Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 tarbiat modares university

2 Associate Professor, Allameh Tabataba’i University

Abstract

Wittgenstein in his later Philosophy, as in his early Philosophy, reiterates that philosophical method or activity is a critical activity although he develops it method in his later Philosophy. In some fragments of Philosophical Investigations, he calls this method therapeutic, in which, the philosopher recognizes the cause of fallacy or categorical mistake. Establishing such a method has been possible through a new vision of language, which does not see language as apart from linguistic activities. In other words, concepts have internal relation with our linguistic activities and our life-with-concepts, and their meanings are not graspable separate from their context. Indeed, by concentration on "use" in language, Wittgenstein wants to show the interrelation of language and our form of life. In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophical problems arise of neglecting this insight about language because philosophers see language separate and abstracted from any activity. By considering Wittgenstein’s revolutionary approach to language, philosophical problems arise from ignoring and confusing the uses of language, which will be dissolved with showing the confusion.

Keywords

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