Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 PhD student in Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, University of Qom, Iran
2 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, University of Qom, Iran
Abstract
Utilitarianism, as one of the normative ethical theories, has always been a subject of debate among philosophers. In its classical approaches, this theory posits that an action is morally good if it brings the greatest amount of good to the greatest number of people. Ethicists have consistently raised objections to the fundamental components of this theory, as evident in the works of Frankena, J.J.C. Smart, and others. These objections have been primarily formulated from a philosophical perspective. On the other hand, decision-making theories in cognitive science and cognitive psychology are pursued through the lens of utility maximization and satisficing approaches. In one of his articles, Gerd Gigerenzer briefly touches on some of the shortcomings of consequentialist theory from the cognitive science perspective. This research aims to explain utilitarianism and decision-making theories more precisely, while critically examining Gigerenzer's objections. It appears that, based on the theory of utility maximization, the realization of the components of classical utilitarianism—particularly Bentham's utilitarianism—is unattainable. Moreover, the calculation of such outcomes, whether by the human mind or computational machines, as generally indicated in Gigerenzer's account, is impossible. Additionally, the existence of multiple criteria and personal disagreements in achieving and maximizing good are among the factors that, from the perspective of cognitive science, render such calculations unfeasible.
Keywords
Main Subjects
)