Extended Abstract

Introduction

This article addresses the tension between Zagzebski’s theory of exemplarism and the Kantian principle of moral autonomy. Autonomy, one of the foundational tenets of Kantian ethics, emphasizes the self-regulation of the moral agent and their independence from any motive other than moral duty. That is, no external authority, such as society, divine will, or even psychological characteristics, should impose moral obligations on us. At first glance, this principle appears to conflict with the adoption of an exemplar as a moral authority, as Kant explicitly warns against the practice of modeling one’s morality on others.
Drawing upon the theory of moral exemplarism, which is central to Zagzebski’s virtue ethics, this article explains its various components, including self-trust, the emotions of admiration, narrative, and conscience-based reflection. In doing so, it raises the challenge that Zagzebski herself addressed and that critics consider to be the most significant problem for exemplarism: how to reconcile the emulation of exemplars with a steadfast commitment to the Kantian principle of autonomy. The main issue is whether the process of moral development through virtuous exemplars, which appears inherently imitative, and the idea of ​​autonomy can be reconciled. Can moral exemplars serve as the basis for the development of moral virtue without undermining the agent’s autonomy?
To answer these questions, the article first examines Zagzebski's account of how the moral agent engages with the exemplar (moral agent). Furthermore, it incorporates contemporary interpretations of Kant such as Korsgaard, to argue that autonomy in Zagzebski's view, reinterpreted through the lens of Korsgaard, does not imply isolation and radical self-reliance. Instead, autonomy is formed through interaction with others, including moral exemplars. In Korsgaard's interpretation, autonomy signifies conscientious self-governance, where the criterion for success is when one’s beliefs, emotions and actions withstand the test of conscientious reflection. 
By analyzing the concept of moral authority within an exemplarist framework, Zagzebski addresses its relationship with imitation, a concept that Kantian ethics often rejects. Zagzebski demonstrates that the emotional and epistemological bond formed with a role exemplar does not violate autonomy. Relying on the Enlightenment tradition regarding the position of the self, self-awareness, the rational ability of the individual, and the inner capacities of an individual, she develops the concepts of "self-trust", “self-awareness”, and the "self-conscious self" which is the ultimate bearer of authority. A self-conscious agent, by virtue of having a “self,” possesses executive function and inherent authority over themselves. The question then arises: Is trust in others (and thus adopting a role exemplar) rational? Here, Zagzebski bridges self-trust to trust in others. Following the rational principle of “treating like things alike,” someone who trusts their own cognitive faculties must extend that trust to other self-conscious and conscientious individuals who possess similar faculties, a trust essential for both knowledge and autonomy.
Beyond this challenge, Zagzebski addresses significant criticisms of exemplarism (including the risk of idealizing exemplars, or the potential for bias or abuse of moral authority) by invoking the concept of “reflective admiration.” This is not merely an immediate emotional reaction; when accompanied by reflection, it serves as an epistemic tool for recognizing virtue. Admiration within exemplarism has cognitive and emotional aspects. The former constructs the theory’s conceptual framework, while the latter provides the source of motivation. This concept is pivotal in resolving the autonomy challenge. Epistemic authority stems from the trust generated by admiration for the role exemplar, rather than from their external or institutional position. We first identify an individual as a role exemplar through experience and then we confirm this admiration through reflection, and thus the individual becomes a moral authority. A causal and normative relationship exists between being a role exemplar and exercising authority. Authority is conferred upon those deemed worthy of emulation due to virtues such as honesty, wisdom, and humility; the very qualities that prompt admiration. There is a connection between the authority of an exemplar and the exemplar as model for ourselves. This connection explains why authority is compatible with autonomy.
‌Literature Review
A review of the published literature on exemplarism and autonomy indicates that existing studies have largely been limited to describing the theory of exemplarism and autonomy. However, one of the most significant challenges of exemplarism theory, namely its compatibility with the principle of autonomy, has not been adequately addressed. A survey of the relevant articles further shows that many studies have examined the concept of autonomy in relation to technology, the ethics of care, and authenticity, while others have explored exemplarism in connection with Quranic ethics, organizational ethics, and mystical exemplarism.
Methodology
In this article, through a conceptual analysis of key notions employed by Zagzebski, such as narrative, epistemic authority, self-trust, admiration and reflective admiration, the researchers elucidated her argument and explanation of the epistemic dimension of emotions.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article, focusing on Zagzebski’s theory of exemplarism, examines the relationship between “moral emulation” and Kant’s “autonomy.” In examining the central elements of exemplarism, it became clear that Zagzebski, by emphasizing the role of admiration and exposure to moral exemplars, grounds moral development in an initial affective perception (an emotionally mediated recognition of excellence) that sets the agent on the path toward virtue. This process begins with a prima facie trust in the emotion of admiration.
Crucially, however, the originality of moral growth lies not in uncritical obedience to another, but in the agent’s inner capacity for conscientious reflection. Thus, in Zagzebski’s theory of exemplarism, emulation in the context of conscientious reflection constitutes a form of active self-regulation. In this view, imitation is a responsible response to the recognition of virtue in another. While it acknowledges the exemplar’s moral authority, it simultaneously facilitates the development of internal authority, strengthens moral self-trust, and deepens moral independence. Accordingly, the notion of imitation, which in Kantian account appears ambiguous, and at times explicitly rejected, can be reconstructed within the framework of the theory of exemplarism in the form of reflective emulation, especially when interpreted through Korsgaard's account of autonomy.