Analysis and Rejection of Infinite Regress Arguments and the Impossibility of Knowledge in the Dialogue of Parmenides Plato

Moghadas, Mohamadmehdi

doi:10.22054/wph.2022.64007.2021

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Mohamadmehdi Moghadas

Ph.D. Candidate in Contemporary philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran

https://doi.org/10.22054/wph.2022.64007.2021

Abstract

In this essay, the first part of Parmenides' dialogue is analyzed. This dialogue presents two challenges to the theory of Forms: "Infinite Regress Arguments" or "Third Man Argument" and "impossibility of knowledge". At first, we try to yield a precise description of the first part of this dialogue, and then by analyzing Parmenides' arguments, we exhibit that his arguments are based on the assumptions of "Self-Predication", "One over Many", "Principle of Non-Identity" and "Principle of Uniqueness". We then make it clear that Parmenides is not justified in applying the assumption of Non-Identity and cannot make an Infinite Regress. Then we deal with the problem of the separation of Forms from the objects of this world and the subsequent "impossibility of knowledge" and by analyzing his arguments we show that Parmenides, in declaring the impossibility of knowledge, has committed at least two logical mistakes, and he then could not conclude that we do not partake of a Form of knowledge.

Keywords

References

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Wisdom And Philosophy

Analysis and Rejection of Infinite Regress Arguments and the Impossibility of Knowledge in the Dialogue of Parmenides Plato

References

References

Volume 18, Issue 69
March 2022
Pages 227-259

Analysis and Rejection of Infinite Regress Arguments and the Impossibility of Knowledge in the Dialogue of Parmenides Plato

References

References

Volume 18, Issue 69March 2022Pages 227-259

Volume 18, Issue 69
March 2022
Pages 227-259