philosophy
Seyyed Ashkan Khatibi; Mohammad Taghi Tabatabaei
Abstract
Bergson's philosophy has sometimes been regarded as dualistic and sometimes as monotheistic. The price of being partial to each has been to destroy some of Bergson's concepts and specifications in favor of others. In the meantime, some have tried to read Bergson's philosophy as dualistic and monistic ...
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Bergson's philosophy has sometimes been regarded as dualistic and sometimes as monotheistic. The price of being partial to each has been to destroy some of Bergson's concepts and specifications in favor of others. In the meantime, some have tried to read Bergson's philosophy as dualistic and monistic at the same time, but the efforts have not only been unsatisfactory, but have also added to the previous difficulties; Because sometimes he has changed Bergson's philosophy to a philosophy of existential unity, sometimes he has made it based on a dialectical foundation, and sometimes he has turned it into a kind of conventional dualism. Gilles Deleuze, by proposing the doctrine of "difference", has given a reading of Bergson's philosophy, based on which Bergson's philosophy has different moments of dualism and monotheism, in each of which Diernard accepts a different "expression": From absolute dualism to hidden monogamy and then to recovered dualism. The purpose of this article is to highlight the fundamental difference between Deleuze's reading and other readings of existential unity or dualistic or dialectical of Bergson's philosophy, and to show that the explanation of these moments and especially the explanation of the logic of the last transition to recovered dualism requires recalling a doctrine that although Deleuze himself He cultivated it, he did not emphasize it much in his reading of Bergson. In this way, the claim is that explaining the logic of separating the moments of Bergson's philosophy in Deleuze's reading, as well as the logic of the transition from one to the other, instead of considering the two statements of Dirndt, it is necessary to consider the third statement of Dirndt as a difference in itself. This is the way that the expression of each aspect of Dirand is possible in three types of difference: Dirand as a pure thing in the essential difference, Dirand as a comprehensive thing in the difference of the material, and Dirand as a creative thing in the difference in itself.
Jafar Mazhabi; Mohammad Meshkat
Abstract
This article is an attempt to address a main question: is there any connection between Wittgenstein’s way and Descartes’ one in overcoming the problem of dualism? The discussion of the position of Wittgenstein on Descartes’ dualism here begins with the private language argument. For ...
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This article is an attempt to address a main question: is there any connection between Wittgenstein’s way and Descartes’ one in overcoming the problem of dualism? The discussion of the position of Wittgenstein on Descartes’ dualism here begins with the private language argument. For understanding Descartes’ position on the issue, one of his correspondences with Princess Elisabeth, and also the concept of the nature in his book the Meditation are examined so as to be shown this connection, regardless of many central differences between them. Moreover, it is shown here that the relatively similar ways of these two philosophers for facing the problem of dualism are in fact the ways for dissolving the matter, rather than solving it. It means that there seems to be no way to solve the problem of Descartes’s dualism on the basis of his own works, and this problem can only be overcome by getting out of his philosophy- the thing that both Wittgenstein and Descartes actually did. This article, therefore, takes this reading as its main idea that the Wittgenstein’s attack on Descartes’s dualism in particular, and on Descartes’s philosophy in general, is a fundamental criticism that comes from his critical point of view about the nature of philosophy itself; and the Descartes’s way which was mentioned above can be justified only in such a this context.
azizeh zirak baroqi; Seyyed Mustafa Shahrāeeni
Volume 10, Issue 40 , January 2015, , Pages 99-116
Abstract
Feeling and Imagination are very important in the thought of Descartes. Descartes categorizes or classified feeling and imagination as state of consciousness under the modes of the thinking thing, without having any relation to external objects. Then, in Sixth Meditation, he Seeks help from these two ...
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Feeling and Imagination are very important in the thought of Descartes. Descartes categorizes or classified feeling and imagination as state of consciousness under the modes of the thinking thing, without having any relation to external objects. Then, in Sixth Meditation, he Seeks help from these two forces for proving of Physical character (or Man-e jesmani) and presented them as a forces that realize they need physical and corporeal activity. Therefore, they are two forces that are not purely subjective (mental) or purely physical, but we can have them in the unity of mind and body and as a human beings composed from mind and body. Indeed, in discussing of feelings and imagination, Descartes tries to prove material or corporality in general and human bodies specially and he wants to explain how mind and body interact with different substances too. But it seems that his talk about these two forces or power is not compatible with his famous mind-body dualism system. In study and review of works of Some of the commentators Descarte's thoughts like Gary Hatfield, Bernard Williams, Margaret Dauler Wilson and Catherine Wilson, we Found that They more or less have discussed about feelings and imagination in the philosophical system of Descartes. But despite the importance of the issue in the thought of Descartes, they have passed from it briefly. Among these, John Katyngm, of the three-volume English translation of Descartes works and the owner of numerous works on Descartes thought system, more than any other commentators, is noted to feeling and imagination In the philosophy of Descartes And he Has noted different views and voted than other Descartes experts. In this article we try to show the place of feelings and imagination in the philosophy of Descartes and linking this issue with Descartes Dualism, according to the works of Descartes And referring to the vote of some commentators his works and somehow it will be shown Highlights of votes Katyngm than Other analysts or commentators.
�زیم و بهنحوی برجستگی آراء کاتینگم را نسبت به دیگر مفسرین نشان دهیم.
mohammad shokri
Abstract
Maurice Merleau-Ponty has undoubtedly made extensive use of Edmund Husserl's works, particularly Ideas and Cartesian Meditations in writing his book Phenomenology of Perception. However, the difference between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl's views comes to light as soon as his approach to Cartesian dualism ...
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty has undoubtedly made extensive use of Edmund Husserl's works, particularly Ideas and Cartesian Meditations in writing his book Phenomenology of Perception. However, the difference between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl's views comes to light as soon as his approach to Cartesian dualism of body-subject is studied and his views are compared with those of Husserl. Although Husserl emphasizes on the close relation between body and subject in some of his works, Merleau-Ponty does not approve of his emphasis on elements like phenomenological interpretation and transcendental subject which imply the mind's independence from body. He surpasses Husserl in emphasizing the body-mind unity and believes that not only does the body have a subjective nature, but also the subject is a creature due to its embodiment. Like Martin Heidegger, he believes that the study of subject as a creature in the world makes the explanation of understanding possible.
Mohammad mehdi Ardebili
Abstract
What is the Truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy? This is the main problem of the present article, in the light of which an attempt has been made, within the framework of the requirements and limitations of this article, to provide an introduction to the discussion of presenting a monistic-idealistic-dynamic ...
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What is the Truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy? This is the main problem of the present article, in the light of which an attempt has been made, within the framework of the requirements and limitations of this article, to provide an introduction to the discussion of presenting a monistic-idealistic-dynamic conception of Nietzsche. In this regard, first of all, as the introduction, the crisis facing any form of Nietzschean research will be briefly mentioned in order to provide possibilities for formulating the main idea of the article. Then, focusing on Nietzsche's various functions of truth and his dualistic (negative/positive or critical/supportive) encounter with this concept, we will address his main critiques of truth in three ways: 1. Critique of dualism; 2. Critique of essentialism; and 3. Criticism of stability. Finally, with the help of the results of these discussions, a preliminary outline of Nietzsche's monistic-idealistic-dynamic conception will be drawn at the end of the article.
