Document Type : Research Paper
Author
University of Tehran
Abstract
One of the arguments of Muslim philosophers for the immaterial soul is the argument from personal identity. Muslim philosophers believe that the body cannot constitute personal identity, because it changes. So, there must be an immaterial soul in us that constitutes personal identity. But this argument is not complete, because the mere fact that something changes does not prevent it from constituting personal identity. According to Sadra, on the one hand, the soul undergoes substantial movement and changes, and at the same time it constitutes personal identity; and on the other hand, the living body, although it changes, has a unity based on which it can constitute personal identity. To complete this argument, it must be shown that nothing but the immaterial soul constitutes personal identity. For this purpose, theories of personal identity can be divided into complex and simple, and by rejecting the complex theories, the simple theory can be concluded. According to composite theories, personal identity constituted by the same evidence of identity, that is, continuity of the body, memories or the sum of the brain and memories. By rejecting complex theories, the only option for personal identity is the simple theory. According to the simple theory, personal identity is an ultimate unanalysable fact which is an existent with an existence distinct from the body and the memories of that existent. This being is the immaterial soul. This article aims to prove the simple theory and complete the argument from personal identity for the immaterial soul.
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