

We have already seen that while Heidegger appreciates the significance of Kant's thought, he criticizes it because it subordinates to the traditional logic and metaphysics. However, this criticism can be applied to his own thinking itself. And it is this methodological problem that Heidegger recognized as 'the fatal mistakes and privations' of his "*Kant and the problem of metaphysics*" as well as "*Being and Time*". From this point of view, it may be possible for us to understand the reason of interruption of "*Being and Time*".

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So far, the meaning that Kant's thought had to Heidegger's thinking, especially the significance of intuition in the question of Being has been clarified through Heidegger's criticism to Kant's thought. Furthermore, we can find out the fundamental character of metaphysical way of thinking, with which Kant and Heidegger are concerned in each manner, and we had make it clear that Heidegger has an ambivalent relation to it, in which he has to subordinate to it contrary to his intention to criticize it and to overcome the traditional metaphysics itself.

In this paper, we can say that the foundation for discerning our way of thinkin in nowadays through clarifying the relation of Kant and Heidegger to metaphysical thinking. On the other hand, later Heidegger's thinking in which the shift from 'the first beginning' of metaphysical thinking to 'the other beginning of thinking' is to be sought after "*Kant and the problem of metaphysics*", cannot be mentioned in this paper. (Heidegger, 1989)

Kant and Heidegger will always continue to impose the subject of thinking to us as the leaders on the path of thinking who have challenged to go even to the farthest limit of our thinking.

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According to Heidegger, we proximally and for the most part encounter a being-ready-to-hand as equipment that has various meanings and value in the context of our own world, rather than a being-present-at-hand as a scientifically and theoretically grasped, objective entity. Of course, when we use it, we have understood enough for what purpose the equipment is to be, but the understanding is usually implicit and we concern ourselves with it tacitly. Then, if there are some troubles, it comes to be observed for the first time. And, being said, for example, "this hammer is too heavy to drive the nail", the implicit understanding comes to be brought to language and 'hermeneutic as' becomes 'propositional as', so that it comes to be caught explicitly. (ibid)

In this way, Heidegger describes the way of disclosure of, and encounter with the things, which are in our average everyday world. Making such a description, Heidegger takes the 'hermeneutical phenomenology' as his own method. Taking this method, he can abandon the metaphysical premise, such as the relation between the transcendental subject and the objects recognized by it, and the phenomenon in our proximally and for the most part world can be described just as it is. In this meaning, we can say that the trial of overcoming of metaphysics by Heidegger is attained to a quite extent.

However, a problem of method takes place here. Heidegger defines the method of the phenomenology in "*Being and Time*" as "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself", and he says this is expressing the maxim formulated as 'To the things themselves!' (Heidegger, 1927, p.34) In order to 'let that which shows itself be seen from itself', we have to make the phenomenon as subject-matter explicit to us. Especially, when it comes to the case of sciences (Wissenschaften), we have to do so by bringing the subject-matter to language, or 'discourse'. This 'discourse (Rede)' is the very word, into which Heidegger always translates the Greek word 'logos' (Heidegger, 1927, p. 32) So phenomenology is interpreted as 'make a discourse about phenomenon', and gets the meaning as mentioned above.

Heidegger started his work to ask the question of Being and tried to overcome the traditional metaphysics through it, but the method which is explained now seems to object to his intention. Because what has been investigated by Heidegger is thoroughly out of the traditional metaphysics, and to seek it with the scientific method is to follow the 'logos', which is the fundamental idea of metaphysics. So to speak, the method of Heidegger is betraying his intention tacitly.

comments about such Kant's position as follows. "Now Kant adheres to the purpose of this metaphysics; indeed, he shifts it still further in the direction of *Metaphysica Specialis*, which he calls 'authentic metaphysics', 'metaphysics in its final end.'"(Heidegger, 1965, p.9) Here, we can see clearly that the intention of Kant is newly to lay ground of metaphysics, and based on such an intention, the critique of pure reason has been made in the form of 'transcendental analytic'.

Now, according to what has been stated previously, although he has discerned the limit of Kant's thought, Heidegger understood Kant with such an intention to be the leader of the path of his own thinking, and highly esteemed his trial of thinking. In fact, Heidegger defines the title of part I of his "*Being and Time*", i.e., the intention of fundamental ontology, as 'the Interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the explication of Time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being'. So that it can be understood to correspond to Kant's 'transcendental doctrine of elements', and we can read from here the intention of Heidegger who wants to inherit Kant's thought.

However, Heidegger will not inherit it as it is. Or rather, inheriting his intention, Heidegger is indeed going to go in the direction in which is revolved further 180 degrees from Kant's position. This becomes clear as a problem of the method of the 'hermeneutical phenomenology' that Heidegger takes in "*Being and Time*" in relation to his interpretation of 'a priori' mentioned previously.

Here we have to be careful that the concept of the 'preliminary (vorgängig)' pointed out as Heidegger's interpretation of 'a priori' is usually used to characterize the understanding of Being as the constitution of Dasein. Understanding of Being is followed on what we Dasein encounter in our average everydayness. in "*Being and Time*", it is disclosed that Dasein understands an entity that is encountered and discovered as a so-called 'being-ready-to-hand (Zuhandenes)', namely a certain equipment, based on 'as-structure (Als-Struktur)'. Furthermore, 'as' of understanding such a being-ready-to-hand, i.e. 'hermeneutical as (hermeneutisches Als)' is distinguished from 'propositional as (apophantisches Als)', which is brought into language, in a proposition or the form of judgment. And the process to make the implicit 'hermeneutical as' explicit is called 'Interpretation (Auslegung)'.(Heidegger, 1927) Since such 'hermeneutical as' is not brought to language explicitly, it cannot be set as an object of scientific and theoretical cognition. Nevertheless, or rather so, Dasein as Being-in-the-world encounters it 'a priori'.

preparatory study for the main question, i.e. the question of Being itself. It can be considered that Heidegger had found out the preceding study of his basic problem in Kant's thought. Indeed, Heidegger says as follows in a lecture 1926, and evaluates Kant's thought: "the philosophical attitude of Kant concerning to the time has been referred first of all in characterizing the problem of temporality (Temporalität), because in some sense, he had come closest to such a thing [temporality], although there are many limitations about the method of him." (p.269) Of course, Kant could not help remaining inside of the 'limitations' as Heidegger says here. However, Kant will still be evaluated by Heidegger as the first and only thinker who had tried to go forward to the extreme end of the way of thinking, which he himself should follow. Therefore, if the path followed by Heidegger has certain significance for us, it will be said that Kant's thought has the same significance for us.

But we have to turn our eyes to 'limitations' referred here. Heidegger says following the previous quotation, "As far as the problematic about time is concerned, even Kant remains all the time in these limitations. For time is the natural time for Kant also. Moreover, it is the natural time in the large meaning and includes the material nature and the mental nature in it." (ibid.) This suggests that, although reaching even to the limit of the primordial nature of time phenomenon, Kant tried to catch this fundamental phenomenon by the traditional metaphysics, or if saying further, by the time concept of natural science which has been already gaining priority those days. Furthermore, as a matter concluded from this problem, Heidegger points it out that if the mental process interconnections of 'the mental nature' referred above, i.e., the representations in the largest meaning, are prescribed by time, the essential exception which specifies the whole problematic in Kant's thought cannot but arise. He says that the exception is 'the authentic definition of subjectivity' or 'I think', which must be able to follow on all my representation in order that the mental in general is a unified interconnection, namely the transcendental apperception, the unity of consciousness falls, and this is extinguished from the time as the pure intuition. Again, here we come across the framework of metaphysical problematic as the fundamental problem that Kant's thought has.

As it is already said, while Kant stood on the turning point in the history of metaphysics, he himself continued stopping at the inside of the tradition of metaphysics. That is, for Kant, the framework of metaphysics cannot be made to shake and critique of pure reason had to be made just for laying-ground of true metaphysics. Heidegger

framework of thinking of traditional logic even to argue the transcendental logic that analyzes pure concepts of understanding, and it had continued to lead Kant's thought itself. So it can be said that Heidegger's next comment has pointed out this problem, "Finally, however, the orientation toward *logos* and *ratio*, which corresponds to their meaning in Western Metaphysics, boasts from the start of a priority in the laying of the ground for metaphysics. In the determination of this ground-laying, this priority comes to be expressed as a *Critique of Pure Reason*." (p.68) Therefore, the point of criticism of Heidegger to Kant's thought is also that he was going to analyze the way of our thinking while admitting the priority of understanding or reason in traditional logic and metaphysics.

Then, we have to think of the reason why Heidegger is going to regard the sensibility or pure intuition as more important than understanding or reason in Kant's thought. For that purpose, we need to look back upon the thinking of Heidegger in "*Being and time*" further.

§3 The problem of Heidegger's thinking who interprets Kant's thought and metaphysics

Kant defines the key concept 'transcendental' as follows: "I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is possible *a priori*." (Kant, 1781, p 11) Referring to this definition, Heidegger says, "[hence] transcendental knowledge does not investigate the being itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary understanding of Being, i.e., at one and the same time: the constitution of the Being of the being." (Heidegger, 1965, p.16) Saying so, he maintains that his study makes an issue of 'transcendence of pure reason to the being' and it can be made possible that our experience is adequate to its possible object by this transcendence. We have to notice that here Heidegger interprets the word 'a priori' with his key concept 'the preliminary understanding of Being'. This is one of the most important concepts in his main work "*Being and Time*." He says that, as Dasein, we have always (and mostly implicitly) the preliminary understanding of Being and the understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. (Heidegger, 1927, p.12)

So we can understand Heidegger's intention to interpret Kant's thought as 'the problem of fundamental ontology'. For Heidegger, 'the fundamental ontology' means 'the hermeneutics of Dasein' as the

can be thought and recognized following upon only logos, namely reason. And later, Plato succeeds this thought, and it traditionally laid the basis of 'Platonism', which maintains that the true Being exists in an immaterial realm of perfect, unchanging Forms and this is graspable only with reasonable and intellectual recognition as opposed to sensuous perception. On the other hand, what can be known by sensuous perception is just a superficial appearance, which is related to physical world of ever-changing phenomena. Moreover, the origin of the name of 'metaphysics' itself, going back to Aristotle's work, shows the framework that gives reasonable recognitions of transcendence the priority to sensuous perceptions of natural world. In this way, sense (or sensibility) had always been set to inferior position to reason in the traditional metaphysics. Moreover, various problems have come to take place in this framework later, such as the problem of dualism, the mind-body problem, or, the problem of transcendence from subject to object concerning to forming of our knowledge, and so on.

In this context, Kant asserted that synthesis of sensibility and understanding is the essential conditions for the possibility of our forming of recognition. However, it is only said that the senses, i.e. the sensibility is playing the equivalent role to understanding in forming of our recognitions. Of course, it had been clearly set to inferior position in the traditional metaphysics, and what Kant had found out here was able to give the indispensable status to it to form our recognition. In other words, it had been thought in the traditional metaphysics that an idea could be recognized by the reason of human beings, and Kant objected to this thought. He has restricted the range of knowledge of human beings as finite being and prohibited such reason to overstep its authority. So his thought has the meaning of pulling back our recognition to the ground level of experience. What is important with it is, as is already said, that this way of thinking has made the function of senses, namely sensibility indispensable to forming of recognition of human beings, who are finite beings. We can say that his trial of thought made the traditional evaluation of sensibility turn around contrary.

However, in making this turning, Kant was not able to exceed the framework of metaphysics. In "*Kant and the problem of metaphysics*", for example, Heidegger discerned the limit of Kant's thought and has said as follows: "It has come to the point, however, that, along with this primary orientation toward the element of thinking, Kant must also draw the universal knowledge of thinking in general in the sense of traditional formal logic." (Heidegger, 1965, p.68) That is, Kant remained in the

which Kant made an issue of here, consists in the inside of the framework of traditional metaphysics. That is, after passing through the 'Copernican turn' of the way of thinking, Kant is thinking of truth with the concept of 'correspondence between intellect and an object', which is still in the center of framework of metaphysics. In other words, indeed, it is the way of recognition of the traditional metaphysics which Kant is criticizing, and he stands on a turning point of metaphysics in that meaning, but it means that he just criticizes the way of knowing, forming of recognition in 'metaphysics', and it is never said that metaphysics itself should be abandoned. Therefore, it can be concluded that what Kant had aimed at is the laying-ground of new metaphysics through criticizing the traditional metaphysics. That is why Heidegger regards Kant's thought as 'the laying-ground of metaphysics'.

On the other hand, Heidegger says about the function of understanding and sensibility in his "*Kant and the problem of metaphysics*", that understanding is clearly subordinate to sensibility. Such an interpretation of Heidegger indicates that he stands on a completely different position from the traditional metaphysics, and at the same time, he interprets the thought of Kant differently from the traditional way of understanding of it. After saying, "Pure recognition is pure intuition through pure concepts" (Heidegger, 1965, p.52), Heidegger rather says, "Pure thinking is essentially subservient to intuition." (p.57) It must be asked here what Heidegger intended by making such an evaluation. In order to reply to this question, we need to specify the fundamental character of 'metaphysics' itself in the following section further.

§2 The problem of metaphysical thinking itself

Furthermore, what has mentioned above about Kant's thought can also be considered from another viewpoint. That is, it has been claimed by many philosophers that dichotomy of reason (or understanding) and sense (sensibility) has always set on the bottom in the traditional metaphysics, our recognition should not be based on sense, but it should be based on reason. We can find out the root of that thought in the beginning of philosophy in ancient Greece. One of the most famous fragments of Parmenides, who is one of the pre-Socratics, says, "[... for] the same thing is thinking and Being" (Kranz, p. 231) "...not with wandering eye, sounding ear or mouth, but by reason [*logos*] judge the much disputed proof uttered by me" (p. 235). In these passages, he says that what truly exists cannot be known following upon your senses, but

Kant tried to answer this question upon the argument of the transcendental aesthetics and the transcendental logic, saying that the multiplicity of senses is received firstly in the intuition of sensibility and what has received there is synthesized by pure understanding concept under the self as transcendental apperception, then our recognition is formed of. Therefore, it can be said that the relation between sense and understanding is, so to speak, as the complementary one, upon which our recognition is formed of for the first time. So the prominent phrase "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (1781. P. 51, 1786. P. 75) may give an account for the argument of Kant. Or in other passage, he says, "With us *understanding* and *sensibility* can determine an object *only in combination*. If we separate them, then we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions, but in either case we cannot relate representations to any determinate object." (1781, p. 258, 1786, p. 314) According to this passage, our representation cannot relate itself with its object without either understanding or sensibility.

Therefore, from this point of view, it can be said that Kant was standing on one of the greatest turning points in the history of metaphysics, because he had found out a very positive significance of sensibility. Sensibility is always taken as passive and refused as the root of a mistaken appearance in the traditional metaphysics since ancient Greece, and which has yielded the priority to the thinking based on understanding or reason. And, on the contrary, these understanding or reason have been given the positive and leading status in the history of the Western metaphysics. Therefore, it is clear that Kant evaluated sensibility more positively than ever by saying that it is essential to our forming of recognition.

We can see this problematic of Kant to explain the traditional truth concept, 'correspondence between intellect and an object' from synthesis of the sensibility-intuition and the concept of understanding which occurs based on the so-called 'Copernican turn' of the way of thinking. Such a problematic of Kant and the way of answer to it reversed radically the way of thinking of the traditional metaphysics, which presupposes that as for our recognition, we have to follow an object. In that meaning, we can say that Kant divides 'before Kant' and 'after Kant' in traditional history of metaphysics and he is truly the watershed of it.

However, Kant has stopped at finding out the equivalent status of sensibility-intuition over thinking based on understanding or reason. It is also clear that the way of recognition or epistemological truth itself

Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "*Critique of Pure Reason*" as 'a laying of the ground for metaphysics' and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of fundamental ontology'. Of course, 'fundamental ontology' is the leading question for 'the question of Being' as Heidegger's main question in "*Being and Time*". So Heidegger tries to relate Kant's thought to his path of thinking, and he highly estimates the status of intuition or sensibility as the ground of 'time' in Kant's argument.

But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, "on the thinking path of twenty years from the first publication, the fatal mistakes and privations of this study have become so obvious for me that I have given up patching it up with complementary notes, an addition, or a postscript." It suggests that this book has the same 'mistakes and privations' as "*Being and Time*" (Heidegger, (1927), of which Heidegger himself has given up publishing the second half. And we have to pay attention to the fact that the 'mistakes and privations' are referred in the context of 'the problem of metaphysics'.

So, in this paper, I would like to make it clear, what meaning and intention such an interpretation of Heidegger has, what a relation it has with the thought of his main work "*Being and Time*", and what a significance it has to regard intuition or sensibility as more important than thinking, in that way. Therefore, I have to distinguish the three dimensions of problems as following: (1) the problem of Kant's thought as the laying-ground of metaphysics, (2) the problem of metaphysical thinking itself, and (3) the problem of Heidegger's way of thinking, in which he criticizes metaphysics and Kant's thought. Then I would like to try to reveal the meaning of Heidegger's trial to overcome metaphysics and to bring it to light that of his 'mistakes and privations' are grounded in his way of thinking, which is, contrary to his intention, still in the range of metaphysical thinking.

Hereafter, this paper is divided into following 3 sections. §1 The problem of Kant's thought as the laying-ground of metaphysics, §2 The problem of metaphysical thinking itself, §3 the problem of Heidegger's thinking who interprets Kant's thought and metaphysics.

§1 The problem of Kant's thought as the laying-ground of metaphysics

Kant posed in his "*Critique of pure reason*" (1781, 1786) the cardinal question, "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" (1786, p. 19)

Overcoming of Metaphysics: Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant's Thought and the Problem of Metaphysics

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Abstract

Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "Critique of pure reason" as the foundation of metaphysics in his "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of basic ontology'. But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, 'on the thinking path of twenty years from the first publication, the fatal mistakes and privations of this study have become so obvious for me that I have given up patching it up with complementary notes, an addition, or a postscript.' It suggests that this book has the same 'mistakes and privations' as his "Sein und Zeit", and we have to pay attention to the fact that the 'mistakes and privations' are referred in the context of 'the problem of metaphysics'.

So I would like to distinguish the three dimensions of problems as following: (1) the problem of Kant's thought as the foundation of metaphysics, (2) the problem of metaphysical thinking itself, and (3) the problem of Heidegger's way of thinking, in which he criticizes metaphysics and Kant's thought. Then I would like to make it clear the meaning of Heidegger's trial to overcome metaphysics and to bring it to light that of his 'mistakes and privations' are grounded in his way of thinking, which is, contrary to his intention, still in the range of metaphysical thinking.

And from that point of view, I would like to reveal the problem of our way of thinking in contemporary philosophy, which is overwhelmed by natural sciences.

Keywords: *metaphysics, Heidegger, Kant, thought, criticism*

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In his "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" (Heidegger, 1929, 1950, 1965),

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