Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Pouria Golshenas ¹
• Yousef Nozohour ²

¹ Ph.D. Student of Logic, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

² Associate Professor of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

In this paper, we attempt to answer this fundamental question that whether is any criterion of truth in Kant’s transcendental philosophy or not? Through analysis of “transcendental deduction”, and referring to Dieter Henrich's interpretation of the background of that term, and Robert Paul Wolff’s formation of that, we try to illustrate the significance of this part of the first critique for establishing a well-formed and compatible theory of truth in Kant’s philosophy. We claim since Kant believes that knowledge contains judgment and predication, in a word, a process of "synthesis", his theory of truth is a kind of “coherence theory of truth”, although Kant himself, in a famous passage of critique, says the definition of truth is correspondence and also we concede that his coherence theory is a peculiar one. Eventually, in favor of Robert Hanna's reading of Kant’s theory of meaning, we conclude that this theory involves a kind of scepticism, which we call “epistemological scepticism”.

Keywords

• Truth
• Correspondence
• Coherence
• Transcendental Deduction
• Epistemological Scepticism