philosophy
ALI ABDI
Abstract
The present article, in its analytical-comparative method, examines the problem of evil from the perspective of Kant's moral teleology and the faithful theology of Marilyn McCord Adams. In Kant's view, evil has no special status in nature, but it is merely one of the possible capacities of Nature, in ...
Read More
The present article, in its analytical-comparative method, examines the problem of evil from the perspective of Kant's moral teleology and the faithful theology of Marilyn McCord Adams. In Kant's view, evil has no special status in nature, but it is merely one of the possible capacities of Nature, in the position of actualizing its powers. The human solution to prevent evil is an opportunity to emerge his intellectual and moral powers. It composes an absolute moral order that, contrary to his natural inclinations, transforms humans kinds into rational and creative beings and organizes human relationships. Kant's God is an idea that is assumed and sanctified as a supreme good over the world, following the call of moral conscience. However, nature in its moral and ultimate reading in Kant's third critique moves in the direction of human well-being. It can be considered an institution and foundation far from evil. On the other hand, M.M. Adams as a Christian thinker who has lived in the modern world, has attempted to take a different reading of the problem of evil. He interpreted it as a condition of man's likeness to God through the experience of divine suffering. An interpretation of evil and morality that is immoral in terms of basis and consequence, according to Kant'sreading of the nature of evil and morality
Arsalan Aghakhani; Seyed Mohammadreza Hoseini Beheshti; shamsolmolouk Mostafavi
Abstract
Immanuel Kant's aesthetics in Critique of Judgment has always been the subject of discussions and the discovery of many points about the anatomy of the faculty of Taste and its judgments. Because of contemporary aesthetic issues, the inquiry concerning the possibility of the reflective perception ...
Read More
Immanuel Kant's aesthetics in Critique of Judgment has always been the subject of discussions and the discovery of many points about the anatomy of the faculty of Taste and its judgments. Because of contemporary aesthetic issues, the inquiry concerning the possibility of the reflective perception of dissatisfaction and following that the position of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetics has been considered by commentators. Ugliness and its judgments have different places in Kant's pre-critical philosophy in comparison with his ideas in the framework of the critical system. Before writing triple critiques, he has taken note of Ugliness in the format of sensorial perceptions and anthropological concepts as the object of merely empirical positive displeasure perception. But the query about Ugliness as a reflective judgment is impossible on his critical aesthetic horizon because the possibility of such a judgment would be contradictory with the systematic purposes and methodology of the third critique. In order to clarify the position of Ugliness in Kant's aesthetic horizon, while the present article examines his view on Ugliness in the pre-critical horizon, it explains the reasons for the absence of the Ugly as a reflective judgment in Kant's critical considerations and proves the impossibility of realizing the reflective judgment on Ugliness in transcendental philosophy.
Roqayeh Mazaheri; Shahin Aawani
Abstract
From Kant’s view, freedom is the universal property of humans as the autonomy of will. He established morals on the ground of freedom through legislation of Practical Reason. In Kant’s philosophy, freedom is a ground, based on which humans have dignity as an individual and human beings. The ...
Read More
From Kant’s view, freedom is the universal property of humans as the autonomy of will. He established morals on the ground of freedom through legislation of Practical Reason. In Kant’s philosophy, freedom is a ground, based on which humans have dignity as an individual and human beings. The concept of freedom is conjunct with moral law and practical reason and is not found in the scope of nature. The moral law being freedom in a sense elevates humans from the scope of nature and gives them value and dignity, which is based on freedom and autonomy. A moral human creates value for the world, and human is the end of creation. The Intermediator of human relationship as a moral being and the end of nature is the freedom concept. This article is written concentrating on Kant’s view of “The relationship between dignity and humans freedom”. Freedom is neither an objective matter nor the subject of cognition because the concept of freedom is related to the rational world and is realized in the behavior and disposition of humans. Everything has a price or dignity in the land of ends. Whatever has a price could be traded, but what is more valuable than any value and has no equivalent whatsoever is dignity. The humanity of humans is the only being that has “dignity” as long as it is capable of having morality.
Ali Akbar Ahmadi Afarmejani; Abdollah Salarvand
Abstract
In the first Critique, Kant delineated the principles of metaphysics of nature and in the second Critique, those of metaphysics of morality. Since these two kinds of principles were essentially distinguished, there appeared an absolute gap between nature and morality, which Kant called abyss or gulf ...
Read More
In the first Critique, Kant delineated the principles of metaphysics of nature and in the second Critique, those of metaphysics of morality. Since these two kinds of principles were essentially distinguished, there appeared an absolute gap between nature and morality, which Kant called abyss or gulf and emphasized that it is "incalculable". That is, if one considers only the first and the second Critique, one should accept the dualism in the essence of subject. Kant, however, takes over in the third Critique the task of investigating the possibility of transition between the two sections of the dualism.
In this paper, we try first to clarify what it means that a transition occurs between nature and morality and then to show how it occurs. Before that, however, we should transform the metaphorical expression of "gulf" into a logical one in order to get the problem right. Once this is done, the meaning of transition becomes clear. In order to delineate how the transition is realized, we should appeal to concepts of the beautiful and the sublime. The transition in the sphere of the beautiful occurs in three instances: intellectual interest in beautiful, the genius, and being the symbol of morality. But in the sphere of the sublime which is "formless", one should go beyond the purposiveness of the form of nature. It will be clear that the sublime represents the possibility of transition in two respects: by introducing the idea of humanity and morality and by aesthetic representation of reason "as both theoretical and practical" which is nothing but unity of the first and the second part of Kantian philosophy.
abdolali shokr; sedighe mirzaee
Volume 12, Issue 45 , April 2016, , Pages 65-78
Abstract
Acceptance and affirmation of principality of existence, requires the acceptance of existence being made. Therefore, principality of existence is in cohesion with it's made; although there are some differences between the two subjects. On the basis of Transcendental Wisdom, criterion of being made is ...
Read More
Acceptance and affirmation of principality of existence, requires the acceptance of existence being made. Therefore, principality of existence is in cohesion with it's made; although there are some differences between the two subjects. On the basis of Transcendental Wisdom, criterion of being made is determined based on copulative existence. Copulative existence means total dependence on other. What is absolutely dependent on the cause, it is a real made of it. In Sadra's school, there are differences between the meaning of copulative existence and copulative existence in the proposition one, something that has been neglected in Kant thought. As critique to Anselm's ontological argument, Kant believes that the existence does not cause any increase in the subject, but it is only copulative existence. Criterion of being predicative is increase in subject. This expression is different of something research in transcendentalism; because Kant refers only to the copulative existence in proposition. But Mulla Sadra refers to another kind of copulative existence which obtained from the analysis of the principle of causality. According to this view, all possibilities will be absolutely related to God. He divided the propositions into composition whetherness and simple whetherness. Predicate in the second one, is existence. Kant says that these kinds of propositions are meaningless. He believes that proposition 'God exists' is not synthetic and not analytic. But Mulla Sadra says that proposition 'God exists' means: the affirmation of the self-identity of a thing. So, in simple whetherness proposition, predicative existence does not increase in subject, because of the quiddity being mentally-posited and fundamental reality of existence.
hamid talebzadeh
Volume 10, Issue 39 , October 2014, , Pages 9-26
Abstract
Abstract
Kant, aware of the difficulty of the epistemological rational of religion which brings about religious experience, followed a new path in philosophy and, instead of beginning from the method of obtaining certain knowledge, started from the possibility of certain knowledge. He was deterred by ...
Read More
Abstract
Kant, aware of the difficulty of the epistemological rational of religion which brings about religious experience, followed a new path in philosophy and, instead of beginning from the method of obtaining certain knowledge, started from the possibility of certain knowledge. He was deterred by research in the method of certain knowledge, which was the destination of rational religion, and therefore went beyond the epistemological limits. Instead, he went on a search for a foundation regarding epistemology and achieved this feat via a transcendental method. The transcendental method, which in general considers as its axis investigating the possibility of a priori certain epistemology, though it resolved the lacks of epistemology, had its own weaknesses which brought about the protest of Kant followers who, though loyal, breached their promise and though close, put distance between themselves and Kant. Fichte transformed the transcendental method by dialectic, and Schopenhauer, by returning to Barkley, ruined Kant’s transcendental method. The present paper reviews Schopenhauer’s passage through Kant’s method and shows that Schopenhauer, though he accepts Kant’s transcendental conditions, he opposes Kant’s transcendental reasoning, which Kant claims to have derived from purely transcendental sources. He also challenges the self-proclaimed object and the exemplification object and, eventually, chooses Barkley’s direct method in experimental idealism.
Mohammadreza Abdulahnezhad
Abstract
The concept of ‘free will’ is central in both Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy. In the Kantian moral system, ‘free will’ is only regarded as moral when it dutifully follows reason and its a priori, absolute rules. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, holds that ...
Read More
The concept of ‘free will’ is central in both Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy. In the Kantian moral system, ‘free will’ is only regarded as moral when it dutifully follows reason and its a priori, absolute rules. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, holds that since human will is a priori to his reason, reason cannot engage will into any action. Instead of reason, he regards human motivations and stimulations as the main sources which shape any action, including moral actions. The important point is that he identifies three types of stimulations, namely ‘compassion’, ‘egoism’ and ‘pessimism’, among which he finds only ‘compassion’ to be the true stimulation for moral action and the basis of moral acts, and he dismisses the other two as immoral stimulations. He criticises foundations of the Kantian moral philosophy with the help of three following arguments: first, he questions the Kantian moral formalism and his a priori claims; second, he criticises the conceptual flaw in Kant’s moral philosophy (which is the result of an inconsistency between his claim that morality should be based on reason and his inner appreciation of verbal morality); third, he accuses Kant’s moral system of being one based on egoism. The present paper aims to explain the main status and characteristic of Schopenhauer’s moral system by way of explaining his criticism of Kant’s moral system.
hajar nili ahmad abadi; ali karbasi zadeh
Abstract
This paper aims to conduct a comparative study of the views held by Allameh Tabataba'i and Kant on the social freedom. Their views are introduced in the first two parts and compared and contrasted in the last part. Allameh Tabataba'i believes the true freedom to be freedom from all restraints but the ...
Read More
This paper aims to conduct a comparative study of the views held by Allameh Tabataba'i and Kant on the social freedom. Their views are introduced in the first two parts and compared and contrasted in the last part. Allameh Tabataba'i believes the true freedom to be freedom from all restraints but the submission to God. Kant, however, deems true freedom to be freedom of the will. They both believe that the mankind first resists the establishment of social life but finally accepts it and enacts the law to secure the society and enjoy the social freedom. In Allameh Tabataba'i's belief, the law should be based on monotheism, resurrection, ethics, and reason, while for Kant, freedom of the will and the self constitute the basis for the law. They, however, share the belief that the law by itself could not help the mankind to establish the social freedom. Allameh Tabataba'i declares monotheism and ethical faith as the basis of the law, and Kant deems ethical rules based on pure reason its prerequisite.
ala turani; fatemeh delshad
Abstract
This paper seeks to demonstrate Kant's and Avicenna's belief in the objectivity of time. First, their views on the generalities are studied and the manner in which they are extracted from tangible and external issues explained. Second, their views on the objectivity and nature of time are explained. ...
Read More
This paper seeks to demonstrate Kant's and Avicenna's belief in the objectivity of time. First, their views on the generalities are studied and the manner in which they are extracted from tangible and external issues explained. Second, their views on the objectivity and nature of time are explained. Time is a real perception according to Avicenna and a synthetic a priori concept according to Kant. Since the real perceptions and synthetic a priori concepts are the confluence of subjective and objective issues, the objective nature of time is established. Moreover, time-related issues, including the dependence of events on matter, time and its essence are addressed.
reza dehghani; hoseyn kalbasi ashtar
Abstract
One of the main themes in Heidegger’s thought is the genesis of metaphysics. This matter plays a significant role in the fundamental question in the so-called Turn period. In this paper, we will concern about three approaches to the genesis of metaphysics in the mentioned period. Heidegger discusses ...
Read More
One of the main themes in Heidegger’s thought is the genesis of metaphysics. This matter plays a significant role in the fundamental question in the so-called Turn period. In this paper, we will concern about three approaches to the genesis of metaphysics in the mentioned period. Heidegger discusses these three approaches in his three different works: Kant and the problem of metaphysics; What is metaphysics? and Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. In Kant and the problem of metaphysics, he indicates a special interpretation of Kant's views according to the notion of "transcendence". In what is metaphysics? Heidegger discusses the issue through the concepts of "nothingness" and "angst", and in Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, he continues the issue via the interpretation of the "Cave Allegory". Although the released times of these three books is so proximate, Heidegger seeks the foundation of metaphysics in them through completely different approaches. In the first and second book, along with Kant’s project, he attempts to find a foundation for metaphysics through the concept of "Dasein". But in the latter book, Heidegger is in the pursuit of transition from metaphysics and calls metaphysics "forgetting of being". He explains that Plato's introducing "Ideas Theory" is an origin of metaphysics and a departure point from being and forgetting it. In this essay, proposing a general approach, we try to explain the mentioned three approaches and their similarities and differences.
ali akbar ahmadi afar majani; amir naeemi
Abstract
Einstein’s theory of relativity made many difficulties for Newtonian physics, so as it did not remain any way for keeping it but setting apart or reforming some of the most fundamental concepts such as space and time. Many thinkers believe that relativity theory made some irreparable hurts on Kant’s ...
Read More
Einstein’s theory of relativity made many difficulties for Newtonian physics, so as it did not remain any way for keeping it but setting apart or reforming some of the most fundamental concepts such as space and time. Many thinkers believe that relativity theory made some irreparable hurts on Kant’s philosophy. However, some other thinkers, like Gödel, have tried to read relativity theory in such a way that not only have no contradiction with Kant’s philosophy, but also introduce some affirmations for it. This paper casts light on Gödel’s effort for reconciling relativity theory with Kant’s philosophy in the topic of 'Time'; It also contains some remarks on the point that how conception of time in relativity theory can lead us to defend Idealism. Finally, it would be suggested that for reconciling Kant’s philosophy with modern science, we should both cease his inflexibility about the process of acquiring knowledge and set apart the hypothesis of being unknowable of the thing-in-itself.
ahmad ali heydari
Abstract
In this paper, it is tried to consider the characteristics of the artistic understanding and to propound a proper answer to the question that “what is the art?” Since, this answer involves the element of value, the status of this element in the views of thinkers such Kant, Hegel, Adorno and ...
Read More
In this paper, it is tried to consider the characteristics of the artistic understanding and to propound a proper answer to the question that “what is the art?” Since, this answer involves the element of value, the status of this element in the views of thinkers such Kant, Hegel, Adorno and Heidegger are considered. The main conclusion of the paper is that Heidegger’s artistic conception enjoy characteristics relying on which we can prepare an area for conjoining different philosophical views about the value of the art and the works of art that gathering them together may seem very problematical.
masoud seyf
Abstract
The main question of this article is whether it is possible in Kant's ethical theory that an ethical agent commits mistake in recognizing a right ethical judgment or not. In order to reply to this question, first the place of wrong ethical judgment in Kant's ethical theory is considered. Then, by referring ...
Read More
The main question of this article is whether it is possible in Kant's ethical theory that an ethical agent commits mistake in recognizing a right ethical judgment or not. In order to reply to this question, first the place of wrong ethical judgment in Kant's ethical theory is considered. Then, by referring to the two main ethical principles in Kant's theory, i.e. universality and autonomy, it is tried to show that these principles are united in Kant’s view and this unity constitutes the basis of his theory and makes him not to accept the possibility of wrong ethical judgment in his ethical theory.
Mohammad Shafii
Abstract
While Kant presupposes the existence of science and ethic, he studies their boundaries and limits as well. For doing this, he applies two terms and expressions, i.e., “reason” and “understanding”. In this paper, we take a look at the definitions of those two concepts in Kant’s ...
Read More
While Kant presupposes the existence of science and ethic, he studies their boundaries and limits as well. For doing this, he applies two terms and expressions, i.e., “reason” and “understanding”. In this paper, we take a look at the definitions of those two concepts in Kant’s terminology within the approach that discriminates their differences. At first, the placement of these two faculties in science territory will be studied and then by examining of Kant’s ethical point of view, it will be concluded that in this approach, the functionality of reason appears in act and ethic domains, and pure reason is practical in its essence.
hoseyn kalbasi ashtari
Abstract
In the present article, the author tries to comparatively study capacities of two Asian and European philosophical systems concerning a particular issue- i.e. the faculty of reason-; and, in this way, to contemplate the possibility of a dialogue among philosophical traditions as an inexorable priority ...
Read More
In the present article, the author tries to comparatively study capacities of two Asian and European philosophical systems concerning a particular issue- i.e. the faculty of reason-; and, in this way, to contemplate the possibility of a dialogue among philosophical traditions as an inexorable priority of the present time. Though no limitation was recognized for reason in the space of Enlightenment (Aufklarung) and by the Newtonian physics, and in Kant’s critical philosophy, unity and complementarity of understanding were provided by reason; limitation of reason and its realm is emphasized practically. "Fallacies", "Antinomies", and "Ideal" of the "Pure Reason" were proclamations of failure of the reason in three fields of knowledge of the truth of Soul, Nature, and God; and" transcendental dialectic" was introduced as a critical situation stemmed from transcendence of the reason. The inevitable result of such approach was duality between subject and object, noumenon and phenomenon, understanding and reason; and Kant’s successors had to overcome such duality. In Islamic philosophy- and in particular in Sadrian philosophy- “Reason” contains, on the one hand, levels of knowledge and in fact levels of "Being", and on the other hand - unlike Aristotelian and Kantian traditions- there is no conflict between levels of knowledge; thus, “Reason” is introduced as a form of levels of Being and as corresponding to these levels. Though, lately in the 18th Century and early in the 19th Century, Kant’s successors- and in particular Hegel- focused their attempts to remove duality between subject and object and noumenon and phenomenon, no philosophical system based on traditional metaphysics managed to overcome the difficulty of critical philosophy. (It was only in the mid-20th Century that a new window was opened by the help of Husserl’s Phenomenology and Heidegger’s Hermeneutics). In the present article, through a comparative study between philosophical system of Kant and Mulla Sadra, the author is trying to open a road to dialogue and critical exchange of ideas between two great philosophical traditions in the West and East.
Stephen Palmquist
Abstract
The surprising comment U7ittgenstein malees at the end of his Tractatus suggests that, even thot(f!,h the analysis of tuords is the proper method of doint philosopy, philosopf?fs ultimate aim mqy be to experience silence. Whereas I:Vit(!!,enstein never explains 1vhat he meant kY his C'l)'ptic conclusion, ...
Read More
The surprising comment U7ittgenstein malees at the end of his Tractatus suggests that, even thot(f!,h the analysis of tuords is the proper method of doint philosopy, philosopf?fs ultimate aim mqy be to experience silence. Whereas I:Vit(!!,enstein never explains 1vhat he meant kY his C'l)'ptic conclusion, Kant provides numerous clues as to bo». the same position can he understood in a more complete and systematic 1vqy. Distin,rz,uishin,_rz, betiueen the meani,zrz,s of "silence," "noise" and "sound" provides a helpful 1vqy of understandinrz, hon; philosophers can devote so much effort to anctfyzjng nerds even thot(rz,h their quest is ultimate!J fu!ftlled onb1 in a deep experience of reali-t_y that is most adequate!J expressed in silence.
kostas kokozelis
Abstract
The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself ...
Read More
The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (Korsgaard). According to this view, the logical inescapability of choosing alivqys already places us within the normative realm. I argue that there is a further function suppressed by this view, which can be termed as approval. This takes us to the further acknowledgement that the core of Kant's practical rationality, that is, the moral question itself, is not simply one of moral knowledge [Wissen], but a broader one of cognition in general [Erkenntnis].
Andrew Gustafson
Abstract
Plantinga, Wolterstorff and Westphal are three eminent Christian Philosophers in the United States today. This paper will examine Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and Westphal's response to Kant's anti-realist epistemology. While perhaps many Christian philosophers doing philosophy of religion in the United ...
Read More
Plantinga, Wolterstorff and Westphal are three eminent Christian Philosophers in the United States today. This paper will examine Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and Westphal's response to Kant's anti-realist epistemology. While perhaps many Christian philosophers doing philosophy of religion in the United States follow the common-sense realism of Thomas Reid, some philosophers, like Merold Westphal, support a Christian-Kantian-Creative-Anti-Realism. I will criticize Plantinga's and Wolterstorff's position, and support Westphal's, arguing that Kant's epistemology does not harm religious belief but in fact supports it
mohammad ardeshir
Abstract
There are at least three elemental parts in Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics that mqy have their origin in Kant. These three parts are (1) the intuition ef time, (2) the synthetic a priority of mathematical kn01vledge, and (3) the inter-suf?jectiviry ef mathematical constructions. Brouwer borrowed ...
Read More
There are at least three elemental parts in Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics that mqy have their origin in Kant. These three parts are (1) the intuition ef time, (2) the synthetic a priority of mathematical kn01vledge, and (3) the inter-suf?jectiviry ef mathematical constructions. Brouwer borrowed the notion ef the movement eftime as an a priori intuition ef time, explicit!J expressed, from Kant. In Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics, the intuition ef time is the on/y a priori notion, on wbicb the whole ef mathematics is built. Houeuer, their notions o] the "intuition eftime" are not the same in the genealogy ef mind As far as the second item is concerned, Brouwer believes that all ef mathematical kn01vledge is a priori and synthetic. His arguments are differentfrom Kant's arguments. The concept of ''inter-suf?jectiviry" ef mathematics in Brotouer's philosophy is very involved, and there is no reference to Kant in this respect. One mqy interpret it f?y the Kantian transcendental subject or even the Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. Both interpretations seem to be consistent. My suggestion is to read Brauner ry himse!f.
louis pajman
Abstract
I can predict from the aspects and signs of our times that the human race 1vill... progressivefy improve without af!)l more total reversals.... The profit which will accrue to the human race as it works its wqy fonvard will not be an ever increasing quantity ofmorality in its attitudes. Instead the legality ...
Read More
I can predict from the aspects and signs of our times that the human race 1vill... progressivefy improve without af!)l more total reversals.... The profit which will accrue to the human race as it works its wqy fonvard will not be an ever increasing quantity ofmorality in its attitudes. Instead the legality of its attitudes willproduce an increasing number of actions governed 0 duty, tuha tever the particular motives behind these mqy be.... Violence will gradualfy become less on the part of those in pouer and obedience tou/ards the la1vs 1vill increase... and this 1vi!I ultimatefy extend to the external relations between the various peoples, until a cosmopolitan society is created. Such developments do not mean , however, that the basic moral capacity ofmankind will increase in the slightest, for this would require a kind ofnew creation or supernatural influence. For we must not expect too much of human beings in their progressive improvements. " (Reiss, 19 70, 18 7)
yooshitaka yamamooto
Abstract
Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "Critique ofpure reason" as the foundation of metaphysics in his "Kant and the Problem of Metapf.?ysics" and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of basic ontology'. But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, 'on the thinking ...
Read More
Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "Critique ofpure reason" as the foundation of metaphysics in his "Kant and the Problem of Metapf.?ysics" and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of basic ontology'. But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, 'on the thinking path of hvenryyearsfro m the first publication, the fatal mistakes andprivations of this stuqy have become so obvious for me that I have given up patching it up ivith complementary notes, an addition, or a postscript. ' It suggests that this book has the same 'mistakes andprivations' as his ''Sein und Zeit", and tue have to pqy attention to the fact that the 'mistakes and privations' are referred in the context of 'the problem of metapf.?ysics'. So I would like to distinguish the three dimensions ofproblems as following: (1) the problem of Kant's thought as the foundation of metaphysics, (2) the problem of metapl?Jsical thinking itse!f, and ( 3) the problem of Heidegger's ivqy of thinking, in which he cn'ticizes metapf.?ysics and Kant's thought. Then I 1vould like to make it clear the meaning of Heidegger's trial to overcome metaphysics and to bring it to fight that of his 'mistakes andprivations' are grounded in his wqy of thinking, which is, contrary to his intention, still in the range of metapbysica! thinking. And from thatpoint of viezv, I would like to reveal the problem of our wqy of thinking in contemporary philosopl?J, iuhicb is ouenuhelmed ry natural sciences.
mahmoud khatami
Abstract
The a priori is the basic characteristic ofKant's theory of knowledge. Formaliz/ng the a priori, Kant appears to distinguish the a priorifrom the postriori and qffirms its purity. He insists that the a priori is prior to the a postriori and stqys independent!Jfrom it. The overall objectiue of this paper ...
Read More
The a priori is the basic characteristic ofKant's theory of knowledge. Formaliz/ng the a priori, Kant appears to distinguish the a priorifrom the postriori and qffirms its purity. He insists that the a priori is prior to the a postriori and stqys independent!Jfrom it. The overall objectiue of this paper is, boueier; to present and to support this idea that the a priori, even prior, can be defined l?J its relation to experience; ifthe a priori is prior to the a postriori, and ifits validity is not depended on the a postriori, it is still not ivithout mry relation with it. The main thesis I u;iflfoll01v here is that the a postriori could be called the root of the a priori: the a priori has its principle in the a postriorijust because it is given to it. The a priori is given in the experience. Instead of conceiving the a priori as a formal or logical cond Ition of ol?Jectiviry, it uould be considered as immanent in the objea and apprehended during the very act of experience, although known implicit!J before experience occurs. If the a priori is indeed given in experience, we are not constrained to restrict it to the formal conditions of oijectiviry. However, before proceeding to substantiate this thesis, I 1vill reiien. Kant's analysis of the a priori quick/y. Then, I willpresent the main thesis and its proof to deformalize the a priori and implant it in the a postriori domain.
