Introduction

The issue of choice has long been of interest to philosophers and theologians. They have explained choice using the principles and factors of choice. Ibn Sina believes that in order to perform a choice, a person first imagines it and, by acknowledging its benefit and the emergence of desire, the will to perform that choice is created in him. Of course, human choice is a consequence of the essence of God and it is not the case that a person freely chooses to do an action; thus, the reason for the coercion of human choice according to Ibn Sina is causality. Ibn Sina claims that what causes the realization and performance of a choice, even if it is a voluntary act, is not itself voluntary and has not been realized voluntarily and voluntarily. An examination of Ibn Sina’s views on choice shows that he cannot justify human choice well and considers only God to have real choice. Mulla Sadra also believes that man is free and has a will; however, he believes that the will itself appears to man in a causal manner. That is, for a person to be free means to be a disciple; but the will itself is coercive and necessary. Thus, coercive factors also intervene in the foundations of voluntary action for Mulla Sadra. Therefore, Mulla Sadra emphasizes the coerciveness of the will and considers it to be the necessary result and effect of external causes and ultimately God.
It seems that Mulla Sadra’s view of voluntary action and the necessity of the will faces serious problems. Because man always acts under the influence of coercion and cannot escape the constraint of a necessary will. It seems that a link is missing in the chain of factors of voluntary action that Mulla Sadra did not address. Allama Jafari, in a broad view, examines voluntary action and the factors affecting its occurrence and mentions a factor called the self or human essence that has the ability to measure or resist the will and ultimately has control over the performance of the action. This factor can be strengthened with knowledge and awareness, and the greater its power of control and agency, the more desirable it can be to prove the will.
Allama Jafari, with a deeper and different approach, considers the voluntary act as an act in which the "I" can exercise control and mastery over himself (Jafari, B-A, p. 90). He considers the concept of "I" or "personality" to be very important in the manifestation of will and emphasizes the freedom of actions. This means that everyone plays a role in the emergence of will according to their personality and essence. Allama Jafari considers the division of will into free and forced to be incorrect and is among the thinkers who believe that a purely philosophical method is not enough in addressing this issue and that the results of scientific and laboratory research should also be used in this field. In stating the proof of free will, he points out that man has the ability to free himself from the influence of lower factors during the stages of development and, while being influenced by higher factors, to act in their shadow.
In order to express the role of the "I" in preferring one of the two parties to act or prevent action for an action, Allama Jafari states that although there is a preferring factor in every action, this preferring factor is not so binding that the "I" element cannot act against it. In any case, assuming that there is an agent for an action, there is still dominance and supervision on the part of the "I" to perform the action according to the preferring factor or to act contrary to that factor and perform the opposite action. This becomes clearer considering the fact that things are not done with 100% certainty and no factor in making a person do something creates 100% motivation in a person. So there is always a place for the "I" to enter and act.
Therefore, there is a factor within the individual that influences the will and is itself influenced by factors. This factor is weak in childhood, and therefore it can be said that human voluntary actions are more influenced by instincts and natural motives, and gradually, with the growth and greater agency of the ego and the human personality, the power to influence actions increases. Thus, if we attribute voluntary action to this factor of the human ego, we can say that with the growth of the human personality, his will and freedom increase both in terms of the scope of performance and in terms of the degree of influence and effect.

Literature Review

Mohammad Shafi'i and Najjarpourian (1401) in an article titled "Reasonable Life and Dimensions of Rational Education from the Perspective of Allama Mohammad Taqi Ja'fari (may Allah have mercy on him)" have examined the discussion of reasonable life and its relationship with rational education, but have not mentioned its relationship with predestination and free will.

Methodology

The present study uses an analytical-comparative method to examine the theoretical foundations of Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Jafari on will. Accordingly, the views of Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Jafari on will were briefly stated, and while briefly comparing their theoretical foundations, the difference between Allama Jafari's view and his different view was stated.

Conclusion

Considering the above, it can be said that Allama Jafari, in a broad view of will, has considered many factors to be involved in the occurrence of a voluntary act. Among them, paying attention to an agent called me or the human personality is a new view that can answer many of the problems related to determinism and free will. Also, paying attention to knowledge, awareness, and free conscience in exercising dominance and supervision of the agent me in voluntary acts is also a new matter that can justify the fact that although a person does not have much free will at the beginning of birth, he can strengthen his role in his destiny and life with increasing age and awareness.