In this article, with the aim of filling in the gaps between the lines, an attempt is made to explain the transition from extreme reductionism to a non-reductionist explanatory approach. James's method is usually considered pragmatism, but the background of his pragmatic approach must be reread in light of the conceptual network of pure experience, neutral monism, and radical empiricism. The distinction between existential and value judgments has its roots in the concept of pure experience, which James considers the metaphysical foundation of radical empiricism. Unlike classical empiricism, he has a comprehensive view of different levels of human experience, including religious experience, and this approach has paved the way for subsequent researchers to consider the epistemological position and psychological function of religious experience. James's phenomenological approach to religious experience can be considered the beginning of the reductionist critique of religious studies. What Newberg says about the principle of neutral causal orientation and the interaction of neuroscience and phenomenology to determine the correlation between religious experience and the neurological mechanisms of the brain has its roots in James's criticisms of medical materialism. Newberg's emphasis on the point that instead of explaining causality, the concept of correlation should be used to explain the relationship between the phenomenological components of religious experience and brain mechanisms is one of the results of James's non-reductionist approach in the literature on the psychology of religion