Document Type : Research Paper

Author

ACECR Institute for Humanities and Social Studies (IHSS)

Abstract

Introduction

The frame problem was first introduced by McCarthy and Hayes (1969). In short, the initial issue was that there are no clear principles indicating what an action changes and what remains unchanged at a given time. This interpretation is called the frame problem. Over time, other interpretations have emerged, such as epistemological readings categorized under "updating beliefs" and issues of relevance. Philosophers like Fodor have also examined the metaphysical aspect of the frame problem, questioning the metaphysical basis of conventional understanding.
Research Question(s): A key question in understanding the frame problem is how we access our cognitive background of the world. More precisely, it asks how our cognitive background is present within and operates alongside our current knowledge. The problem extends to how we selectively retrieve relevant information while ignoring irrelevant details.

Literature Review

2.1. The Epistemic and Cognitive Dimensions of the Frame Problem
The most significant interpretation of the frame problem is its epistemic aspect, which relates to updating beliefs and issues of relevance. For example, Dennett (1978) describes the puzzle of how a person, who holds many beliefs about the world, can update these beliefs when taking an action that relies on firm beliefs about the world.
Initially proposed in its logical form, the frame problem evolved into a philosophical issue within two decades. Fodor (1987) argues that this issue is deeply philosophical, directly related to human knowledge, and should be studied by philosophers and cognitive scientists rather than being relegated to artificial intelligence.
2.2. Cognitive Background and Knowledge Retrieval
Understanding language expressions requires not only linguistic and semantic knowledge but also knowledge of the world. Similarly, recognizing a piece of cloth as a valuable object, like a flag, depends on prior cultural and social knowledge. Our knowledge is rooted in stored cultural, historical, social, and linguistic frameworks, which constitute our cognitive background. When encountering a new situation, relevant information is retrieved while irrelevant information is ignored—this is a central concern of the frame problem.
2.3. Linguistic and Contextual Factors
In the philosophy of language and linguistics, a key question is how we access our linguistic ability (a person’s institutionalized linguistic knowledge). Linguistic ability can be seen as background knowledge that enables us to understand the meanings of linguistic expressions. Additionally, social and contextual features of speech help us produce or interpret statements appropriate to a given situation. Accessing these features requires background knowledge of the world.

Methodology

This paper examines the frame problem through an interdisciplinary approach, drawing from philosophy, cognitive science, and linguistics to explore how cognitive background knowledge influences problem-solving and belief updating.

Discussion

To illustrate further, consider the cognitive process involved in understanding a simple conversation. When someone hears a sentence, they do not merely parse the syntax and semantics; they also draw on their knowledge of the speaker, the context of the conversation, and relevant world events. This complex integration of information is largely unconscious and highlights the depth of our cognitive background. The frame problem, therefore, is not just about identifying relevant information but also about understanding the mechanisms through which our minds filter and integrate vast amounts of knowledge in real time.
Another example can be seen in cultural artifacts. When individuals from different backgrounds encounter a cultural symbol, their interpretations can vary widely based on their unique cognitive backgrounds. For instance, a national flag might evoke feelings of patriotism and sacrifice in one person, while for another, it could signify oppression and conflict. These differing perceptions underscore the importance of background knowledge in shaping our understanding and reactions.

Conclusion

The frame problem spans multiple domains, from logic and epistemology to metaphysics and cognitive science. It raises fundamental questions about the nature of human cognition, how we process information, and how we adapt our understanding in dynamic environments. As our world becomes increasingly complex, addressing the frame problem becomes even more critical. Ultimately, the frame problem challenges us to deepen our understanding of the intricate processes that underpin human thought and knowledge.
Acknowledgments:
This article is an extract from a research project with the code 4001460, which was supported by  Iran National Science Foundation (INSF).

Keywords

Main Subjects

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