Wisdom And Philosophy

Abstract This article examines a major criticism of Søren Kierkegaard's moral philosophy: the charge of "ethical anarchy." From an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective, Alasdair MacIntyre contends that Kierkegaard's emphasis on the "teleological suspension of the ethical" and the primacy of individual faith undermines moral rationality and risks relativism. This study employs an analytical-descriptive approach to clarify Kierkegaard's understanding of the relationship between ethics and faith and to examine MacIntyre's four main criticisms. By drawing on contemporary philosophical responses and Kierkegaard's own texts, the article argues that these charges stem largely from reductive readings. It shows that the "suspension of the ethical" constitutes an exceptional and paradoxical experience, contingent upon conditions such as anxiety, the suffering of solitude, and love, which prevent its misuse. Consequently, Kierkegaardian ethics, despite its radical individualism, does not lead to anarchy but rather strives for a more authentic and committed moral life wherein values are internalized through personal responsibility.

Abstract Dawkins’s gene-centered theory offers an evolutionary account of living beings in which the gene plays a decisive role in shaping behavior and biological structures, and the human being is understood as the product of genetic processes. By emphasizing the mechanism of natural selection, this approach tends toward a form of reductionism that explains mental, volitional, and teleological elements in biological terms. In contrast, Mulla Sadra, through his account of the soul in light of the primacy of existence and substantial motion, presents a dynamic and supra-biological view of human reality in which the soul possesses existential stages independent of the body and is oriented toward an end. Using an analytical-comparative method, this study first examines the epistemological and ontological foundations of Dawkins’s and Mulla Sadra’s views, and then compares their anthropological implications. The findings indicate that Sadrian metaphysics, by affirming degrees of existence and a teleological understanding of the soul, is better able to explain consciousness, free will, and human perfection, whereas in Dawkins’s genetic model these are either neglected or reduced to biology. Thus, Transcendent Philosophy provides a broader framework for understanding human identity.

Abstract This paper offers a philosophical investigation into the question of the truth of the name through the hermeneutic framework of Hans-Georg Gadamer. It contends that this question, already articulated in its earliest form within ancient Greek thought—most notably in Plato’s Cratylus—remains fundamentally unresolved. Within this context, Gadamer, in fact, reformulates the question of the truth of the name as the question of the being of the name for itself, and demonstrates how, in Cratylus, the being of the name remains dependent upon the “thing.”
Building on this reformulation, the paper demonstrates how Gadamer’s emphasis on the ontological status of the artwork—interpreted through the Greek concept of mimesis—opens a productive horizon for rethinking the name itself as a work of art. It is argued that the re-presentation of the familiar within artistic performance, whereby each instance attains a mode of being irreducible to mere repetition, constitutes a preliminary step toward articulating the being of the name as an artwork.

Furthermore, drawing upon Jean Grondin’s interpretation of the concept of Darstellung, and in light of his claim that the coming-into-being of the artwork is inseparable from its presentation—thus rendering it inherently performative, interpretive, epiphanic, and festive—the paper undertakes an analysis of these four dimensions in relation to the ontology of the artwork. It subsequently mobilizes these dimensions as a criterion for understanding the name as an artwork, ultimately demonstrating how each is instantiated within the being of the name itself.

Abstract In this article, with the aim of filling in the gaps between the lines, an attempt is made to explain the transition from extreme reductionism to a non-reductionist explanatory approach. James's method is usually considered pragmatism, but the background of his pragmatic approach must be reread in light of the conceptual network of pure experience, neutral monism, and radical empiricism. The distinction between existential and value judgments has its roots in the concept of pure experience, which James considers the metaphysical foundation of radical empiricism. Unlike classical empiricism, he has a comprehensive view of different levels of human experience, including religious experience, and this approach has paved the way for subsequent researchers to consider the epistemological position and psychological function of religious experience. James's phenomenological approach to religious experience can be considered the beginning of the reductionist critique of religious studies. What Newberg says about the principle of neutral causal orientation and the interaction of neuroscience and phenomenology to determine the correlation between religious experience and the neurological mechanisms of the brain has its roots in James's criticisms of medical materialism. Newberg's emphasis on the point that instead of explaining causality, the concept of correlation should be used to explain the relationship between the phenomenological components of religious experience and brain mechanisms is one of the results of James's non-reductionist approach in the literature on the psychology of religion

Abstract This paper critically examines the possibility of cognition in artificial intelligence (AI) from the perspective of Islamic philosophy, focusing on the epistemological foundations laid by ʿAllāmeh Ṭabāṭabāʾī. Central to this analysis are the concepts of the soul’s immateriality, mental agency, intuitive (ḥuḍūrī) knowledge, and the theory of the unity of the knower and the known. According to this framework, true knowledge is a kind of existential presence in which the knower and the known are ontologically united, and the object of knowledge is present within the immaterial soul. In contrast, AI systems rely on symbolic representation, computational models, and statistical learning — mechanisms that inherently lack self-awareness, presence, and ontological union with the known. This study argues that due to the absence of immateriality, mental subjectivity, and existential unity, what is referred to as “cognition” in AI does not qualify as true knowledge in the philosophical sense but rather constitutes an external simulation of cognitive behavior. Hence, from the standpoint of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s philosophy, knowledge in its genuine form is exclusive to immaterial beings endowed with a self-conscious soul. This analysis offers a novel critique of the epistemic foundations of AI and helps to clarify the essential boundaries between human and machine cognition.

Abstract With the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI), aligning this technology with human values has become increasingly essential. Value-Sensitive Design (VSD) has emerged as a practical approach to value alignment, attracting considerable scholarly attention. This article evaluates VSD as a method for aligning AI with social values, drawing on the pragmatist account of sociotechnical systems as the evaluative framework. Using an analytical-critical method, both strengths and challenges are examined. The findings show that VSD offers a robust framework for value alignment. Its strengths include providing a practical pathway for embedding social values into technology, incorporating stakeholder perspectives, recognizing human agency, and addressing the full life cycle of AI systems. Nevertheless, VSD faces significant challenges, such as the protracted nature of alignment processes, difficulties in ensuring meaningful human control, and the lack of enforceable international laws and regulations. Our analysis suggests that treating alignment methods merely as self-regulatory tools may produce long-term negative consequences. To fully realize the benefits of aligning AI with human values, it is therefore crucial to develop enforceable international frameworks that complement and support local laws and governance structures.

Abstract

Introduction

The problem of hyle (prime matter) and its simplicity, alongside the criterion of rationality, constitutes a perennial debate in Islamic philosophy, extending from the Aristotelian tradition to the seventeenth century. While Peripatetics like Ibn Sīnā defined hyle as "pure potentiality" and its simplicity as merely "generic," Illuminationists like Suhrawardī perceived it as the simplest of all entities due to its dark, yet pure essence. Fayyāḍ Lāhījī, in his marginalia on Muḥaqqiq Khaffarī’s Taʿlīqāt on Sharḥ al-Tajrīd, subjects these diverse views to a rigorous critique. He argues that prior thinkers often conflated conceptual simplicity with existential actuality. The central research question of this study is: How does Lāhījī redefine the ontological status of hyle and its capacity for rationality through a critical engagement with Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and post-Avicennan scholastic perspectives?


Literature Review

The discourse on hyle in Islamic philosophy is deeply rooted in Greek thought.
2.1. The Greek Origins
Plato’s chora served as a foundational "receptacle" for forms, while Aristotle developed the doctrine of hyle as "pure potentiality," devoid of intrinsic actuality.
2.1.1. Evolution in Islamic Philosophy
Ibn Sīnā refined the Peripatetic view, emphasizing that hyle only gains existence through forms. In contrast, Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist school interpreted hyle as "pure darkness," yet paradoxically the most simple entity by essence.
2.1.1.1. Contemporary Scholarly Perspectives
Existing studies, such as those by Amini Najafi (2016) and Hosseini & Ghorbani (2021), have addressed rationality and transcendence in Lāhījī’s work. However, this study uniquely focuses on his critical synthesis of hyle within the Sharḥ al-Tajrīd marginalia.


Methodology

This research employs a descriptive-analytical and comparative method. It utilizes a textual-critical approach to analyze Lāhījī’s marginal notes. By comparing his arguments against the established doctrines of Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Khaffarī, the study reveals the structural logic of his philosophical innovation in the 17th century.


Results

Lāhījī’s analysis yields three critical results:
The Simplicity Distinction: Lāhījī differentiates between "generic simplicity" (basāṭat-e jinsī), which hyle possesses, and "existential simplicity," which is the true condition for rationality.
Rejection of Essentialist Confusion: He demonstrates that Suhrawardī’s attribution of extreme simplicity to hyle results from confusing essence with existence.
Rationality Criterion: Lāhījī distinguishes between being "intelligible" (potentially graspable by the intellect) and "rational by essence" (ʿāqil li-dhātih), identifying self-subsistent actuality as the sole mediator of the latter.

Table 1
Comparative Criteria for Rationality in Islamic Philosophy
| Tradition | Criterion of Rationality | Status of Hyle |
| Peripatetic | Actual Existence | Non-rational (Potentiality) |
| Illuminationist | Luminous Essence | Potentially Simple/Null |
| Lāhījī’s View | Self-subsistent Actuality | Intelligible but Non-rational |
Note: This table highlights the conceptual shift in Lāhījī’s independent critique.

Figure 1
The Conceptual Distinction between Intelligibility and Rationality
(A schematic model showing that while hyle falls within the scope of intelligibility, it is excluded from the circle of rationality due to existential dependency.)


Discussion

Lāhījī’s critical edge lies in his insistence that the ontological status of hyle is the "farthest from transcendence." Even if one accepts hyle as a conceptually simple notion, its external realization is entirely dependent on forms. Therefore, it lacks the "self-disclosure" required for self-awareness. He argues that rationality is an existential perfection that cannot be reduced to conceptual simplicity. By establishing that hyle is a "mental construct" used to explain change, he safeguards the independence of the intellect.


Conclusion

Lāhījī’s critique marks a significant turning point in post-Avicennan philosophy. By separating the levels of conceptual abstraction from existential actuality, he provides a more coherent account of why hyle remains an "intelligible" object rather than an "intellectual" subject. His synthesis serves as a critical bridge that preserves the rigors of Peripatetic ontology while sharpening the tools of Illuminationist and scholastic debate, thereby redefining the conditions of rationality.

Acknowledgments
The author acknowledges the scholarly contributions of the library of Allameh Tabatabai in Shiraz for providing the manuscript sources for this analysis.

Notes

This distinction is elaborated in Lāhījī’s critique of the "existence of potentiality" versus "potentiality of existence."

Abstract Employing a phenomenological and analytical approach, this study explores the structure of the “self” and provides a radical critique of the concept of voluntarism within the intellectual framework of Jiddu Krishnamurti. The central argument of the article is predicated on the premise that the “self” is not a fixed, transcendental substance, but rather a cumulative, psychological construct born of time, memory, and past experiences, which possesses an inherently contradictory and fragmenting nature. The research demonstrates that any “will to change” originating from this conditioned center inevitably resorts to “psychological time” and creates the false duality of the “observer and the observed,” thereby merely reproducing and reinforcing the very same problematic structure. Consequently, all moral systems, prevailing methodologies of self-improvement, and volitional efforts toward “becoming” are evaluated as the subtle strategies of the “self” to perpetuate its own survival. Krishnamurti’s proposed alternative is a fundamental transition from the paradigm of “gradual change” to “instantaneous perception.” This paradigmatic shift is actualized solely through “choiceless awareness”—that is, the completely unmediated and non-judgmental observation of “what is”—which ultimately culminates in “psychological death” (the radical severance of attachment to the accumulation of the past) and the genesis of creative intelligence and a centerless love. Finally, by evaluating the criticisms leveled against this perspective from the standpoints of analytical philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology, the article underscores the central claim that a profound, non-volitional transformation of the individual is the sole necessary prerequisite for the genesis of any authentic and enduring social change.

Abstract This study seeks to clarify the ground of moral obligation in Rawls’s theory of justice and to challenge purely contractual interpretations. It argues that Rawls’s theory must be understood within a two-level framework: the rational justification of the principles of justice in the original position, and the moral internalization of those principles through the sense of justice. The problem is framed through the debate between Leonard Choptiany and Jeffrey Reiman, which demonstrates that a rational contract alone cannot generate moral obligation. Using an explanatory-analytic method and a direct reading of Rawls, the article reconstructs Choptiany’s threefold critique (methodological, substantive, and inferential) and, through Rawls’s texts and Samuel Freeman’s Kantian interpretation, shows that moral obligation is not grounded in the contract but in the educative formation of the sense of justice. The article concludes that Rawls’s theory of justice is defensible only if the link between its contractual and moral levels is acknowledged; otherwise, Choptiany’s critique remains valid. Thus, education is not merely a consequence of justice but a condition of its possibility, since the stability of justice depends on the internalization of the value of fairness through public institutions.

Abstract This article provides a systematic and logical analysis of David Benatar’s anti-natalist perspective and its relation to the question of life’s meaning. The aim of the study is to examine the logical and ethical foundations of Benatar’s argument concerning the “badness of coming into existence” and to critique its implications for reproductive ethics and the meaning of life. The research method is descriptive–analytical, drawing on Benatar’s primary works and his critics to explore the logical structure of the “asymmetry between pleasure and pain” argument. Relying on an analytical and objectivist approach, Benatar considers life to be fundamentally devoid of positive value and views birth as a harmful event. The asymmetry between pleasure and pain, the low quality of human life, psychological optimism and self-deception, and the distinction between the value of beginning life and continuing it constitute the core elements of Benatar’s reasoning. Although Benatar’s logical argument for the asymmetry between pleasure and pain is formally valid, his improper transition from descriptive “is” statements to prescriptive “ought” statements undermines the final coherence of his logic. Despite its internal consistency, Benatar’s reasoning remains logically and ontologically insufficient and lacks realism.

Abstract The question of language and the question of Being are two fundamental questions that have accompanied Heidegger since the beginning of his intellectual and philosophical development. However, the way he engages with and reflects upon language differs before and after the fundamental shift in his thought in 1936, which he describes as two „leaps“ in which he moves from „analysis of Dasein“ to „history of Being.“ In the first leap, Heidegger examines language from the perspective of Dasein and human being; in the second, he considers it in its relation to Being. In both leaps, however, the question of language is a single question about the essence of language, linked to numerous evaluations, critiques, and attacks on linguistic and philosophical research on language, as well as on metaphysical conceptions of language, particularly those of the Greeks in the concept of Logos and the idea of animal rationale. In this article, we will trace Heidegger's inquiry to the essence of language in the indicated leaps and cycles of his thoughts. To offer a historical perspective on the genesis and evolution of these thoughts in each of these steps, we will consider his writings and speeches within the context of their historical development.