Research Paper
mehdi dehbashi
Research Paper
mohamadreza hoseini behashti
Research Paper
minu hojat
Research Paper
mohammad ardeshir
Abstract
There are at least three elemental parts in Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics that mqy have their origin in Kant. These three parts are (1) the intuition ef time, (2) the synthetic a priority of mathematical kn01vledge, and (3) the inter-suf?jectiviry ef mathematical constructions. Brouwer borrowed ...
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There are at least three elemental parts in Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics that mqy have their origin in Kant. These three parts are (1) the intuition ef time, (2) the synthetic a priority of mathematical kn01vledge, and (3) the inter-suf?jectiviry ef mathematical constructions. Brouwer borrowed the notion ef the movement eftime as an a priori intuition ef time, explicit!J expressed, from Kant. In Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics, the intuition ef time is the on/y a priori notion, on wbicb the whole ef mathematics is built. Houeuer, their notions o] the "intuition eftime" are not the same in the genealogy ef mind As far as the second item is concerned, Brouwer believes that all ef mathematical kn01vledge is a priori and synthetic. His arguments are differentfrom Kant's arguments. The concept of ''inter-suf?jectiviry" ef mathematics in Brotouer's philosophy is very involved, and there is no reference to Kant in this respect. One mqy interpret it f?y the Kantian transcendental subject or even the Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. Both interpretations seem to be consistent. My suggestion is to read Brauner ry himse!f.
Research Paper
louis pajman
Abstract
I can predict from the aspects and signs of our times that the human race 1vill... progressivefy improve without af!)l more total reversals.... The profit which will accrue to the human race as it works its wqy fonvard will not be an ever increasing quantity ofmorality in its attitudes. Instead the legality ...
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I can predict from the aspects and signs of our times that the human race 1vill... progressivefy improve without af!)l more total reversals.... The profit which will accrue to the human race as it works its wqy fonvard will not be an ever increasing quantity ofmorality in its attitudes. Instead the legality of its attitudes willproduce an increasing number of actions governed 0 duty, tuha tever the particular motives behind these mqy be.... Violence will gradualfy become less on the part of those in pouer and obedience tou/ards the la1vs 1vill increase... and this 1vi!I ultimatefy extend to the external relations between the various peoples, until a cosmopolitan society is created. Such developments do not mean , however, that the basic moral capacity ofmankind will increase in the slightest, for this would require a kind ofnew creation or supernatural influence. For we must not expect too much of human beings in their progressive improvements. " (Reiss, 19 70, 18 7)
Research Paper
michel Mc gee
Abstract
Aestheticians and moralphilosophers alike are inclined to the view that there is no particular!J beneficial effect on moral life ofa developed aesthetic sensibility. The usual supporting witness is the pitiless Nazi SS officer with a refined tastefor Mozart and torture. But though his testimony can hard!J ...
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Aestheticians and moralphilosophers alike are inclined to the view that there is no particular!J beneficial effect on moral life ofa developed aesthetic sensibility. The usual supporting witness is the pitiless Nazi SS officer with a refined tastefor Mozart and torture. But though his testimony can hard!J be gainsaid, there is an unnoticed and unwarranted narro1ving of the scope ofaesthetic sensibiliry implicit in the very production ofsuch a witness. In a word, aesthetic sensibiliry is reduced to a matter of iabat Kant called taste, wbicb, for him, iuas a matter ofjudgments ofthe beautiful, whether in art or nature. What is neglected is the parallel Kantian notion of the sublime. Kant charges those who remain unciffected by the sublime not with a want oftaste but a want of feeling,, and he makes it clear that if we are to be moved by the sublime we must already be furnished with moral ideas. In that case, our question should not be tuhetber there is a beneficial effect on moral life ofa developed aesthetic sensibility, but whether moral life can have an ciffect on aesthetic sensibiliry. But before ne can address such questions we need to examine Kant's conception of sublimiry, which appears to connect it, not just to the moral life andpoetry but also to religion, in such a wqy that we mqy come to the conclusion that the relationship between moral life and aesthetic sensibiliry is reciprocal, in the sense that whereas we mqy need to befurnished with moral ideas to be moved by the sublime, this andpoetry (or the arts more general!Y), turn out to be a means ofextending our conception ofwhat constitutes moral life. I make no attempt in whatfolloivs to offer a systema tic account ofwhat Kant writes about sublimiry, ideas and art in the third Critique, and nor do I attempt to show af!)' general cultural influence on the poet whose work I appeal to from time to time, W:B. Yeats. It is rather that I have been both moved and perplexed l?J Kant's account of aesthetic ideas over a number ofyears1 and though I have written about these issues elsewhere, (McGhee1 2000) further reading shows me the inadequacy of my previous understanding. Over the same number of years, and indeed for much longer, I have also been moved and perplexed ry the greatpoems of Yeats's The Tower and The Winding Stair, and I have sometimes thought that the poet and the philosopher can shed light on the meaning ofeach other's work.
Research Paper
yooshitaka yamamooto
Abstract
Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "Critique ofpure reason" as the foundation of metaphysics in his "Kant and the Problem of Metapf.?ysics" and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of basic ontology'. But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, 'on the thinking ...
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Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "Critique ofpure reason" as the foundation of metaphysics in his "Kant and the Problem of Metapf.?ysics" and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of basic ontology'. But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, 'on the thinking path of hvenryyearsfro m the first publication, the fatal mistakes andprivations of this stuqy have become so obvious for me that I have given up patching it up ivith complementary notes, an addition, or a postscript. ' It suggests that this book has the same 'mistakes andprivations' as his ''Sein und Zeit", and tue have to pqy attention to the fact that the 'mistakes and privations' are referred in the context of 'the problem of metapf.?ysics'. So I would like to distinguish the three dimensions ofproblems as following: (1) the problem of Kant's thought as the foundation of metaphysics, (2) the problem of metapl?Jsical thinking itse!f, and ( 3) the problem of Heidegger's ivqy of thinking, in which he cn'ticizes metapf.?ysics and Kant's thought. Then I 1vould like to make it clear the meaning of Heidegger's trial to overcome metaphysics and to bring it to fight that of his 'mistakes andprivations' are grounded in his wqy of thinking, which is, contrary to his intention, still in the range of metapbysica! thinking. And from thatpoint of viezv, I would like to reveal the problem of our wqy of thinking in contemporary philosopl?J, iuhicb is ouenuhelmed ry natural sciences.
Research Paper
mahmoud khatami
Abstract
The a priori is the basic characteristic ofKant's theory of knowledge. Formaliz/ng the a priori, Kant appears to distinguish the a priorifrom the postriori and qffirms its purity. He insists that the a priori is prior to the a postriori and stqys independent!Jfrom it. The overall objectiue of this paper ...
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The a priori is the basic characteristic ofKant's theory of knowledge. Formaliz/ng the a priori, Kant appears to distinguish the a priorifrom the postriori and qffirms its purity. He insists that the a priori is prior to the a postriori and stqys independent!Jfrom it. The overall objectiue of this paper is, boueier; to present and to support this idea that the a priori, even prior, can be defined l?J its relation to experience; ifthe a priori is prior to the a postriori, and ifits validity is not depended on the a postriori, it is still not ivithout mry relation with it. The main thesis I u;iflfoll01v here is that the a postriori could be called the root of the a priori: the a priori has its principle in the a postriorijust because it is given to it. The a priori is given in the experience. Instead of conceiving the a priori as a formal or logical cond Ition of ol?Jectiviry, it uould be considered as immanent in the objea and apprehended during the very act of experience, although known implicit!J before experience occurs. If the a priori is indeed given in experience, we are not constrained to restrict it to the formal conditions of oijectiviry. However, before proceeding to substantiate this thesis, I 1vill reiien. Kant's analysis of the a priori quick/y. Then, I willpresent the main thesis and its proof to deformalize the a priori and implant it in the a postriori domain.
