Document Type : Research Paper


In this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, showing that the situation is actually asymmetric should count as a refutation to conciliatory views of disagreement. By appealing to the difference between the processes by which the beliefs of the two parties have been formed, I try to show that there is a difference between the reliabilities of the two beliefs. This means the asymmetrical situation between two peers in disagreement. Since the conciliatory and steadfast views are contradictory views, any argument against one of them should be considered as an argument for the other.


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