), Thomasson (2003), Braun (2005), and Salmon (2012).
However, beyond language development, Kripke's proposal regarding true-negative existentials has not been well-received by prominent scholars like Evans, Braun, Burgess, and Salmon. Evans views Kripke's suggestion as resembling a metalinguistic or descriptive analysis (Evans, 1982, pp. 349-350). Salmon similarly considers it to be either descriptivist or caught in an infinite regress of empty sentences (Salmon, 2012, pp. 63-65). Burgess thinks Kripke faces an inevitable dilemma: either accept the gappy proposition theory or adopt a metalinguistic analysis (Burgess, 2013, p. 100). Braun argues that such proposals ultimately resort to a meta-propositional view that falls prey to the same problems as descriptive theories (Braun, 1993, pp. 455-456).
Methodology
This study undertakes a detailed examination and critical analysis of Saul Kripke’s works and those of his critics on the subject of empty names semantics. Through a combination of descriptive exposition and analytical engagement with these texts, the authors have adopted a descriptive-analytical methodology.
Discussion
For Kripke, who considers the referent of a name to be its sole semantic content, the presence of empty names in language presents a significant problem. He engages in a detailed critique of prevailing trends in his era in the semantics of names—especially Millian, Russellian, and descriptivist theories—focusing on how they address the issue of empty names. Contrary to the dominant approach, which treats fictional names as pretended names, Kripke proposes a more ingenious and nuanced strategy.
Understanding Kripke’s approach requires attention to the stratification of language—a move that implies a certain acceptance of ambiguity. He distinguishes between two levels of language: developed and undeveloped. The undeveloped level is where empty names are used in independence of their associations with fictional works (such as stories, myths, or erroneous scientific theories). At this level, speakers intend to refer to a real entity—for instance, they use “Hamlet” as if referring to an actual person. According to Kripke, at the undeveloped level, empty names lack referents, and sentences containing them fail to express any proposition at all.
The proposal that language has a form of pretense, applies only at that stage when empty names are introduced into natural language. If for clarity, we narrow the scope of discussion to fiction alone, then, given the presence of an appropriate fictional work, we can say that the language has developed, and there are two distinct usages for fictional names in it: in-the-story and outside-the-story usage.
In in-the-story usage, the truth or falsity of sentences containing empty names is evaluated according to the internal logic of the story, and is interpreted under the sentence operator “in the story”. In outside-the-story usage, however, the referents of empty names are understood as abstract, fictional entities that have entered the actual world through specific creative acts by an author.
Before addressing the problem of empty names at the undeveloped level of language, Kripke argues that if a name is truly empty, then its referent not only does not exist but also cannot exist; in fact, the name's referent has no chance to exist! This is because in order to speak of the possible existence of an object, there must be a conceivable distinction between its ontological conditions of existence (its essential properties) and its epistemic conditions (its accidental properties). For fictional names, such a distinction is not possible. This explains why, when Kripke returned to the undeveloped level of language to examine the uses of empty names, he insists that sentences containing such names express no propositions.
Nonetheless, Kripke takes a two-step approach to resolving the problems of empty names at the undeveloped level of language. First, he asserts that sentences containing empty names express no propositions. Second, by describing the use of empty names as quasi-intensional, he analyzes such sentences as follows: There is no true proposition about m that p. Then, looking at natural language and how speakers actually use such sentences, he observes a strong tendency to call them false. Accordingly, by extending the concept of falsity, he proposes that besides its conventional meaning—namely, the existence of a proposition that is not true —falsity can also mean the absence of any proposition.
Conclusion
It appears that the issue is as complex as Kripke thinks it is. One of the major problems with the development of language—aside from the principle of parsimony—is the ambiguity between in-the-story and outside-the-story uses of names, as well as the ambiguity between developed and the undeveloped language. Moreover, as Salmon has noted (Salmon, 2012, p. 68), even within in-the-story usage, merely positing an “in the story” operator is insufficient, since it remains unclear what entities empty names are supposed to refer to.
The situation becomes even more difficult when we turn to the analysis of sentences involving empty names at the undeveloped level of language. Nevertheless, Kripke’s proposal, unlike the accounts given by Burgess (2013, p. 100) or Evans (1982, p. 349), does not constitute a metalinguistic analysis. Not only does Kripke devote several pages to criticizing such analyses, but the metalinguistic approach also does not require an expanded notion of falsity, since the resulting sentence still expresses a proposition. Similarly, as Salmon (2012, p. 65) and Evans (1982, p. 350) point out, Kripke’s account is not a variant of the descriptivist theory either, for under that theory, the analyzed sentence expresses a proposition and is false in the ordinary semantic sense of falsity.
Undoubtedly, Kripke’s appeal to “quasi-intensional use” (rather than fully intensional) is ambiguous. Yet it seems to represent a somewhat hesitant effort to emphasize the speaker’s role without committing to a descriptivist theory. Here, Kripke appears to be simultaneously attentive to language use and willing to accept a certain ambiguity in the meaning of the term “false.”
At the end of the fifth lecture in Reference and Existence, when Kripke became frustrated with the failure to identify a “third” kind of use for empty terms—following his discussion of Donnellan’s critique of Russell—he concluded that what he pursues is not a pragmatic account, but a semantic one. The proposal, shaped by Donnellan’s objections to Russell and Kripke’s own modifications, centers on the “divergence between speaker reference and semantic reference” as a way to account for Donnellanian counterexamples. In that framework, once ambiguity is resolved, divergence collapses into unity. But in our case, the case of empty names, such disambiguation is impossible—since there is, in fact, no semantic referent at all. For this reason, Kripke seems to acknowledge the speaker’s intended reference when using empty names. Observing the actual practices of language users, he concedes that the concept of “falsity,” beyond its standard semantic meaning—i.e., an incorrespondence between an existing proposition and reality—also carries a pragmatic meaning: the absence of any proposition whatsoever.
Research Paper
philosophy
Khoshnevisan Khoshnevisan
Abstract
Introduction
Arthur Schopenhauer introduces suffering as a fundamental and inevitable feature of human existence, which is caused by a blind and aimless will. In his philosophy, Schopenhauer introduces the concept of will as the core of human experience and the main source of suffering. In Schopenhauer's ...
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Introduction
Arthur Schopenhauer introduces suffering as a fundamental and inevitable feature of human existence, which is caused by a blind and aimless will. In his philosophy, Schopenhauer introduces the concept of will as the core of human experience and the main source of suffering. In Schopenhauer's view, the will to live is not only a vital force that drives living beings towards their survival, but also the main factor in creating endless suffering in humans. According to Schopenhauer, this will is inherently unconscious and blind and always seeks objects and goals that can never be fully achieved; hence, humans are always in an unpleasant and painful situation. In this context, religion is presented as a means to reduce and alleviate this suffering. Schopenhauer sees religion not as a metaphysical truth, but as a social and psychological function that humans take refuge in in order to escape the suffering of life.
He introduces ascetic teachings and the negation of the will as a way to escape from the suffering of the world. The best way to escape from suffering is to deny material desires and negate the will, which is manifested in religious asceticism and austerity. He considers suffering to be the result of the endless desires of the will and sees the path to liberation in asceticism, art, and compassion.
Schopenhauer, influenced by Buddhism and ascetic Christianity, introduces asceticism as a way to free oneself from the bondage of the will and ultimately achieve peace. In Schopenhauer's view, various religions, especially those that emphasize ascetic teachings and the disregard of worldly desires, can act as a means of liberation from the will and the suffering that comes with it. In religious teachings such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity, concepts such as "self-denial", "annihilation in God", or "liberation from the material world" are proposed as ways to escape the endless cycle of will and suffering. In these teachings, the denial of individual desires and the effort to reach a higher, metaphysical truth allow the individual to be free from the suffering of the will and achieve a kind of "peace". For example, in Christianity, the concept of salvation through self-sacrifice and following spiritual teachings can free people from inner conflicts and suffering caused by the will. Similarly, in Buddhism, teachings such as meditation and the attainment of nirvana (liberation from the cycle of birth and death) aim to destroy worldly desires and free them from will.
Schopenhauer has a dual view of religion: from a practical point of view, he sees religion as a useful tool for reducing suffering, promoting asceticism, and creating social order. From a metaphysical point of view, he sees religion as a kind of illusion and symbolic representation of truth that is convenient for non-philosophers, but lacks scientific and rational value. Thus, he affirms religion as a social and moral reality, but does not accept it as a metaphysical truth. Schopenhauer believes that art, religion, and philosophy can all help reduce suffering, but each has its own role and place. Art and religion are more consoling for the masses, while philosophy offers a deeper understanding of suffering and the ultimate ways to escape it. However, he sees the role of these three areas as complementary to each other. The conflict between Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism and the function of religion is that religion attempts to justify and console suffering, while Schopenhauer's philosophy seeks to accept the bitter truth of suffering and find a way to truly escape from it. Although he understands the moral and social value of religion, he sees it as an illusion that hides the truth. Consequently, although religion is a comfort to many people, Schopenhauer believes that only true asceticism and the denial of the will are the ultimate path to freedom from suffering, and he believes that all of them can ultimately lead man to peace and liberation. Comparing Schopenhauer's view of religion with other philosophers shows that he is situated in the midst of a spectrum of different opinions. Unlike Kant, who links religion with ethics, Schopenhauer sees ethics as independent of religion. Unlike Nietzsche, who sees religion as the enemy of life, Schopenhauer accepts it as a means to reduce suffering. Unlike Spinoza, who aligns religion with pantheistic philosophy, Schopenhauer analyzes religion in terms of blind will. Unlike Kierkegaard, who sees faith as a way to escape suffering, Schopenhauer sees the negation of will as the main way to liberation.
This comparison shows that Schopenhauer has a middle position: he neither rejects religion completely (like Nietzsche), nor accepts it as a fundamental truth (like Kierkegaard or Spinoza). Rather, he analyzes it as a means to reduce suffering, but at the same time an illusion.
So far, the book: Schopenhauer's Philosophy by Abolghasem Zakirzadeh and numerous articles (such as "Asceticism as a Path to Salvation in Schopenhauer's Philosophy" by Fatemeh Bakhtiari and "Metaphysics of the Common People" by Amir Abbas Solikhani and Hedayat Alavi Tabar) related to Schopenhauer's thought have been written. Since no independent research has been conducted on Schopenhauer's view of religion in Persian, the present article aims to address Schopenhauer's view of religion as a means to get rid of suffering by studying his works such as "The World as Will and Imagination". This article seeks to examine Schopenhauer's view of religion and analyze how religion is used as a means of escape from suffering. This article, within the framework of the descriptive-analytical method and focusing on Schopenhauer's main works, especially "The World as Will and Imagination", examines Schopenhauer's view of religion as a means of getting rid of suffering and shows how religion, in his view, can be consoling, but at the same time, it is limited and illusory. Therefore, Schopenhauer has a middle position: he neither completely rejects religion nor accepts it as a fundamental truth, but rather analyzes it as a means to reduce suffering. Schopenhauer does not see religion as a saving truth, but as a temporary means to deal with the suffering and pains of human life. Finally, Schopenhauer examines religion as a means to relieve and reduce human suffering. But his view of religion as a social and psychological phenomenon differs from the traditional views of religion as a metaphysical and spiritual truth. For Schopenhauer, religion is not only a way to achieve salvation and connection with divine truth, but also a means of escaping the suffering and pain of human life. Schopenhauer's understanding of religion as a means of escape from suffering is of particular importance, because he sees religion not as an absolute truth or a moral tool, but as a way to provide temporary solace to humans who suffer from the endless suffering of life. In this regard, Schopenhauer sees religion as a tool that humans resort to in the face of the suffering of existence and especially in the face of individual and social inadequacies. This view of religion is especially important in the modern world, which is facing spiritual and moral crises.
Research Paper
philosophy
Mahmoud Dorosti; Mohaddaseh Rezaei
Abstract
Introduction
Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), an existentialist philosopher, was influenced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The focus of his thought was modern man. Their questions about the human self, including "What is the meaning of being human?" led Jaspers to think about the life of "modern man" and ...
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Introduction
Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), an existentialist philosopher, was influenced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The focus of his thought was modern man. Their questions about the human self, including "What is the meaning of being human?" led Jaspers to think about the life of "modern man" and prompted him to question the function of philosophy. He was worried and anxious about the dangerous and serious situation of human harmony, which was caused by the emergence and spread of meaninglessness. His main concern was that humans, in the face of modern and complex civilization, would not be reduced and diminished by turning away from humanity and its values. Since the lack and decline of humanity leads to the devaluation of oneself and fundamental values, Jaspers' thought was focused on how man can maintain his uniqueness and authenticity. This article explores the concept of existential communication in Jaspers' thought, focusing on its role in preserving individuality while facilitating meaningful human connections. It delves into the duality between "communication in being" and "existential communication", emphasizing the transformative nature of the latter. Additionally, it examines the pivotal role of solitude in the process of self-awareness and the significance of "loving struggle" in authentic dialogue. The discussion further extends to Jaspers' ethical reflections, which underscore the concreteness of individual existence as opposed to abstract moral principles. By integrating values such as freedom, love, and choice in human life, Jaspers offers a compelling perspective on how existential communication nurtures both self and solidarity. Therefore, this research seeks to illuminate the relevance of Jaspers' ideas in contemporary philosophical and ethical discourses, particularly in the context of human relationships and personal growth.
Methodology
This research examines the concept of existential communication in the thought of Karl Jaspers, its importance in human life, and its role in self-awareness and existential transcendence, using the method of conceptual analysis of the type of interpretation and conceptual development.
Discussion
According to Jaspers, communication is a way of realizing oneself in the light of another existence. This existential communication helps Jaspers protect selfhood against abstraction. In his view, no universal validity can be claimed for selfhood. Truth in existential communication is "the truth of existence, not for universal validity". In his work, Philosophy Volume II, Jaspers provides the context for this clarification of the concept of communication. His existential communication rejects the various approaches that have been previously put forward. Jaspers' explanation of existential communication is as follows:
In the face of the desire for self-sufficiency, in the face of contentment with mere awareness of consciousness in general, in the face of individual will, in the face of a yearning for a comprehensive life, in the face of surrender to the patterns of habitual life of the existing tradition – in the face of all these, we want our philosophizing, free, authentic understanding and communication of being to clarify, an understanding that enables us to confront the constant threat of selfishness or universality [as] validity.
In the past, the human self was considered a "self-sufficient" and "comprehensive" reality, and its awareness was considered a public awareness. Jaspers intended to protect human selfhood, and for this reason, his explanation of the possible existence in communication rejects any universalization of human individuality and consciousness.
According to Jaspers, communication is ultimately a matter of authentic selfhood. He distinguishes between "communication in existence" and "existential communication". Communication in "communication in existence" can be examined and proven. In this type of communication, the question of the existence of the individual is not raised. Man remains unaware of his consciousness; he lives more of a collective life than being a particular human being. His selfhood becomes one with the selfhood of others.
In this objective form of communication, the spirit is regarded as a "self" or "I", and consciousness is seen as a universal and common consciousness. The individual is a rational being, and his communication is centered on the state, family, and society. The subject of his conversation with everyone is the same. Jaspers calls this type of communication "pseudo-communication". Although this communication is not inherently existential, it can open a path towards existential communication. The explanation of "existential communication" begins only after awareness of the shortcomings and inadequacies of "objective communication". For this reason, Jaspers defines "existential communication" as a way in which the true and authentic "self" of an individual is revealed and becomes apparent.
Existential communication takes place between two selves. In this communication, which is entirely historical and cannot be externally discerned, the certainty of selfhood is inherent. This is the only way in which one self, for another self, in the process of mutual creation, becomes possible. Only in the context of freedom as a possibility can one understand what is meant by this proposition: I cannot be my own free self unless the other is also free and has the will to be himself - and I am with him. The necessity of existential communication arises merely from freedom.
Conclusion
Karl Jaspers' philosophy of existential communication provides a valuable framework for understanding the complex interplay between individuality and relatedness. By distinguishing between pseudo-communication and existential communication, Jaspers highlights the transformative potential of authentic dialogue in fostering self-awareness and mutual understanding. His emphasis on solitude as a prerequisite for meaningful interaction challenges modern tendencies towards superficial connection, while the concept of "loving struggle" underscores the relational nature of selfhood.
Jaspers' ethical reflections further emphasize the importance of grounding moral actions in the concreteness of individual existence, rather than abstract universality. By embracing values such as freedom, love, and choice, existential communication emerges as a vital pathway towards authentic living. In an era where the complexities of human identity and connection remain a significant and urgent matter, Jaspers' insights continue to resonate, offering timeless guidance for personal and interpersonal growth.
Research Paper
philosophy
Hamedeh Rastaei; Nayere Kazemi
Abstract
Introduction
The issue of choice has long been of interest to philosophers and theologians. They have explained choice using the principles and factors of choice. Ibn Sina believes that in order to perform a choice, a person first imagines it and, by acknowledging its benefit and the emergence of ...
Read More
Introduction
The issue of choice has long been of interest to philosophers and theologians. They have explained choice using the principles and factors of choice. Ibn Sina believes that in order to perform a choice, a person first imagines it and, by acknowledging its benefit and the emergence of desire, the will to perform that choice is created in him. Of course, human choice is a consequence of the essence of God and it is not the case that a person freely chooses to do an action; thus, the reason for the coercion of human choice according to Ibn Sina is causality. Ibn Sina claims that what causes the realization and performance of a choice, even if it is a voluntary act, is not itself voluntary and has not been realized voluntarily. An examination of Ibn Sina’s views on choice shows that he cannot justify human choice well and considers only God to have real choice. Mulla Sadra also believes that man is free and has a will; however, he believes that the will itself appears to man in a causal manner. That is, for a person to be free means to be a disciple; but the will itself is coercive and necessary. Thus, coercive factors also intervene in the foundations of voluntary action for Mulla Sadra. Therefore, Mulla Sadra emphasizes the coerciveness of the will and considers it to be the necessary result and effect of external causes and ultimately God.
It seems that Mulla Sadra’s view of voluntary action and the necessity of the will faces serious problems. Because man always acts under the influence of coercion and cannot escape the constraint of a necessary will. It seems that a link is missing in the chain of factors of voluntary action that Mulla Sadra did not address. Allama Jafari, in a broad view, examines voluntary action and the factors affecting its occurrence and mentions a factor called the self or human essence that has the ability to measure or resist the will and ultimately has control over the performance of the action. This factor can be strengthened with knowledge and awareness, and the greater its power of control and agency, the more desirable it can be to prove the will.
Allama Jafari, with a deeper and different approach, considers the voluntary act as an act in which the "I" can exercise control and mastery over himself (Jafari, B-A, p. 90). He considers the concept of "I" or "personality" to be very important in the manifestation of will and emphasizes the freedom of actions. This means that everyone plays a role in the emergence of will according to their personality and essence. Allama Jafari considers the division of will into free and forced to be incorrect and is among the thinkers who believe that a purely philosophical method is not enough in addressing this issue and that the results of scientific and laboratory research should also be used in this field. In stating the proof of free will, he points out that man has the ability to free himself from the influence of lower factors during the stages of development and, while being influenced by higher factors, to act in their shadow.
In order to express the role of the "I" in preferring one of the two parties to act or prevent action for an action, Allama Jafari states that although there is a preferring factor in every action, this preferring factor is not so binding that the "I" element cannot act against it. In any case, assuming that there is an agent for an action, there is still dominance and supervision on the part of the "I" to perform the action according to the preferring factor or to act contrary to that factor and perform the opposite action. This becomes clearer considering the fact that things are not done with 100% certainty and no factor in making a person do something creates 100% motivation in a person. So there is always a place for the "I" to enter and act.
Therefore, there is a factor within the individual that influences the will and is itself influenced by factors. This factor is weak in childhood, and therefore, it can be said that human voluntary actions are more influenced by instincts and natural motives, and gradually, with the growth and greater agency of the ego and the human personality, the power to influence actions increases. Thus, if we attribute voluntary action to this factor of the human ego, we can say that with the growth of the human personality, his will and freedom increase both in terms of the scope of performance and in terms of the degree of influence and effect.
Literature Review
Mohammad Shafi'i and Najjarpourian (1401) in an article titled "Reasonable Life and Dimensions of Rational Education from the Perspective of Allama Mohammad Taqi Ja'fari (may Allah have mercy on him)" have examined the discussion of reasonable life and its relationship with rational education, but have not mentioned its relationship with predestination and free will.
Methodology
The present study uses an analytical-comparative method to examine the theoretical foundations of Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Jafari on will. Accordingly, the views of Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Jafari on will were briefly stated, and while briefly comparing their.
Research Paper
philosophy
Behrouz Asadi; mohammad karami
Abstract
Introduction
Forgiveness requires overcoming something within ourselves, overcoming an aspect of our natural reaction to the injustice that has been done to us. The usual and understandable reaction of victims to oppressors includes anger, hatred, disgust, contempt, malice and a range of negative ...
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Introduction
Forgiveness requires overcoming something within ourselves, overcoming an aspect of our natural reaction to the injustice that has been done to us. The usual and understandable reaction of victims to oppressors includes anger, hatred, disgust, contempt, malice and a range of negative emotions. Anger and resentment are difficult but important emotions to control, and forgiveness is the most obvious virtue that helps us control them. Victims who refuse to forgive their torturers and oppressors often face a double reaction from us. On the one hand, we give them the right to not forgive their torturers for their cruelty and aggression, but on the other hand, deep down, by looking critically at their actions, we would like them to overcome their bitter and tragic feelings and forgive the wrongdoers. The Gospel of Luke quotes Jesus as saying, "If your brother sins, blame him, and if he sins against you seven times a day and comes to you seven times and says, I repent, forgive him." (Luke,17:3-4) According to this verse and numerous other verses, the Gospels emphasize the unconditional forgiveness of sinners. (Graham, 2013:3-4) On the other hand, moderate advocates of forgiveness believe that the guilt and repentance of the wrong person should be a prerequisite for his forgiveness. In other words, as long as the offender does not feel guilty, he does not regret what he did, forgiving him is unwise and even dangerous. But in contrast to these two categories, some, like Friedrich Nietzsche, believe that forgiveness can seem like a result of weakness, lack of honor, and cowardice, because forgiveness tells us to respond to evil with good and to show goodness to those who have wronged us.
The main question of this study is how should we react to the mistakes of others? Is forgetting necessary for forgiveness, and in what cases, is it felt necessary? Is forgiveness a healing and an alternative to permanent hatred and disgust? And are there situations where refusal to forgive is not only permissible but necessary?
Literature Review
In an overview of the background of this issue in researches in Persian, in the article "The Virtue of Forgiveness from the Point of View of Supporters and Opponents", we see an examination of this concept from the point of view of morality, the sacred texts of the Abrahamic religions and the views of Islamic and Jewish-Christian commentators and thinkers. The research examines the concept of forgiveness first, then the conditions of forgiveness, and some of the reasons for forgiveness advocates, such as feeling strong and at peace of mind, as well as the reasons for opponents, such as destroying the victim's self-esteem through forgiveness. (Cavandi, 2021)
Methodology
This research is based on the study and philosophical analysis of books and articles published in Persian and English.
Discussion
One of the most famous reasons for proving the virtue of forgiveness, in addition to being a high-minded sign of generosity and kindness, is its healing and usefulness for both the giver and the recipient of forgiveness parties. The existence of some gospel verses that emphasize unconditional forgiveness is not ineffective in the design of Nietzsche's view that opposes forgiveness. Whereas, according to some other scriptures, as well as some advocates of forgiveness, revenge and forgiveness are alternatives to the choice of the victim, each of which is justified according to the circumstances. Nietzsche sees forgiveness as an expression of anguish and nursing anger for past injuries, and a cover for resentment and a desire for revenge. In his opinion, forgiveness means overcoming anger and suffering; it always requires ignoring the demand for the right from someone who has been hurt or insulted in some way. Such ignorance makes forgiveness unfair. So Nietzsche opposes any forgiveness in defense of Justice. He sees punishment and revenge as repaying debt. So in the eyes of the debtor and the creditor, punishment is a source of discharge from negative emotions and a source of Justice. Nietzsche recommends forgetting instead of forgiving. In his opinion, active forgetfulness causes someone who suffers not to forget, but to remember without resentment, because staying in the bitter experiences of the past will destroy the power, hope, passion, joy and pride, and someone who does not have the power of this deliberate forgetfulness cannot do anything.
Results
Nietzsche's mistake is that he insists on forgetfulness and revenge at the same time, and this portrays a kind of conceptual and behavioral contradiction, because a person seeking revenge has undoubtedly failed to try to forget, or he would have ignored revenge. It seems that Nietzsche is well aware that in any case - forgiveness or revenge - not forgetting and remembering oppression causes a negative feeling of resentment in the victim. Nietzsche's solution to revenge on the one hand, exacerbates violence and hatred in society and on the other hand, makes it difficult to correct the behavior of criminals because revenge has made criminals feel no regret for their actions and continue and justify their delinquency. Nietzsche also generalized the motivation of some people to forgive, which may be out of cowardice and fear of the consequences of revenge against the oppressors, to all humans and ignored any other motivation to forgive. Although in some people, forgiveness may be out of cowardice and a cover for hatred and a desire for revenge, its generalization to all humans shows the fallacy of "misplaced generalization" in Nietzsche's argument. Therefore, alternatives to revenge such as handing criminals over to the law, excusing and forgiving criminals - taking into account conditions such as regret and the attempt of perpetrator to compensate and correct behavior - violate Nietzsche's view.
Research Paper
philosophy
Farzad Kiani
Abstract
Introduction
For Strauss, modern philosophy is linked to the foundations of relativist and historicist thinking. This has led to the definition of natural right as a fundamental concept in modern thought, tending toward a material or relative view. However, natural right, in its classical form, is ...
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Introduction
For Strauss, modern philosophy is linked to the foundations of relativist and historicist thinking. This has led to the definition of natural right as a fundamental concept in modern thought, tending toward a material or relative view. However, natural right, in its classical form, is connected to a teleological view of the universe. All natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of operation is good for them. In the case of man, reason is required to discern these operations: reason determines man’s natural end. The teleological view of the universe, of which the teleological view of man forms a part, would seem to have been undermined by modern natural science. (Altini, 2022: 168)
The modern attitude toward the issue of natural right has caused stable values in life to be replaced by relative values. According to Strauss, this ultimately leads the modern world to nihilism. The ancient philosophers—Socrates and Plato in particular—observed that different societies had different customs, personified and sanctified by different gods. But they asked themselves: Which, if any, are the right customs? What is good by nature rather than by custom? What is good independent of human desire, choice, opinion, or tradition? (Young, 2021: 199–200)
Strauss considers revelation an essential element in the path of human consciousness, whose teachings cannot be proven by reason. If revelation is regarded as a source of truth in the pursuit of knowledge, then, alongside reason, it can also be responsible for guiding and cultivating man. Strauss appeals to the views of Maimonides to support his perspective on the relationship between reason and revelation in shaping human consciousness. According to Maimonides, the highest goal of revelation is to guide man toward philosophizing, to educate him for life. (Wussow, 2020: 124) Strauss uses this thesis regarding the highest goal of revelation as a foundational principle and a source of truth in medieval society. In this context, if man’s ultimate purpose is based on reason, there is no contradiction between revelation and reason in terms of the final goal, even though they remain distinct entities.
In Strauss’s philosophy, the movement toward light can be achieved through the teaching of philosophy, a statement he makes under the direct influence of Plato’s views. Philosophy is a path that can guide man from the cave of shadows to light and truth, bringing him out of the cave of ignorance and acquainting him with his true foundation. Ultimately, this is a way to escape nihilism in the modern world. What we call education today often does not refer to the formation of character but rather to instruction, training, and conditioning—reducing education to the leveling of consciences. (Altini, 2022: 194) Therefore, it is necessary to reform the educational process to cultivate people’s awareness based on their natural truth.
The subject of this article is not only an examination of Strauss’s view on the concept of natural right but also an analysis of the relationship between this concept and human development and advancement. This relationship takes contrasting forms in different historical periods. In fact, the awareness and education of individuals toward both personal and social advancement—as a natural right, according to Strauss—have a specific connection to the prevailing concept of right in different historical contexts.
In one period, this natural right might conflict with the law prevailing in the city, which guarantees human survival. In another period, the right to education and the pursuit of excellence in life find meaning under the religious interpretation of the concept of revelation. It can be said that Strauss, in a way, is searching for a solution to modern man’s alienation by examining these historical relationships between the concept of right and the matter of human development. Coincidentally, this denial and alienation stem from the material definition of the concept of right and an excessive emphasis on individual rights—an issue that has endangered modern education.
Research Paper
philosophy
Ghasem Pourhasan; Arvin Moradi
Abstract
Introduction
Peirce offers conflicting perspectives on the relationship between science, ethics, and religion. On one hand, he considers ethics and religion to be vital realms that can only be grasped through inner feeling and instinct; on the other hand, he occasionally adopts views that run counter ...
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Introduction
Peirce offers conflicting perspectives on the relationship between science, ethics, and religion. On one hand, he considers ethics and religion to be vital realms that can only be grasped through inner feeling and instinct; on the other hand, he occasionally adopts views that run counter to this approach. Ultimately, Peirce argues that logic is founded upon ethics, and ethics, in turn, is based on aesthetics. This paper examines the internal inconsistencies within Peirce’s philosophy, demonstrating that his attempt to separate science from ethics and religion is at odds with the overall coherence of his thought. In our analysis, we first explore the role of instinct in reasoning, alongside the concept of self-control as the guiding principle of inquiry. We show that, for Peirce, instinct forms the foundation of all reasoning and thought. However, instinct alone is insufficient—it must be regulated by certain principles. The principle governing inquiry is essentially ethical, and since, in Peirce’s view, ethics is grounded in aesthetics, the traditional boundaries between these three domains ultimately vanish. Moreover, two additional key concepts in Peirce’s philosophy—agapism and synechism—demonstrate how the world is harmonized by the force of love. Peirce envisions the universe as an interconnected whole in which distinctions between mind and matter, reason and emotion, and soul and body become untenable. Finally, we contend that although Peirce’s methodology reasonably incorporates ethics and aesthetics into scientific inquiry, his acceptance of ideas such as evolutionary love introduces a metaphysical element into his philosophy that ultimately undermines its rational foundation.
