Introduction

Quantificational pluralism is, more or less, the recognition of a plurality of distinct quantifiers in describing the ontological status of the world. This position arises from the historical idea that things exist in various ways, and in other words, they differ in their mode of being. A simple example is paying attention to the ontological aspect of abstract objects and concrete objects. A believer in quantificational pluralism, for instance, considers a difference between abstract being and concrete being and therefore thinks that this difference should be reflected in their metaphysical language. Therefore, assuming that the quantifier represents our ontological commitments, she uses two different quantifiers to refer to these two different beings: ∃_a, which represents the abstract being, and ∃_c, which represents the concrete being. Or, for example, a quantificational pluralist uses two distinct quantifiers to refer to the existence of God and the existence of creatures, arising from the alleged fact that God and creatures have different modes of existence.
There is a fundamental question facing quantificational pluralism: if, according to this approach, we accept a plurality of quantifiers, should we discard the generic quantifier– the one employed in the semantics of predicate logic that encompasses all things within its domain? Esfandiari (2024) previously penned an article advocating for the acceptance of generic quantifiers within quantificational pluralism. In that article, the author presents four arguments in favor of this view. But there are criticisms of this acceptance in the literature. In other words, the acceptance of the generic quantifier has elicited opposition and seemingly poses challenges to quantificational pluralism. In this paper, we will examine these opposition and challenges.

Methodology

The research method used in this article is descriptive-analytical.

Discussion

In this article, four arguments are presented against the compatibility of accepting the generic quantifier with ontological (quantificational) pluralism:
First. The Shorthand Argument. This argument considered a type of rigorous logical argument, is proposed by Merricks (2019), who demonstrates that combining the generic quantifier with ontological pluralism leads to problems and contradictions for the latter.
Second. The Argument from Incompatibility with the Intuition of Pluralism. In this argument, Merricks (2019: 601-602) refers to the thoughts of Moore and Russell, whom he considers to be among the first pluralists and believers in multiple ways of being. According to these two philosophers, as Merricks points out with references, pluralism is indicative of the basic intuition or idea that things exist in two different ways: abstractly and concretely. In such a way that if a thing exists abstractly, it does not exist concretely, and vice versa. In other words, there is no ontological similarity between these two categories of things. Merricks considers this belief to be the central intuition and the main motivation for pluralism. Therefore, this fundamental intuition is incompatible with the acceptance of the generic quantifier; because belief in the generic quantifier indicates that there is a way of being (generic being) that both categories of things share, and this means that there is a kind of ontological similarity between them.
Third. The Argument of Vulnerability to Confusing Existence with Essence. This argument was proposed by van Inwagen (2014) and, in brief, states that accepting the generic quantifier is in fact accepting a unique mode of being (which is also accepted by monists). However, if after accepting the generic quantifier, like a pluralist, we also accept restricted quantifiers, then this argument tells us that restricted quantifiers represent nothing but different kinds or essences of things and have no relation to the way things are. Therefore, using restricted quantifiers to represent the nature or essence of things and attributing a mode of being to them is incorrect.
Fourth. The Argument of Historical Discontinuity. In summary, this argument suggests that accepting the generic quantifier is incompatible with the historical motivations of pluralists for endorsing pluralism (Merricks, 2019: 603-604). I have first reviewed the historical motivations of pluralism in at least five (or six) cases, which are: theological motivations, metaphysical motivation, logical motivation, phenomenological motivation, and anti-ontological-pragmatic motivations. Then, I have articulated Merricks' arguments about the incompatibility of those motivations with accepting the generic quantifier.
While presenting each of these arguments against the acceptance of the generic quantifier for ontological pluralism, I have also critiqued them and shown how pluralism can still accept the generic quantifier.

Conclusion

In this article, I have presented four arguments based on which quantificational pluralism should not accept the generic quantifier. Criticisms were also raised against each of these four arguments. As a result, focusing solely on these criticisms, and disregarding the arguments in favor of accepting the generic quantifier in the literature, it can be said that it is better for pluralism to accept the generic quantifier. Firstly, because this acceptance, ironically, leads to the historical coherence of this approach, since pluralists generally accept the generic quantifier as well. Secondly, because the possibility of accepting the generic quantifier leads to a weaker version of pluralism, which in turn makes pluralism more comprehensive and general and increases its ability to face potential objections. Thirdly, because a version of pluralism that allows for the acceptance of the generic quantifier provides a better and more accurate reflection of the original idea or intuition of this approach; since this approach has been formed around the ontological differences of beings, and at its core, there is no necessary requirement to deny the ontological similarities of beings. So, by allowing the acceptance of the generic quantifier for pluralism, we have proposed a better reflection of its central idea. Fourthly, accepting the generic quantifier completely exonerates pluralism from the accusation of conflating existence with essence. Based on these reasons, as the final conclusion of this article, I have provided a definition of quantificational pluralism:
Quantificational Pluralism: Recognition of a plurality of existential quantifiers that represent different ways of being and ontological differences among things. In addition, the generic quantifier that all things are in its domain is also acceptable.