Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Abstract
In his philosophical theory of space (and time), Immanuel Kant distinguishes between the relation that exists between things to each other in space (Verhaltnis) and the one that exists between space (and time) to us (Beziehung). He holds that space cannot be manifested by the mere experience of relations between spatial manifestations of things. Rather, space results solely from the possibilities of representation of space/place. However, our awareness of the reality of space/place does not depend on the experiential recognition of things. Human beings are engaged in space without having any primary experience of space, whereas Kant somehow reduces space to some external spatial aspect of things. Nevertheless, space amounts to more than what Kant considers to be the grasping/understanding of the pure form of space. The origin of space lies primarily/essentially beyond the human subjectivity and the boundaries of cognitive recognition of space/place. Kant regards space as the condition of the appearance of things that exist in the external world and become available to our perceptions, though there would be no relation between space and the determinations of things themselves. Therefore, one may ask where that space/place is where things in themselves exist. On the one hand, Kant does not provide any positive argument in order to dismiss the space itself that maintains the thing(s) in itself. On the other hand, if space is not a characteristic of a thing in itself, it cannot be said that the thing in itself is contained in space itself. If space is not given to us as a primary reality that is irreducible to the mere characteristics of things in themselves, things in themselves, as substances, would have nothing in common with space, whether substantial or not. If we do not accept that space is a place where things in themselves are, then where would those things in themselves be located? Moreover, where would we and our world be situated?
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