Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
Abstract
First, we shall scrutinize Modal Generalism and Modal Particularism, two main metaphysical approaches to modality, and recount their differences. Second, we’ll explain epistemic and metaphysical possibilities and how they are explicated at generalism. There, we’ll show that metaphysical necessity, nemed to broad logical necessity, is a kind of logical necessity. By this definition of metaphysical necessity, the relation between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility is partial-general-and-specific. Third, on the one hand we’ll critique the modal generalism in which our intuitive perception of modality will be refuted and on the other hand, some accounts of modal particularism like Possibilism and Haecceitism are confronted with some kind of Ungroundedness. Next, we’ll present a new account of modal particularism. In this new account, the concept of “being a possible world”, as a modal concept, is counted as Primitive concept. With the help of this new account and the concept Conceiving, we’ll present a new definition of Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility. At last, we shall show that in this new definition, the relation between epistemic and metaphysical possibility is absolute-general-and-specific.
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