نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

• زهرا حاجی شاه کرم ¹
• سید مصطفی محقق داماد ²
• قاسم پورحسن ³

¹ پژوهشگر پسادکتری بنیاد ملی نخبگان، تهران، ایران

² عضو فرهنگستان علوم و استاد، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

³ دانشیار فلسفه، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

رهیافت تلفیقی در اخلاق، طرح ملاک‎های سه‎گانه در سنجش کنش‎های انسانی، اهتمام و اعتناء به نقش عرف و عقل جمعی در ظهوردادن بخشی از نظام اخلاق از دستاوردهای بنیادین فلسفۀ ابن‎سینا محسوب می‏گردد. برخلاف دیدگاه رایج و مسلط در میان پژوهشگران و حتی متفکران حوزۀ فلسفۀ اسلامی و ادعای فقدان نظریه یا رویکرد اخلاقی در میان فیلسوفان اسلامی، تبیینی صحیح و بنیادین از اندیشه‎های فارابی و ابن‏سینا می‏تواند نادرستی مفروضات ادعایی را عیان سازد. افزون‎برآن، دیدگاهی که بر فقدان اندیشه‎های اخلاقی در دوران پس از فارابی و به‎طور خاص امتناع آن در فلسفۀ ابن‏سینا تأکید می‏کند، ریشه در ناآگاهی نسبت به آراء، آثار، رویکردها و اندیشه‎های مهم بوعلی دارد.  یکی از ابداعات خاص ابن‎سینا در باب اخلاق، مطرح‏ساختن رهیافت تلفیقی ملاک‏ها در سنجش درستی و نادرستی کنش‎های اخلاقی و فهم خاستگاه‎های «شایست و ناشایست» أعمال آدمیان است. نه‌تنها التفاتی صحیح به این رویکرد در بررسی اندیشه‎های ابن‏سینا در باب اخلاق نشده است، بلکه می‎توان ادعا کرد که همانند نظریۀ «زمینه‎مندی عرفی» دستگاه اخلاق در فلسفۀ شیخ‎الرئیس، از ساحت‎های «نااندیشیده» به‌شمار می ‎آید. در این نوشتار کوشش خواهیم کرد تا دو مسئلۀ بسیار مهم مزبور را که تاکنون متأسفانه در ابن‏سیناپژوهی مورد غفلت واقع شده است، بررسی و تحلیل نموده و أبعاد ابداعات و دستاوردهای مهم بوعلی در حوزۀ اخلاق را آشکار نماییم.
یکی از ابداعات خاص ابن‎سینا در باب اخلاق، مطرح‏ساختن رهیافت تلفیقی ملاک‏ها در سنجش درستی و نادرستی کنش‎های اخلاقی و فهم خاستگاه‎های «شایست و ناشایست» أعمال آدمیان است. نه تنها التفاتی صحیح به این رویکرد در بررسی اندیشه‎های ابن‏سینا در باب اخلاق نشده است، بلکه می‎توان ادعا کرد که همانند نظریۀ «زمینه‎مندی عرفی» دستگاه اخلاق در فلسفۀ شیخ‎الرئیس، از ساحت‎های «نااندیشیده» به‌شمار می‎آید. در این نوشتار کوشش خواهیم کرد تا دو مسئلۀ بسیار مهم مزبور را که تاکنون متأسفانه در ابن‏سیناپژوهی مورد غفلت واقع شده است، بررسی و تحلیل نموده و أبعاد ابداعات و دستاوردهای مهم بوعلی در حوزۀ اخلاق را آشکار نماییم.

کلیدواژه‌ها

• ابن‏سینا
• اخلاق
• ملاک‎های سه‎گانه
• نظریۀ تلفیقی
• ابداعات
• مناسبات اجتماعی
• عقل جمعی

موضوعات

• فلسفه

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Foundations of Avicenna's Multi-Criteria (Integrative) Theory in Moral Actions and the Significance of Conventional Reason

نویسندگان [English]

• Zahra Haji Shahkaram ¹
• Seyyed Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad ²
• Ghasem Pourhasan ³

¹ Postdoctoral Researcher, Iran's National Elites Foundation, Tehran, Iran

² Member of the Academy of Sciences and Full Professor, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

³ Associate Professor of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

Extended Abstract

Introduction

This research offers a systematic examination of the foundations of Avicenna's multi-criteria (or integrative) theory within the realm of moral philosophy, particularly concerning the evaluation of human actions. It further analyzes the pivotal role of the concept of "conventional reason" or "general convention" in the framework of his ethical thought. Among many scholars of the history of philosophy, particularly within the Western tradition and in some cases, among researchers in the field of Islamic philosophy, there prevails a common interpretation that Muslim philosophers were primarily focused on metaphysical discussions, logic, and physics, and that in the domain of ethics, they did not develop an independent and coherent philosophical theory or framework. This perception has often been interpreted as the absence of a 'systematic moral philosophy' in the thought of philosophers such as al-Farabi and Avicenna. However, through a careful study that moves beyond selective and reductive readings of these philosophers' works, particularly by scrutinizing the lesser-known works of Avicenna in the field of practical ethics, household governance [tadbir al-manzil], and social organization, one can uncover dimensions of his ethical thought. These dimensions not only affirm the existence of such a system but also reveal a notable degree of theoretical sophistication. The claim that ethical reflection declined after al-Farabi and, more specifically, within the philosophical system of Avicenna, stems principally from a neglect of a significant portions of his corpus, the predominance of a metaphysical perspective in interpreting his thought, and, in certain instances, from a priori assumptions formed prior to comprehensive analysis.
Research Question(s)
The main question is: how may the three criteria, the rational, the religious (divine law), and the conventional (customary), be reconciled within a coherent normative framework? Are actions good or bad solely by virtue of their essence, or does the ground of their praiseworthiness or blameworthiness lie beyond their essence and rational structure? Can the integration of these three criteria provide answers to some of the most intricate and persistent problems?
Literature Review
To date, no independent research has been conducted on Avicenna 's ethical system on the basis of his integrative approach that combines the three domains of ethics and the three corresponding criteria. However, from the very beginning, his particular view on this matter was reinterpreted and discussed by his students and later commentators. Avicenna, who following al-Farabi, first proposed an ethical perspective grounded in conventional opinions [mashhurāt] (Avicenna, 1404 AH) and distinguished between ethical propositions and actions based on intrinsic goodness and badness [ḥusn and qubḥ dhātī] (Avicenna, 1375 AH) and specific commendable acts [maḥmūdāt] (Avicenna, 1375 AH), influenced many thinkers and commentators. Among them are Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (Ṭūsī, 1403 AH) and Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadrā, 1391 AH), who addressed the three criteria in ethics, namely the rational, religious, and conventional standards, in relation to the goodness or badness of actions or propositions. In the modern period, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1350 AH) and his students, including Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (Muṭahharī, 1377 AH), Ḥā’irī (Ḥā’irī, 1394 AH), Miṣbāḥ (Miṣbāḥ, 1394 AH), and Javādī Āmulī (Javādī, 1373 AH), have revisited, interpreted, and elaborated aspects of this approach. More recently, Pūrḥasan, in Ibn Sina and Iranian Wisdom (Pūrḥasan, 1400 AH), and Pūrḥasan and Ḥājī Shāhkaram, in The Equation of Ethics and Religion (Pūrḥasan and Ḥājī Shāhkaram, 1403 AH), have examined certain dimensions of this theory within the framework of the six equations of ethics. Nevertheless, the integrative theory represents a new and original perspective in the study of Avicenna's ethical system.
 Methodology
Our primary method is a hermeneutic analysis of Avicenna’s texts and their interpretations across the three domains of the ethical system. While remaining attentive to a phenomenological orientation, we seek to employ hermeneutic analysis in the reinterpretation of these texts. The significance of this method lies in the fact that, by suspending prior interpretations and theories of commentators and interpreters concerning Avicenna, through adoption of a phenomenological approach, we aim to achieve a more direct engagement with the texts, one that is free from dominant widely held presuppositions, and thus to present a reading from Avicenna's own perspective on ethics. In contrast to many existing studies, this method enables us to disclose his distinctive view regarding the integration of the three ethical systems.
Discussion
A fundamental and distinctive innovation of Avicenna in the domain of ethics lies in his proposal of an integrative, multi-criteria framework for the assessment of the moral value of actions. In contradistinction to the monolithic approaches prevalent within certain philosophical traditions, which focus solely on intention (as observed in certain intra-religious interpretations), or exclusively on consequence (as in utilitarianism), or solely on the nature of the act itself (as in deontology), Avicenna advances a plurality of criteria synthesized within a unified theoretical construct. These criteria most likely include theoretical intellect (the apprehension of truth and existential perfection), psychic virtue (the moderation of the soul’s faculties as the internal foundation of action), individual and social expediency (consideration of the consequences and ends of action), as well as conformity with sound custom and established social conventions. This synthesis reveals Avicenna's realistic and holistic perspective on the complex phenomenon of ethical action, wherein the inner dimension and intention of the agent, the intrinsic characteristics of the act, as well as the social context and consequences of the action are all considered in moral judgment. Another significant contribution of Avicenna, which bears an intimate connection with the social dimension of his integrative theory, is his emphasis on the role of "conventional reason" (or social convention) in the formation and manifestation of part of the ethical system. By "conventional reason" is meant the collective and consensual wisdom that, within the context of a particular society and culture, gradually generates criteria for distinguishing good from evil, the virtuous from the vicious, and the reprehensible from the commendable. Avicenna recognizes such convention as an independent and complementary source alongside pure philosophical reason and religious law. Within his thought, this idea may be interpreted as a form of "contextually-grounded conventional reading" of ethics. Accordingly, many of the values and prescriptions that govern social life arise from this collective reason and from unwritten social conventions, which themselves emerge from lived experiences, shared necessities, and the everyday interactions of individuals within a community. This perspective distances Avicenna from a purely abstract and transhistorical conception of ethics and brings his thought closer to the dynamic reality and context-dependent nature of human ethical life.
Conclusion
Regrettably, both of these pivotal axes of Avicenna’s ethical thought, namely, his integrative multi-criteria theory and his contextually-grounded theory of conventional reason, have been largely neglected in studies on Avicenna. It may be argued that these concepts belong to the category of the "unthought," or at the very least the "underthought," within existing research on Islamic moral philosophy. This neglect has resulted in a fragmentary and reductive representation of the depth and scope of this major philosopher's thought. The present article, employing an analytical, hermeneutical, and analogical methodology, and drawing upon Avicenna’s primary texts, including al-Shifaʾ [The Healing], fi al-Akhlaq [On Ethics], fi al-Siyasa [on politics], Tadbir al-manziliyya [On Household Administration], fi al-‘Ahd [On the Covenant], as well as al-Najat, al-Isharat wa-l-tanbihat [Directives and Remarks], the Danish Namah-I-Alaii, and al-Mubaḥathat [The Discussions], seeks to elucidate, through an examination of these two interconnected issues, the innovative dimensions and neglected contributions of Avicenna in the domain of moral philosophy. In so doing, the study aimed to demonstrate how Avicenna, by conjoining internal criteria (virtue) and external criteria (consequences and utility, convention and satisfaction), and by integrating a purely philosophical perspective with a socio-centric and context-sensitive outlook, articulates a flexible yet systematic framework for the ethical assessment of actions.
Moreover, it will be argued that, within his framework, the concept of "conventional reason" constitutes not merely a derivative or secondary consideration, but rather a fundamental source for normative determination in the sphere of collective life, one capable of bridging rational ideals and the mutable realities of the social order.
A reassessment and revitalization of these aspects of Avicenna's ethical thought carries several significant implications. First, this approach enriches the historiography of moral philosophy by revealing the hitherto unrecognized capacities of the Islamic philosophical tradition in this domain. Second, it challenges the prevalent and reductive representation of Avicenna as a purely metaphysical thinker. Third, it facilitates a dialogue between Islamic moral philosophy and contemporary ethical schools, such as virtue ethics, contextualism, Kantian ethics, and certain forms of moral pragmatism, which emphasize concepts such as the integration of criteria, the role of society and context in morality, and practical wisdom. Finally, it offers a conceptual framework for addressing the complex ethical dilemmas of contemporary societies, where the tension between universal principles and local values, between abstract rationality and empirical collective wisdom, is acutely felt.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

• Avicenna
• Ethics
• Integrated Theory
• Social Relations
• Conventional Reason