Research Paper
philosophy
Zahra Haji Shahkaram; Seyyed Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad; Ghasem Pourhasan
Abstract
Extended Abstract IntroductionThis research offers a systematic examination of the foundations of Avicenna's multi-criteria (or integrative) theory within the realm of moral philosophy, particularly concerning the evaluation of human actions. It further analyzes the pivotal role of the concept of "conventional ...
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Extended Abstract IntroductionThis research offers a systematic examination of the foundations of Avicenna's multi-criteria (or integrative) theory within the realm of moral philosophy, particularly concerning the evaluation of human actions. It further analyzes the pivotal role of the concept of "conventional reason" or "general convention" in the framework of his ethical thought. Among many scholars of the history of philosophy, particularly within the Western tradition and in some cases, among researchers in the field of Islamic philosophy, there prevails a common interpretation that Muslim philosophers were primarily focused on metaphysical discussions, logic, and physics, and that in the domain of ethics, they did not develop an independent and coherent philosophical theory or framework. This perception has often been interpreted as the absence of a 'systematic moral philosophy' in the thought of philosophers such as al-Farabi and Avicenna. However, through a careful study that moves beyond selective and reductive readings of these philosophers' works, particularly by scrutinizing the lesser-known works of Avicenna in the field of practical ethics, household governance [tadbir al-manzil], and social organization, one can uncover dimensions of his ethical thought. These dimensions not only affirm the existence of such a system but also reveal a notable degree of theoretical sophistication. The claim that ethical reflection declined after al-Farabi and, more specifically, within the philosophical system of Avicenna, stems principally from a neglect of a significant portions of his corpus, the predominance of a metaphysical perspective in interpreting his thought, and, in certain instances, from a priori assumptions formed prior to comprehensive analysis.Research Question(s)The main question is: how may the three criteria, the rational, the religious (divine law), and the conventional (customary), be reconciled within a coherent normative framework? Are actions good or bad solely by virtue of their essence, or does the ground of their praiseworthiness or blameworthiness lie beyond their essence and rational structure? Can the integration of these three criteria provide answers to some of the most intricate and persistent problems?Literature ReviewTo date, no independent research has been conducted on Avicenna 's ethical system on the basis of his integrative approach that combines the three domains of ethics and the three corresponding criteria. However, from the very beginning, his particular view on this matter was reinterpreted and discussed by his students and later commentators. Avicenna, who following al-Farabi, first proposed an ethical perspective grounded in conventional opinions [mashhurāt] (Avicenna, 1404 AH) and distinguished between ethical propositions and actions based on intrinsic goodness and badness [ḥusn and qubḥ dhātī] (Avicenna, 1375 AH) and specific commendable acts [maḥmūdāt] (Avicenna, 1375 AH), influenced many thinkers and commentators. Among them are Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (Ṭūsī, 1403 AH) and Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadrā, 1391 AH), who addressed the three criteria in ethics, namely the rational, religious, and conventional standards, in relation to the goodness or badness of actions or propositions. In the modern period, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1350 AH) and his students, including Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (Muṭahharī, 1377 AH), Ḥā’irī (Ḥā’irī, 1394 AH), Miṣbāḥ (Miṣbāḥ, 1394 AH), and Javādī Āmulī (Javādī, 1373 AH), have revisited, interpreted, and elaborated aspects of this approach. More recently, Pūrḥasan, in Ibn Sina and Iranian Wisdom (Pūrḥasan, 1400 AH), and Pūrḥasan and Ḥājī Shāhkaram, in The Equation of Ethics and Religion (Pūrḥasan and Ḥājī Shāhkaram, 1403 AH), have examined certain dimensions of this theory within the framework of the six equations of ethics. Nevertheless, the integrative theory represents a new and original perspective in the study of Avicenna's ethical system. MethodologyOur primary method is a hermeneutic analysis of Avicenna’s texts and their interpretations across the three domains of the ethical system. While remaining attentive to a phenomenological orientation, we seek to employ hermeneutic analysis in the reinterpretation of these texts. The significance of this method lies in the fact that, by suspending prior interpretations and theories of commentators and interpreters concerning Avicenna, through adoption of a phenomenological approach, we aim to achieve a more direct engagement with the texts, one that is free from dominant widely held presuppositions, and thus to present a reading from Avicenna's own perspective on ethics. In contrast to many existing studies, this method enables us to disclose his distinctive view regarding the integration of the three ethical systems.Discussion A fundamental and distinctive innovation of Avicenna in the domain of ethics lies in his proposal of an integrative, multi-criteria framework for the assessment of the moral value of actions. In contradistinction to the monolithic approaches prevalent within certain philosophical traditions, which focus solely on intention (as observed in certain intra-religious interpretations), or exclusively on consequence (as in utilitarianism), or solely on the nature of the act itself (as in deontology), Avicenna advances a plurality of criteria synthesized within a unified theoretical construct. These criteria most likely include theoretical intellect (the apprehension of truth and existential perfection), psychic virtue (the moderation of the soul’s faculties as the internal foundation of action), individual and social expediency (consideration of the consequences and ends of action), as well as conformity with sound custom and established social conventions. This synthesis reveals Avicenna's realistic and holistic perspective on the complex phenomenon of ethical action, wherein the inner dimension and intention of the agent, the intrinsic characteristics of the act, as well as the social context and consequences of the action are all considered in moral judgment. Another significant contribution of Avicenna, which bears an intimate connection with the social dimension of his integrative theory, is his emphasis on the role of "conventional reason" (or social convention) in the formation and manifestation of part of the ethical system. By "conventional reason" is meant the collective and consensual wisdom that, within the context of a particular society and culture, gradually generates criteria for distinguishing good from evil, the virtuous from the vicious, and the reprehensible from the commendable. Avicenna recognizes such convention as an independent and complementary source alongside pure philosophical reason and religious law. Within his thought, this idea may be interpreted as a form of "contextually-grounded conventional reading" of ethics. Accordingly, many of the values and prescriptions that govern social life arise from this collective reason and from unwritten social conventions, which themselves emerge from lived experiences, shared necessities, and the everyday interactions of individuals within a community. This perspective distances Avicenna from a purely abstract and transhistorical conception of ethics and brings his thought closer to the dynamic reality and context-dependent nature of human ethical life.ConclusionRegrettably, both of these pivotal axes of Avicenna’s ethical thought, namely, his integrative multi-criteria theory and his contextually-grounded theory of conventional reason, have been largely neglected in studies on Avicenna. It may be argued that these concepts belong to the category of the "unthought," or at the very least the "underthought," within existing research on Islamic moral philosophy. This neglect has resulted in a fragmentary and reductive representation of the depth and scope of this major philosopher's thought. The present article, employing an analytical, hermeneutical, and analogical methodology, and drawing upon Avicenna’s primary texts, including al-Shifaʾ [The Healing], fi al-Akhlaq [On Ethics], fi al-Siyasa [on politics], Tadbir al-manziliyya [On Household Administration], fi al-‘Ahd [On the Covenant], as well as al-Najat, al-Isharat wa-l-tanbihat [Directives and Remarks], the Danish Namah-I-Alaii, and al-Mubaḥathat [The Discussions], seeks to elucidate, through an examination of these two interconnected issues, the innovative dimensions and neglected contributions of Avicenna in the domain of moral philosophy. In so doing, the study aimed to demonstrate how Avicenna, by conjoining internal criteria (virtue) and external criteria (consequences and utility, convention and satisfaction), and by integrating a purely philosophical perspective with a socio-centric and context-sensitive outlook, articulates a flexible yet systematic framework for the ethical assessment of actions.Moreover, it will be argued that, within his framework, the concept of "conventional reason" constitutes not merely a derivative or secondary consideration, but rather a fundamental source for normative determination in the sphere of collective life, one capable of bridging rational ideals and the mutable realities of the social order.A reassessment and revitalization of these aspects of Avicenna's ethical thought carries several significant implications. First, this approach enriches the historiography of moral philosophy by revealing the hitherto unrecognized capacities of the Islamic philosophical tradition in this domain. Second, it challenges the prevalent and reductive representation of Avicenna as a purely metaphysical thinker. Third, it facilitates a dialogue between Islamic moral philosophy and contemporary ethical schools, such as virtue ethics, contextualism, Kantian ethics, and certain forms of moral pragmatism, which emphasize concepts such as the integration of criteria, the role of society and context in morality, and practical wisdom. Finally, it offers a conceptual framework for addressing the complex ethical dilemmas of contemporary societies, where the tension between universal principles and local values, between abstract rationality and empirical collective wisdom, is acutely felt.
Research Paper
philosophy
Simin Jahani; Mohsen Javadi; Zahra Khazaei
Abstract
Extended Abstract IntroductionThis article addresses the tension between Zagzebski’s theory of exemplarism and the Kantian principle of moral autonomy. Autonomy, one of the foundational tenets of Kantian ethics, emphasizes the self-regulation of the moral agent and their independence from any motive ...
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Extended Abstract IntroductionThis article addresses the tension between Zagzebski’s theory of exemplarism and the Kantian principle of moral autonomy. Autonomy, one of the foundational tenets of Kantian ethics, emphasizes the self-regulation of the moral agent and their independence from any motive other than moral duty. That is, no external authority, such as society, divine will, or even psychological characteristics, should impose moral obligations on us. At first glance, this principle appears to conflict with the adoption of an exemplar as a moral authority, as Kant explicitly warns against the practice of modeling one’s morality on others.Drawing upon the theory of moral exemplarism, which is central to Zagzebski’s virtue ethics, this article explains its various components, including self-trust, the emotions of admiration, narrative, and conscience-based reflection. In doing so, it raises the challenge that Zagzebski herself addressed and that critics consider to be the most significant problem for exemplarism: how to reconcile the emulation of exemplars with a steadfast commitment to the Kantian principle of autonomy. The main issue is whether the process of moral development through virtuous exemplars, which appears inherently imitative, and the idea of autonomy can be reconciled. Can moral exemplars serve as the basis for the development of moral virtue without undermining the agent’s autonomy?To answer these questions, the article first examines Zagzebski's account of how the moral agent engages with the exemplar (moral agent). Furthermore, it incorporates contemporary interpretations of Kant such as Korsgaard, to argue that autonomy in Zagzebski's view, reinterpreted through the lens of Korsgaard, does not imply isolation and radical self-reliance. Instead, autonomy is formed through interaction with others, including moral exemplars. In Korsgaard's interpretation, autonomy signifies conscientious self-governance, where the criterion for success is when one’s beliefs, emotions and actions withstand the test of conscientious reflection. By analyzing the concept of moral authority within an exemplarist framework, Zagzebski addresses its relationship with imitation, a concept that Kantian ethics often rejects. Zagzebski demonstrates that the emotional and epistemological bond formed with a role exemplar does not violate autonomy. Relying on the Enlightenment tradition regarding the position of the self, self-awareness, the rational ability of the individual, and the inner capacities of an individual, she develops the concepts of "self-trust", “self-awareness”, and the "self-conscious self" which is the ultimate bearer of authority. A self-conscious agent, by virtue of having a “self,” possesses executive function and inherent authority over themselves. The question then arises: Is trust in others (and thus adopting a role exemplar) rational? Here, Zagzebski bridges self-trust to trust in others. Following the rational principle of “treating like things alike,” someone who trusts their own cognitive faculties must extend that trust to other self-conscious and conscientious individuals who possess similar faculties, a trust essential for both knowledge and autonomy.Beyond this challenge, Zagzebski addresses significant criticisms of exemplarism (including the risk of idealizing exemplars, or the potential for bias or abuse of moral authority) by invoking the concept of “reflective admiration.” This is not merely an immediate emotional reaction; when accompanied by reflection, it serves as an epistemic tool for recognizing virtue. Admiration within exemplarism has cognitive and emotional aspects. The former constructs the theory’s conceptual framework, while the latter provides the source of motivation. This concept is pivotal in resolving the autonomy challenge. Epistemic authority stems from the trust generated by admiration for the role exemplar, rather than from their external or institutional position. We first identify an individual as a role exemplar through experience and then we confirm this admiration through reflection, and thus the individual becomes a moral authority. A causal and normative relationship exists between being a role exemplar and exercising authority. Authority is conferred upon those deemed worthy of emulation due to virtues such as honesty, wisdom, and humility; the very qualities that prompt admiration. There is a connection between the authority of an exemplar and the exemplar as model for ourselves. This connection explains why authority is compatible with autonomy.Literature Review A review of the published literature on exemplarism and autonomy indicates that existing studies have largely been limited to describing the theory of exemplarism and autonomy. However, one of the most significant challenges of exemplarism theory, namely its compatibility with the principle of autonomy, has not been adequately addressed. A survey of the relevant articles further shows that many studies have examined the concept of autonomy in relation to technology, the ethics of care, and authenticity, while others have explored exemplarism in connection with Quranic ethics, organizational ethics, and mystical exemplarism.MethodologyIn this article, through a conceptual analysis of key notions employed by Zagzebski, such as narrative, epistemic authority, self-trust, admiration and reflective admiration, the researchers elucidated her argument and explanation of the epistemic dimension of emotions.Discussion and ConclusionThis article, focusing on Zagzebski’s theory of exemplarism, examines the relationship between “moral emulation” and Kant’s “autonomy.” In examining the central elements of exemplarism, it became clear that Zagzebski, by emphasizing the role of admiration and exposure to moral exemplars, grounds moral development in an initial affective perception (an emotionally mediated recognition of excellence) that sets the agent on the path toward virtue. This process begins with a prima facie trust in the emotion of admiration.Crucially, however, the originality of moral growth lies not in uncritical obedience to another, but in the agent’s inner capacity for conscientious reflection. Thus, in Zagzebski’s theory of exemplarism, emulation in the context of conscientious reflection constitutes a form of active self-regulation. In this view, imitation is a responsible response to the recognition of virtue in another. While it acknowledges the exemplar’s moral authority, it simultaneously facilitates the development of internal authority, strengthens moral self-trust, and deepens moral independence. Accordingly, the notion of imitation, which in Kantian account appears ambiguous, and at times explicitly rejected, can be reconstructed within the framework of the theory of exemplarism in the form of reflective emulation, especially when interpreted through Korsgaard's account of autonomy.
Research Paper
philosophy
Ghazaleh Hojjati
Abstract
Extended Abstract IntroductionThe inference to a divine designer from the presence of order, complexity, and purposiveness in nature has historically constituted one of the most intuitively compelling arguments for the existence of God. Known as the Argument from Design or the teleological argument, ...
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Extended Abstract IntroductionThe inference to a divine designer from the presence of order, complexity, and purposiveness in nature has historically constituted one of the most intuitively compelling arguments for the existence of God. Known as the Argument from Design or the teleological argument, its persuasive force lies in the apparent improbability that highly intricate natural structures, such as biological systems, planetary motions, or fundamental physical constants, could arise through unguided processes. Yet the philosophical credibility of this argument was significantly challenged by David Hume’s well-known criticisms in the 18th century. In response, a reformulation of the design argument has emerged in contemporary philosophy of religion, drawing on the methodology of abductive inference or inference to the best explanation (IBE). This paper presents and defends this abductive formulation of the design argument, showing how it effectively addresses Hume’s classical objections and offers a philosophically resilient case for theistic belief. Literature Review In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume questioned the analogical foundation of the design argument, doubted its empirical adequacy, raised the specter of alternative naturalistic explanations, exposed the problem of designer regress, and invoked the existence of evil and suffering as disconfirming evidence for a benevolent and omnipotent designer. The traditional design argument relied heavily on a substantive analogy between natural systems (e.g., the universe) and human artifacts (e.g., a watch). Hume rightly criticized the strength of this analogy given the profound dissimilarities between the cosmos and human-made objects. Moreover, he argued that chance, physical necessity, or an infinite series of designers could equally account for the appearance of order. These objections have long been considered deeply damaging to the classical teleological argument. However, recent work in philosophy of religion has revived the design argument by shifting from analogical reasoning to abductive reasoning, thereby avoiding Hume’s central critiques and presenting the design hypothesis as the best explanation for fine-tuning and biological complexity.MethodologyThis study employs the method of abductive inference, or inference to the best explanation (IBE), which is widely used in both philosophy and science. Rather than resting on a problematic analogy between the universe and human artifacts, the abductive approach evaluates competing explanatory hypotheses for the existence of fine-tuned structure and order in the universe. The core claim is that, among possible explanations, namely, random chance, physical necessity, or intelligent design, the design hypothesis possesses the strongest explanatory virtues: it accounts for the data more coherently, more simply, and with greater predictive depth than its counterparts. This abductive strategy does not aim to demonstrate the existence of God with deductive certainty but to show that theism is the best available explanation for phenomena such as cosmological fine-tuning and biological complexity. The paper systematically applies IBE criteria, explanatory scope, simplicity, coherence, and predictive power, to compare the three rival hypotheses. Additionally, it addresses Hume’s specific objections (analogy failure, regress problem, problem of evil, and inductive skepticism) within the abductive framework, demonstrating how each objection loses its force when the argument is reformulated as an inference to the best explanation.Discussion and ConclusionThe reconfiguration of the design argument along abductive lines transforms it from a fragile analogy into a rigorous explanatory model. The abductive formulation dispenses with any analogy between the universe and human artifacts, instead treating lawlike regularities, precise initial conditions, and biological intricacies as data points in need of explanation. Against Hume’s viable alternatives: pure chance fails to account for the extraordinarily low probability of life-permitting parameters; physical necessity offers order but it offers no explanatory insight into why the fundamental laws of nature are precisely as they are. The design hypothesis not only accommodates fine-tuning but renders it intelligible; the universe appears as it does because it was intentionally ordered by a rational agent. The concern about infinite regress is addressed by appealing to the epistemological norms of best explanation: just as the laws of physics are treated as fundamental in scientific explanation without further causal grounding, the postulation of a simple, necessary, or non-contingent designer need not itself be explained to serve as the best explanation for cosmic order. Finally, Hume’s inductive skepticism is met by shifting from frequency-based induction to comparative explanatory success, aligning the design argument with contemporary philosophy of science where IBE justifies theoretical postulates. Thus, even if certainty is unattainable, rational belief in design is warranted if it emerges as the best explanation available. This modern defense of theism does not claim logical compulsion but epistemic superiority, showing that given the current state of knowledge, belief in a designer is more intellectually satisfying and explanatorily powerful than disbelief. It highlights the importance of reformulating traditional arguments in light of advances in logic, methodology, and science, thereby offering a promising trajectory for religious epistemology.
Research Paper
philosophy
Ahmad Ebadi; Amirpouya Danesh
Abstract
Extended Abstract IntroductionThe asymmetry of time—its apparent direction from past to future—remains one of the most perplexing problems in contemporary philosophy of physics. While the fundamental laws of nature are largely time-symmetric, human experience and macroscopic phenomena exhibit ...
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Extended Abstract IntroductionThe asymmetry of time—its apparent direction from past to future—remains one of the most perplexing problems in contemporary philosophy of physics. While the fundamental laws of nature are largely time-symmetric, human experience and macroscopic phenomena exhibit a clear temporal directionality. This tension has led to competing explanatory frameworks. David Albert’s Past Hypothesis attributes the arrow of time to a low-entropy initial condition of the universe, while Huw Price critiques this approach, arguing that temporal asymmetry is a cognitive and linguistic construct rather than a physical reality. This article offers a comparative analysis of these two positions and proposes an alternative framework: the Layer-Phenomenological Model of Time, which integrates physical, phenomenal, and existential dimensions to provide a more comprehensive account of temporality.Literature Review Albert’s Past Hypothesis, developed in Time and Chance, builds on Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics and posits that the universe began in a highly ordered, low-entropy state. This improbable initial condition, Albert argues, accounts for the macroscopic arrow of time and the one-way structure of causality. He emphasizes that temporal directionality is not derived from the laws of physics themselves, which are symmetric, but from the statistical distribution of states in phase space. Albert’s framework avoids invoking observers or mental experience, treating time as an objective feature grounded in physical probability.Price, by contrast, challenges the explanatory sufficiency of the Past Hypothesis. In Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point, he argues that many physical theories presuppose the very directionality they aim to explain. He introduces the notion of “temporal bias,” suggesting that our intuitions and linguistic structures shape our perception of time’s asymmetry. Price therefore advocates for a “view from outside”, a supra-temporal perspective that reveals the symmetry of physical laws and the constructed nature of temporal distinctions. He further explores retrocausality in quantum mechanics, proposing that effects may precede causes without contradiction, thereby undermining the necessity of temporal asymmetry.This debate reflects deeper metaphysical questions: Is time’s directionality an objective feature of the universe, or is it a cognitive artifact? Albert’s realism and Price’s constructivism represent two poles of this philosophical spectrum. The present article seeks to bridge these positions through a layered model that accommodates both physical and experiential dimensions of time.MethodologyThe study employs a comparative philosophical methodology, analyzing Albert’s and Price’s theories alongside classical Islamic perspectives, particularly those of Avicenna and Suhrawardī. It draws on primary texts in physics, metaphysics, and phenomenology, including works by Boltzmann, Reichenbach, Carroll, and contemporary quantum theorists. The Layer-Phenomenological Model is constructed through conceptual synthesis, aiming to reconcile the explanatory strengths of both physical realism and phenomenological analysis.The Layer-Phenomenological Model of Time posits three interrelated layers:Physical Layer: Time is understood as a statistical and causal structure arising from initial conditions, entropy, and quantum dynamics. Albert’s Past Hypothesis is situated here, emphasizing the objective basis of temporal directionality.Phenomenal Layer: Time is experienced through consciousness, memory, and anticipation. Drawing on Husserl’s tripartite model (retention, impression, and protention) this layer accounts for the subjective experience of temporal flow and asymmetry.Existential-Conceptual Layer: Inspired by Islamic philosophy, this layer interprets time as a metaphysical horizon that transcends both physical and phenomenal dimensions. Avicenna conceives time as the measure of motion, dependent on both external change and intellectual apprehension. Suhrawardī views time as a luminous unfolding within the hierarchy of being, where causality is not mechanical but illuminative.This stratified model avoids the reductionism of Albert’s physicalism and the epistemic exclusivity of Price’s constructivism. It shows that time is neither entirely external nor purely internal, but emerges through the interplay of physical laws, conscious experience, and metaphysical orientation.DiscussionAlbert’s framework rigorously constructs temporal asymmetry from statistical mechanics. He distinguishes between microstate dynamics and macrostate evolution, arguing that the improbability of the universe’s initial state grounds the arrow of time. He treats wave function collapse as a real, asymmetric physical event, reinforcing the directionality of time. Probability, in his view, is ontological, not epistemic.Price, however, critiques this approach as circular. He argues that the assumption of low entropy already presupposes temporal asymmetry. His constructivist lens reveals that many physical explanations are shaped by observer bias and narrative structure. He emphasizes the role of language, cognition, and representation in forming our concept of time. Price’s advocacy for retrocausality and time-symmetric interpretations challenges the necessity of one-way causality and collapse.The contrast between Albert and Price is not merely empirical but philosophical. Albert moves from physics to experience, seeking objective foundations. Price moves from experience to physics, exposing hidden presuppositions. Their divergent paths highlight the need for a model that integrates both perspectives.Integration of Islamic Philosophy Avicenna’s conception of time as the measure of motion situates temporality within a dual framework of nature and intellect. He emphasizes that time has meaning only insofar as change exists and is apprehended by reason. This view aligns with the phenomenal layer of the proposed model, where time is shaped by both external motion and internal cognition.Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy offers a metaphysical account of time as the luminous unfolding of being. Time is not mechanical but existential, arising from the gradations of light and the ontological dependence of effects on causes. His doctrine of idāfa ishrāqiyya (illuminative relation) reframes causality as pure dependence, not categorical relation. This perspective enriches the existential-conceptual layer of the model, offering a non-reductive account of temporal emergence.Findings and Implications The Layer-Phenomenological Model reveals that time’s directionality cannot be fully explained by initial conditions or cognitive bias alone. Instead, it emerges from the dynamic interaction of physical structure, conscious experience, and metaphysical depth. This model provides a framework for reinterpreting key phenomena:- Prayer and Revelation: Not merely psychological acts, but moments of contact with the metaphysical horizon of time.- Wave Function Collapse: Not solely a physical event, but also a reflection of observer position and narrative structure.- Causality: Not a fixed ontological feature, but a layered phenomenon shaped by statistical behavior, experiential orientation, and metaphysical dependence.By integrating insights from physics, phenomenology, and Islamic philosophy, the model offers a robust foundation for rethinking temporality in both scientific and theological contexts.ConclusionThe directionality of time is a multilayered phenomenon that resists reduction to any single explanatory framework. Albert’s Past Hypothesis and Price’s Construct Hypothesis each illuminate important aspects of temporality, yet their respective limitations indicate the need for a more integrative approach. The Layer-Phenomenological Model of Time provides such a framework, by bringing together physical realism with phenomenological depth and metaphysical insight. It opens new pathways for understanding time not as a singular entity, but as a horizon of emergence, experience, and meaning.
Research Paper
philosophy
Qodratullah Qorbani
Abstract
Extended Abstract IntroductionThe question of the historicity of religion and the verses on revelation is deeply challenging. Conversely, the belief in the transhistorical nature of religion in its entirety also faces serious difficulties. In fact, each of these two positions carries its own set of characteristics, ...
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Extended Abstract IntroductionThe question of the historicity of religion and the verses on revelation is deeply challenging. Conversely, the belief in the transhistorical nature of religion in its entirety also faces serious difficulties. In fact, each of these two positions carries its own set of characteristics, theoretical and practical implications, and consequences, and each confronts its proponents with substantial problems. Those who maintain that religion is entirely transhistorical, in all its teachings and rulings, must not only demonstrate the function of religious doctrines under any circumstances, even at the level of particular instances, but also to address counterexamples that seem to contradict their claim. Such an approach must further defend the universality, stability, and comprehensiveness of the teachings and verses of revelation across all relevant domains.In contrast, the historicity approach must be able to specify which aspect of religion it considers historical. Does historicity apply to the religious message itself, to the sacred texts, to believers’ interpretations of religion, or only to a subset of revelatory rulings and teachings? Furthermore, this view must address the following: What are the epistemological, hermeneutical, practical, and linguistic consequences of affirming the historicity of religion for theology? In particular, could such a view lead to epistemic relativism or undermine the epistemic validity of revelatory teachings?Broadly speaking, there are two dominant views regarding the historicity of revelation. The first affirms the transhistorical character of all verses of revelation, accepting no temporal or spatial limitations for them. The second emphasizes the historicity of most, or even all, verses of revelation (the Qur’an), and indeed of religion itself. The first view rests on the premise that the Qur’anic verses have a divine origin, that Islam is an eternal and comprehensive religion, and that God possesses absolute knowledge of what benefits His creatures. Consequently, the verses of revelation are necessarily transhistorical. The second view, in its various formulations, points to the historicity either of the phenomenon of religion itself, or of religious texts, or of believers’ interpretations. In its more minimal form, it applies to certain legal (juridical) and scientific verses. This view is grounded in the necessity that the revelatory message be formed within the temporal, spatial, and cultural context of the people at the time of its descent. Given the difficulties inherent in both perspectives, this study seeks to offer an integrative, subject-based approach that draws on the strengths of each while avoiding their shortcomings.Methodology The approach of religious historicity operates on multiple levels. It may attribute historicity to the very essence and origin of the religious message; to the stage of receiving and delivering revelation; to the implementation and efficacy of religion; to believers’ reading and understanding of religious texts; or to the preservation and continuity of religion. In other words, the historicity of religion can encompass the original message, the religious scriptures themselves, the recipient of revelation, the conditions of its descent, and its execution and transmission. Such a view is particularly rooted in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, in which human existence is inherently historical, temporal, and spatial. Historicity thus becomes an inescapable bound of human existence. Religious texts, too, are embedded in cultural, historical, and geographical contexts, what is often called tradition, and acquire meaning within those boundaries. On this view, neither tradition, nor language, nor understanding, nor experience, nor human existence is fixed or unchanging; all are in constant flux.The transhistorical approach, by contrast, has been the dominant view among traditional Muslim scholars regarding the content of the Qur’anic verses. It rests on key foundations: the divine origin of the Qur’an; that the verses of revelation are God’s very words sent down to the Prophet’s heart; that the Qur’an is a clear exposition of all things (tibyān li-kulli shay’), addressing all human needs; and that the Qur’an is an eternal text for the final religion, universally containing the teachings necessary for humanity. Proponents cite verses such as Q. 6:38; 5:3; 16:89, 44; 59:7; 34:28; and 21:107. This view also emphasizes that the Qur’an was revealed in Arabic, in the very words that exist, from God to the Prophet, the Prophet being the receptive cause of revelation, not its active cause. Moreover, citing verses such as Q. 53:3–4, it insists that not only is the Qur’an divine revelation, but its reception and delivery are free from any human whim or desire on the part of the Prophet. In this perspective, all verses, whether doctrinal, ethical, legal, or otherwise, possess equal and permanent, transhistorical validity and are never subject to abrogation.Discussion Given the challenges faced by both the historicity and transhistoricity views, this study proposes an integrative, subject‑based approach. This approach seeks to benefit from the advantages of both perspectives while avoiding their drawbacks as much as possible.The first step is to attend to the thematic diversity of the revelatory verses and focus on their content. In this way, we can determine what characteristics different groups of divine verses, addressing different topics, have regarding historicity or transhistoricity. Using an inductive method, the Qur’anic verses are classified into categories such as: philosophical‑doctrinal, ethical, ritual‑legal (jurisprudential), narrative‑historical, social‑ political‑ economic, scientific, women‑related, and divine norms (sunan). This classification helps us recognize the general features of each category, thereby enabling better judgment about their historicity or transhistoricity, and avoiding confusion among their distinct characteristics. In other words, this classification helps us understand: What is the occasion of revelation (sha’n nuzūl) for such verses? Is their implication and message limited, temporary, and historical, or is it transhistorical, trans‑temporal, and trans‑spatial?Conclusion Attending to the thematic diversity of divine verses appears to be a sound method for properly assessing their possible transhistoricity or historicity. This approach allows us to distinguish the subject matter to which the verses refer and to understand more clearly the purposes for which they were revealed in different contexts. Notably, it clarifies God’s intrinsic intention (al-qaṣd bi-al-dhāt) from His extrinsic intention (al-qaṣd bi-al-ʿaraḍ) in sending down diverse verses. Distinguishing God’s intrinsic intention from His extrinsic intention in turn distinguishes what is “religious” from what is “non‑religious” but nevertheless serves a religious purpose. Consequently, verses that directly express God’s intrinsic intention and are regarded as religious undoubtedly possess a transhistorical, trans‑spatial, and trans‑temporal character, because they directly convey God’s eternal and everlasting messages. Verses that reflect God’s extrinsic intention and are non‑religious, however, may have their subject matter affected by historicity, yet the purpose of their revelation, divine guidance, remains non‑historical, eternal, and everlasting. Thus, distinguishing what is religious and intended by God intrinsically from what is non‑religious and intended extrinsically is of great importance. In effect, this distinction helps separate the historical context of revelation (the matter to which revelation refers) from the purpose for which revelation was sent down. Even when the context or subject matter of revelation is historical, the purpose may still be transhistorical.Finally, paying attention to the various roles of the Prophet of Islam, as recipient, deliverer, and actor upon revelation, can also help in discerning the transhistorical or historical dimensions of the verses. Distinguishing the Prophet’s religious functions from his non‑religious (worldly) functions can help us recognize that some verses revealed in his time were meant to guide him in managing the economic, political, social, and cultural affairs of his contemporary society. As the conditions of later societies change, such guidance may no longer be applicable in its specific instances, because it addressed the Prophet’s non‑religious functions in that particular society. Nevertheless, extracting general principles from them for the believers of subsequent eras remains possible and viable.
Research Paper
philosophy
Safoura Panahi; Seyed Ali Kalantari; Amir Ehsan Karbasizadeh
Abstract
Extended Abstract IntroductionThe problem of the normativity of logic is one of the fundamental debates in contemporary philosophy of logic, examining the relationship between the “formal laws of logic” and “epistemic norms.” This theory seeks to attribute a role to logic that ...
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Extended Abstract IntroductionThe problem of the normativity of logic is one of the fundamental debates in contemporary philosophy of logic, examining the relationship between the “formal laws of logic” and “epistemic norms.” This theory seeks to attribute a role to logic that extends beyond the mere evaluation of the validity of arguments, presenting it as a normative tool for regulating belief and properly guiding thought. Such a conception transforms logic from an abstract science into a practical guide for epistemic life. Nevertheless, the unquestioning acceptance of the normativity of logic faces numerous psychological and epistemic challenges. Philosophers therefore attempt to determine how a balance might be achieved between the “logical ought” and human “epistemic capacity.” If logic is regarded as strictly normative, the human mind is confronted with a vast array of logical consequences that it lacks the capacity to process; conversely, if the link between logic and norms is severed, rationality and the coherence of thought are compromised. This research aims to find a middle ground to address this dilemma.Research Question(s)Is it possible to provide a formulation of the normativity of logic that is both consistent with common-sense intuitions and resilient against fundamental critiques (particularly those advanced by Harman)?Can a diachronic interpretation of logical norms address Gilbert Harman’s critiques regarding everyday reasoning? Literature ReviewThe normativity of logic, which roots can be traced to philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and particularly Gottlob Frege, has been reconstructed and further developed in the contemporary era by John MacFarlane. The perspective held by Frege and MacFarlane is grounded in the conviction that logic must prescribe binding normative rules for thought. By contrast, Gilbert Harman, through his critique of the principles of implication and contradiction, argues that these principles have limited utility in everyday life and that there is no definitive link between formal logic and ordinary reasoning.In response to these critiques, John MacFarlane attempts to provide a more nuanced account of logical normativity by proposing a systematic framework known as ‘Bridge Principles.’ By introducing 36 distinct formulations based on three parameters, the type of deontic operator (obligation, permission, or having a reason), polarity (positive or negative norms), and scope (narrow, medium, or wide), he outlines a comprehensive set of possible norms. These formulations enable philosophers to specify precisely under what conditions a logical entailment obliges an agent to revise their beliefs.The Preface Paradox demonstrates that an individual may hold a set of inconsistent initial beliefs without knowing which specific one is false. In such a situation, the abrupt or arbitrary discarding of beliefs is irrational. This paper proposes the ‘Gradual Belief Revision’ approach, which is grounded in a step-by-step review and the incremental identification of contradictions. MethodologyThis research employs a method of logical-philosophical analysis and systematic evaluation. In the first step, by utilizing 36 different formulations of normative principles derived from the relation , and by applying MacFarlane’s indices (deontic operator type, polarity, and scope), the landscape of possible norms was mapped. Subsequently, these norms were evaluated against five rational criteria: Maximal Demands, the Preface Paradox, the Strictness Criterion, the Priority Problem, and Logical Adversity.Furthermore, to resolve the ‘Preface Paradox,’ the ‘Gradual Belief Revision’ approach was proposed and elucidated through practical analogies. After identifying the weaknesses in traditional norms (such as those based on strict requirement), the study, using an analytic-synthetic method, proposes a new model based on the distinction between ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ interpretations. Discussion In the evaluations conducted, many Wo+ and Wr- norms are rejected for various reasons. A focal point of the discussion is the ‘Preface Paradox’, which demonstrates that an individual may hold a set of conflicting initial beliefs without being able to correctly identify which specific belief is false. In such circumstances, the abrupt or arbitrary discarding of beliefs is irrational. In response to this problem, the paper proposes an approach based on the ‘gradualness of belief revision.’ According to this view, the process of making a belief network consistent should not rely on instantaneous elimination; rather, it should be grounded in continuous review, the incremental identification of contradictions, and step-by-step refinement. This approach is illustrated through an analogy of managing real-world issues (such as a factory manager dealing with undocumented employees).In this article, while critically analyzing various normative formulations, the author examines the combination of Wr+ and Wo- norms. Here, Wr+ functions as a positive reason for believing in logical consequences, allowing for the defeasibility of reasons in the face of the stringent requirements of Wo+. Meanwhile, the Wo- norm is introduced as a norm governing the ‘closure’ of the belief network, requiring that whenever an individual believes in premises A and B, they must not disbelieve the consequence C.Through this lens, the paper identifies two distinct interpretations of Wo-: Synchronic and Diachronic. The synchronic interpretation (Wo-s) asserts that an individual’s beliefs must be fully consistent with norms at a single moment; that is, you must ensure that at the very instant you believe A and B, you do not disbelieve C. However, this expectation is unrealistic in everyday life, as beliefs may encounter contradictions simultaneously. In contrast, the diachronic interpretation (Wo-d) emphasizes that adherence to norms must occur over time. That is, an individual should gradually avoid disbelieving logical consequences through continuous revision of their beliefs; you must ensure that throughout the time you hold beliefs A and B, you do not disbelieve C. This approach allows for the gradual identification and resolution of contradictions and is more aligned with intuition and daily experience.Therefore, the diachronic interpretation of Wo- is proposed as a more logical and practical model compared to its synchronic counterpart. According to Wo-d, an individual must avoid disbelieving logical consequences over time through the gradual revision of their beliefs. This diachronic interpretation aligns with fallibilism, epistemic revision, and common-sense intuitions. ConclusionIn conclusion, the paper demonstrates that the combination of Wo−d and Wr+ as two complementary norms not only compensates for the weakness of Wo− in facing logical adversity but also mitigates the limitations of Wr+ regarding its obligatory force. Furthermore, by establishing a balance between logical requirement and epistemic flexibility, this combination provides a deliberate framework for responding to Harman’s criticisms.Additionally, considering the variation in circumstances, the relative importance of these two norms is deemed context-sensitive: the significance of Wr+ becomes more pronounced in contexts where an individual’s background beliefs are limited, whereas its role diminishes in contexts with a vast number of background beliefs. In contrast, Wo−d remains consistently important, while it is Wr+ that fluctuates in intensity depending on the context. This flexibility in prioritizing norms is itself an indication of the proposed model’s theoretical capacity to align with the real-world complexities of reasoning and believability.
