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Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement
Volume 14, Issue 56 , January 2019, , Pages 43-59

https://doi.org/10.22054/wph.2019.27680.1481

Abstract
  In this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, showing ...  Read More