Analysis and investigation of the concept of

Abdollahi, Mohammad Saied; Javadi, Mohsen; Legenhausen, Muhammad

doi:10.22054/wph.2024.75844.2188

Analysis and investigation of the concept of "hinge propositions" in Wittgenstein's epistemic system (based on the book "On Certainty")

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

mohammad saied abdollahi ¹

Mohsen Javadi ²

Muhammad Legenhausen ³

¹ qom university

² University of Qom

³ Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute

https://doi.org/10.22054/wph.2024.75844.2188

Abstract

In his reflections on certainty and his epistemological analyses, Wittgenstein mentions propositions that he calls "hinge propositions". What role do these propositions play in Wittgenstein's epistemological system? What are their characteristics and how many types are there? What is their difference or similarity with other definite propositions such as mathematical propositions? The mentioned items are some of the questions that we will address in this article. According to Wittgenstein, when we reach these propositions, doubt loses its meaning. These propositions are like hinges around which our beliefs revolve. Hinge propositions do not give us knowledge, but they build the basis of knowledge. They are not ordinary propositions because properties such as knowability, being justified or unjustified, being true or false do not have meaning about them. These propositions are the criteria of truth and falsity. In this article after clarifying the concept of hinged propositions, we will enumerate their different types and examine Wittgenstein's claims about propositions. Also, we have tried to show Wittgenstein's meaning by making such propositions and finally we try to criticize his point of view.

Keywords

Certainty

knowledge

Wittgenstein

basis of knowledge

hinge propositions

Subjects

philosophy

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