Introduction

The problem of hyle (prime matter) and its simplicity, alongside the criterion of rationality, constitutes a perennial debate in Islamic philosophy, extending from the Aristotelian tradition to the seventeenth century. While Peripatetics like Ibn Sīnā defined hyle as "pure potentiality" and its simplicity as merely "generic," Illuminationists like Suhrawardī perceived it as the simplest of all entities due to its dark, yet pure essence. Fayyāḍ Lāhījī, in his marginalia on Muḥaqqiq Khaffarī’s Taʿlīqāt on Sharḥ al-Tajrīd, subjects these diverse views to a rigorous critique. He argues that prior thinkers often conflated conceptual simplicity with existential actuality. The central research question of this study is: How does Lāhījī redefine the ontological status of hyle and its capacity for rationality through a critical engagement with Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and post-Avicennan scholastic perspectives?
 

Literature Review

The discourse on hyle in Islamic philosophy is deeply rooted in Greek thought.
2.1. The Greek Origins
Plato’s chora served as a foundational "receptacle" for forms, while Aristotle developed the doctrine of hyle as "pure potentiality," devoid of intrinsic actuality.
2.1.1. Evolution in Islamic Philosophy
Ibn Sīnā refined the Peripatetic view, emphasizing that hyle only gains existence through forms. In contrast, Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist school interpreted hyle as "pure darkness," yet paradoxically the most simple entity by essence.
2.1.1.1. Contemporary Scholarly Perspectives
Existing studies, such as those by Amini Najafi (2016) and Hosseini & Ghorbani (2021), have addressed rationality and transcendence in Lāhījī’s work. However, this study uniquely focuses on his critical synthesis of hyle within the Sharḥ al-Tajrīd marginalia.
 

Methodology

This research employs a descriptive-analytical and comparative method. It utilizes a textual-critical approach to analyze Lāhījī’s marginal notes. By comparing his arguments against the established doctrines of Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Khaffarī, the study reveals the structural logic of his philosophical innovation in the 17th century.
 

Results

Lāhījī’s analysis yields three critical results:
   The Simplicity Distinction: Lāhījī differentiates between "generic simplicity" (basāṭat-e jinsī), which hyle possesses, and "existential simplicity," which is the true condition for rationality.
   Rejection of Essentialist Confusion: He demonstrates that Suhrawardī’s attribution of extreme simplicity to hyle results from confusing essence with existence.
   Rationality Criterion: Lāhījī distinguishes between being "intelligible" (potentially graspable by the intellect) and "rational by essence" (ʿāqil li-dhātih), identifying self-subsistent actuality as the sole mediator of the latter.
 
Table 1
Comparative Criteria for Rationality in Islamic Philosophy
| Tradition | Criterion of Rationality | Status of Hyle |
| Peripatetic | Actual Existence | Non-rational (Potentiality) |
| Illuminationist | Luminous Essence | Potentially Simple/Null |
| Lāhījī’s View | Self-subsistent Actuality | Intelligible but Non-rational |
Note: This table highlights the conceptual shift in Lāhījī’s independent critique.
 
Figure 1
The Conceptual Distinction between Intelligibility and Rationality
(A schematic model showing that while hyle falls within the scope of intelligibility, it is excluded from the circle of rationality due to existential dependency.)
 

Discussion

Lāhījī’s critical edge lies in his insistence that the ontological status of hyle is the "farthest from transcendence." Even if one accepts hyle as a conceptually simple notion, its external realization is entirely dependent on forms. Therefore, it lacks the "self-disclosure" required for self-awareness. He argues that rationality is an existential perfection that cannot be reduced to conceptual simplicity. By establishing that hyle is a "mental construct" used to explain change, he safeguards the independence of the intellect.
 

Conclusion

Lāhījī’s critique marks a significant turning point in post-Avicennan philosophy. By separating the levels of conceptual abstraction from existential actuality, he provides a more coherent account of why hyle remains an "intelligible" object rather than an "intellectual" subject. His synthesis serves as a critical bridge that preserves the rigors of Peripatetic ontology while sharpening the tools of Illuminationist and scholastic debate, thereby redefining the conditions of rationality.
 
Acknowledgments
The author acknowledges the scholarly contributions of the library of Allameh Tabatabai in Shiraz for providing the manuscript sources for this analysis.
 
Notes

This distinction is elaborated in Lāhījī’s critique of the "existence of potentiality" versus "potentiality of existence."