Wisdom And Philosophy

Abstract The paper is to compare between Ibn Khaldun's style of philosophizing and the modern viewpoint of Philosophy of Culture. Speculating on Asabiyyah (group feeling), civilization, and influences of climate on the human being, Ibn Khaldun sets the stage for his contribution to some of the most important categories of the philosophy of culture. He describes how gradually human beings, humans that first home around nature, reach the state of prosperity by way of Asabiyyah and he believes that this way is bound for wars and for the negation of the other. Ibn Khaldun, then, in the course of the discussion, somehow like oppressed utopian, recognizes other cultures and goes beyond the horizon of his own culture and views human being from the higher standpoint of O’mran, a standpoint that is devoid of any specific values, that is Jenseits von Gut und Böse. He rethinks religion so as to pave the way for poly – cultural standpoint.

Abstract The "Sacred Soul" is a term used by philosophers to often name a person who is severely alike. Mulla Sadra and Qazi Saeed both believe in the connection between this soul and the soul of the Prophet, which necessitates the recognition of its characteristics. In this paper, by direct reference to their works, in the first step, the features of the sacred soul are explained and then, by examining the relation of the holy soul and Prophetic soul, the question of the possibility of access of other human beings to the standard of the soul is evaluated. It must be said that the difference between the ontological and anthropological grounds of Mulla Sadra and Qazi Saeed has led to a difference of opinion between the two thinkers. According to the omnipotence of the existence and the formation of existence, the essential movement and the union of the intelligent and the intelligible ranks the arrogance for a sacred soul from the man that can Conjecture to the soul of the Prophet, but Qazi Saeed who did not accept these bases, reveals the instances of a sacred soul in the universal soul and the soul. Despite this difference in appearance, the relationship of the soul with the soul of the Prophet and other human populations in the thoughts of these two great philosophers is very close, to the extent that their difference of opinion cannot be regarded as a literal contribution of a sacred soul in their philosophical system.

Abstract This paper aims to examine the possibility and sensibility of Religious Science based on the metaphysical consistency of Science and Religion. The main question of this paper is whether the Religious Science is possible and sensible in principle. In order to reply to this question, I confine myself to natural or empirical science, and discriminate between science and technology on the one hand, and between humanities and social sciences from empirical sciences on the other hand. In the first step, I examine Golshani’s view as a brilliant defender of the metaphysical approach of Religious Science and then consider the critical view of Paya, as its opponent. Based on some evidence from the history and philosophy of science, it is concluded that principally religious science in the sense of metaphysical consistency of both areas is possible and sensible. Also, the possibility and sensibility of Religious Science depend on the selected approach to the nature of science or our own philosophy of science. From the metaphysical point of view, the meaning of nature and world and from the epistemological point of view, the meaning of science and its goals could be different in a Religious Science and in Islam can be driven from ‘Tawheed’ principle especially. So, the possibility of religious science is relying on the change in our philosophy of science. In addition, it seemed that the term ‘Theistic Science’ is can lead to less misunderstanding than Religious Science.

Abstract In this paper, the formation and development of Signification theory and its effect on Muslim thinkers are studied. In the ancient period, there were three important schools that investigated signals and issues surrounding them. First, Aristotle investigated signs at the outset of his “On Interpretation”, as well as, at the end of his “Prior Analytics”. Second, physicians with classifying signs into two main groups made various comments about the argumentative role of them in inferences. Third, Stoics studied signs as a primary part of their logic and investigated arguments on the basis of them. In the Islamic period, Avicenna is the first logicians studying verbal signification meticulously and classifying it into three parts. Avicenna’s doctrines about verbal signification which are repeated in other logicians’ books are in accordance with Aristotle’s discourse at the beginning of “On Interpretation”. Natural verbal signification is added into logical books explicitly by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and after him, Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī and other logicians implied to it. Rational verbal signification is added to verbal signification in the works of Siraj al-Dīn Urmawī, Allameh Ḥelli, and Quṭb al-Dīn Shirāzī. Furthermore, Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī with examining non-verbal signification extended the domain of signification theory, as well as he introduced a new definition of signification. This new definition of signification and attention to non-verbal signification possibly are rooted in Aristotle’s comment in the second book of Prior Analytics as well as Stoics and physicians' doctrines which were transmitted through theologians and Aristotle commentator into later logicians.

Abstract The utopias play a major role in shaping the mental images of the players and building the future of mankind. thinking about a good future, indeed, has a history as old as human history. However, after Thomas More, the modern era of utopian literature began with its own characteristics. One of the most important transitions in utopian literature since More has been the transition in the meaning of "Place" and, moreover, "Time", which, according to this article, has happened under the influence of the concept of the machine. In fact, it seems that the machine has largely disarranged Utopia's inner body and changed the foundations of its fundamental concepts.
This article seeks to answer the question of what is the role of the machine in changing the concept of place in post-Morian utopias? In order to answer this question and based on Hobbes's understanding of the machine, historical periods of the post-Morion utopias were studied, and then the role of the machine in each period has been discussed. This historical trajectory shows that “No-where” (U-Topia), in the historical movement of Post-Morion utopias, first becomes to “No-when” (non-time) and then to “without-where (Placeless) and without-when (Timeless)” or, in another word, Cyber Utopias. As a result, Utopia, which at first was a "distant-city" or "future-society" becomes a machine that itself does not have time and space but becomes, in itself, the time and place of the ideal or anti-Ideal society.

Abstract According to semantic externalism, the meaning of some words and thus the content of some of our mental states is determined at least partly by features of the external world. For the first time, Putnam has tried to argue that accepting externalism leads to the rejection of skepticism about the external world. However, it is widely argued that this argument does not work; therefore, some philosophers have tried to provide an alternative argument that, by accepting the semantic externalism approach, will succeed in rejecting skepticism about the external world. Nevertheless, these arguments are subject to further criticisms. In this paper, I attempt to develop some arguments to show that none of these externalist arguments succeed in rejecting skepticism. On the other hand, using the basic idea of skepticism in rejecting the possibility of acquiring knowledge, I suggest a new externalist argument on which basis it can be correctly claimed that skepticism is an untenable position.

Abstract In the Notebooks and final pages of the Tractatus Wittgenstein identifies “good” with “happy”, and the latter with “being in harmony with the world”. He makes a distinction between two notions of self: Empirical and Transcendental. While the former stands in causal connection with the World, the latter is causally independent of the world. The subject matter of ethics, Wittgenstein claims, is not actions of the self, but its attitudes (of approval or disapproval) towards the world. Moreover, he argues that it is merely the attitude of the transcendental self and its state of “Willing” that can be judged from an ethical point of view. In this paper, I will argue that this account of ethics faces a formidable difficulty: to be a legitimate subject matter of ethics, the self ought to be transcendental and at the same time have some attitude (acceptance or disapproval) towards the world. I argue that the transcendental subject cannot meet both requirements. Finally, I use Backström (2018) and McGuinness (2002), as examples, to explain how this difficulty has led to misreadings of Wittgenstein’s account of ethics in the Tractatus.

Abstract In this essay, we are trying to inquire and critique Allen Wood's ideas about the problem of formalism in Kantian Ethics. Wood is one of Kant's interpreters who has been dealing with the formalism problem for so many years. Once he believed that the problem is a real challenge for Kant's ethical thought and then he tried to suggest a solution for it. At first, we try to explain the theoretical foundation of the problem and in light of that show the importance of the problem for judging Kant's ethics and illustrate why and how the formalism problem was brought about. In the second part, we explain Wood's approach to the problem and critique the final position of him as an advocator. Then deal with critiques that Wood's solution can not handle; the critiques that Robert Pippin suggests and their foundations are in Hegelian heritage. In conclusion, we show that why ascribing a theory of value can not overcome the formalism challenge. In the same part, we introduce an approach that can help solve the problem; an approach that claims that we may be able to fill the emptiness of moral law and rational moral agent in Kant's ethics by focusing on Kant's philosophy of history and philosophy of religion provides. Contents that can shed light to solve the problem by connecting moral agents to the world and his concrete entity.

Abstract  
Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i “Theory of Etebariat” is a theory for explaining the mechanism of a set of human perceptions which have not counterparts in the external world and are the fictions of the active powers of man. Some of these perceptions consist of our perceptions of Goodness (Husn) and Badness (Qubh). By knowing Goodness and Badness as Etebari (conventional), it can be assumed that Tabataba'i Theory of Etebariat is a contractualist theory. In this paper, we have tried to compare Tabataba'i theory with one of the contemporary contractualist theory, i.e., John Rawls’ “Justice as fairness” theory, to consider their points of similarities, and to get, by this comparison, a better understanding of Tabataba'is Theory of Etebariat and it's being a contractualist or non-contractualist theory. So, in this paper, we will discover, extract, and state, by an analytic method, the presuppositions, arguments, and implications of these two theories. We claim that, in these three aspects, there are similarities in Tabataba'i’s and Rawls’ theories, which justifiably support our assumption.