Mehdi Mohammadi; Asghar Vaezi
Abstract
Tabatabai and Motahari consider Sadra's philosophy to be a realistic philosophy and claim a kind of realism in the book "Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism". Ilham Dilman also believes that Wittgenstein's rejection of realism does not make him an idealist. Rather, Wittgenstein is also ...
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Tabatabai and Motahari consider Sadra's philosophy to be a realistic philosophy and claim a kind of realism in the book "Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism". Ilham Dilman also believes that Wittgenstein's rejection of realism does not make him an idealist. Rather, Wittgenstein is also considered a realist in a sense. This article examines and compares the realism proposed in "Principles..." on the one hand and the realism that Dillman attributes to Wittgenstein on the other hand.
Abolfazl Sabramiz
Abstract
“What is understanding” is an important question in Later Wittgenstein's works. To examine what understanding is and his positive discussion of understanding, Wittgenstein first shows what understanding is not. According to him, in common sense, understanding is a special mental state that ...
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“What is understanding” is an important question in Later Wittgenstein's works. To examine what understanding is and his positive discussion of understanding, Wittgenstein first shows what understanding is not. According to him, in common sense, understanding is a special mental state that is the source of correct use. But he believes that understanding is not a matter of the mind. He means that understanding is not a mental experience, not a mental state, not a mental process, not a brain disposition. In this article, I examine Wittgenstein's view of why understanding is none of the three mental things (mental experience, mental state, mental process) mentioned above. Also, I will evaluate Wittgenstein's view and show that it is possible to challenge the claim that understanding is not a mental experience, not a mental state, not a mental process. In other words, I will show that Wittgenstein has failed to show that understanding is not a matter of the mind.
amir samsami; jahangir masoodi
Abstract
Subjectivism as an epistemological schema is a fundamental element of modern thought. This schema was based on the Cartesian cogito and considering human as the “thinking substance”, and with Kant’s transcendental Philosophy and granting human a self-grounded role in the act of cognition, ...
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Subjectivism as an epistemological schema is a fundamental element of modern thought. This schema was based on the Cartesian cogito and considering human as the “thinking substance”, and with Kant’s transcendental Philosophy and granting human a self-grounded role in the act of cognition, it gained unique importance in the Human Knowledge of the New Age. However, with the beginning of the 20th century and the paradigmatic changes that occurred in Philosophy, thoughts appeared that strongly challenged the schema of subjectivism, this substantial foundation of modern thinking. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein is one of the philosophers who has made the most of his efforts to overcome this schema in his Philosophy. The present paper tries to measure the relation between Wittgenstein’s early and later thought with regards to modern subjectivism, and at the same time, strives to demonstrate the degree to which Wittgenstein's efforts have been successful toward transitioning past subjectivism in each period. On this basis, the first part of the article, with a transcendental reading of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus will show that Wittgenstein, while attempting to abandon the schema of subjectivism, continues to adhere to Kant's subjective approach. And in the second part, while referring to Wittgenstein's novel way of inquiring regarding philosophical issues, the paper will investigate how to transition from subjectivism in his later thought.
alireza faraji
Abstract
The question about life and living has a history as long as human history and it is a matter that has taken various faces in the evolution of thought history. Today, this question is being pursued more seriously, to the extent that it even became a branch of philosophy of religion in universities. Also, ...
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The question about life and living has a history as long as human history and it is a matter that has taken various faces in the evolution of thought history. Today, this question is being pursued more seriously, to the extent that it even became a branch of philosophy of religion in universities. Also, among various contemporary philosophical methods, analytic and linguistic philosophers have analyzed with precision and specificity the various structures of language propositions that are partly based on the attitudes of Wittgenstein's philosophical logic treatise. Therefore, analyzing the logical structure of the question of the meaning of life, and the correctness or inaccuracy of its design in Wittgenstein's thinking is attractive and new or modern; for, on the one hand, in his dual thought, propositions of some sciences such as ethics, philosophy, art, religion, and metaphysics are dumb and meaningless because they are not compatible with rational standards of language, and on the other hand, his faithful and pragmatic beliefs have led to different perceptions of human life and living. Hence, our attempt in the present article is to measure the contradiction and paradoxes in Wittgenstein's thinking in proportion to the important question of the meaning of life, and to review its possible answer.
Reza Mosmer
Abstract
In his later philosophical reflections, Wittgenstein, criticizes his early views in the Tractatus. Since the publication of Philosophical Investigations commentators and philosophers have made various attempts to explain the nature and the scope of these criticisms and revisions. Paul Horwich in his ...
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In his later philosophical reflections, Wittgenstein, criticizes his early views in the Tractatus. Since the publication of Philosophical Investigations commentators and philosophers have made various attempts to explain the nature and the scope of these criticisms and revisions. Paul Horwich in his recent work “Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy” attempts to give a new and systematic account of these revisions. In the current study, I aim to examine some themes in Horwich’s reading of later Wittgenstein. I shall first give a rough description of the metaphysics of the Tractatus. Then, I discuss Horwich’s picture of the notion of Tractarian “object”. This will be followed by a discussion of Horwich’s picture of some of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of the Tractatus ontology in the third section. In this section, I will explain through three criticisms (T3), (T4), and (T6). The paper will end up with a series of objections to Horwich’s (T3), (T4), and (T6). I argue that his account of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of the Tractatus, as they are expressed in Philosophical Investigations, is exegetically problematic and philosophically incoherent.
Jafar Mazhabi; Mohammad Meshkat
Abstract
This article is an attempt to address a main question: is there any connection between Wittgenstein’s way and Descartes’ one in overcoming the problem of dualism? The discussion of the position of Wittgenstein on Descartes’ dualism here begins with the private language argument. For ...
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This article is an attempt to address a main question: is there any connection between Wittgenstein’s way and Descartes’ one in overcoming the problem of dualism? The discussion of the position of Wittgenstein on Descartes’ dualism here begins with the private language argument. For understanding Descartes’ position on the issue, one of his correspondences with Princess Elisabeth, and also the concept of the nature in his book the Meditation are examined so as to be shown this connection, regardless of many central differences between them. Moreover, it is shown here that the relatively similar ways of these two philosophers for facing the problem of dualism are in fact the ways for dissolving the matter, rather than solving it. It means that there seems to be no way to solve the problem of Descartes’s dualism on the basis of his own works, and this problem can only be overcome by getting out of his philosophy- the thing that both Wittgenstein and Descartes actually did. This article, therefore, takes this reading as its main idea that the Wittgenstein’s attack on Descartes’s dualism in particular, and on Descartes’s philosophy in general, is a fundamental criticism that comes from his critical point of view about the nature of philosophy itself; and the Descartes’s way which was mentioned above can be justified only in such a this context.
Khadije Hasanbeykzāde; Mirsaʻid Mousavi Karimi
Volume 11, Issue 42 , July 2015, , Pages 43-58
Abstract
Wittgenstein's view on the so-called “private language argument” is among the most important parts of his school of thought in the second period of his philosophical life. Here, there is one basic question that is whether we can imagine a language whose terms are merely understandable for ...
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Wittgenstein's view on the so-called “private language argument” is among the most important parts of his school of thought in the second period of his philosophical life. Here, there is one basic question that is whether we can imagine a language whose terms are merely understandable for the person using it. Whilst by giving reference to the lack of condition available to explicate the meaning of internal entities and feelings, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that such terms and words are private, and he argues that this language is not acceptable and imaginable because our sensory language depends on the physical world. In this article, we firstly try to analyze the concept of introspection to conceive a better perception of the private language argument. Then, we will investigate Wittgenstein’s approach about the so-called “private language argument” which is based on two fundamental concepts, namely meaning condition and Rule-guided argument, and will show how he is able to express his argument with a realistic attitude of meaning.
Abdul Razzaq Hesamifar
Volume 11, Issue 41 , April 2015, , Pages 49-68
Abstract
Abstract
The refuting of private language is one of the important ideas of later Wittgenstein; a language whose words are only known for its user. To justify impossibility of the private language, Wittgenstein in his diary argument shows that it is impossible for a person to name one of his own sensations ...
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Abstract
The refuting of private language is one of the important ideas of later Wittgenstein; a language whose words are only known for its user. To justify impossibility of the private language, Wittgenstein in his diary argument shows that it is impossible for a person to name one of his own sensations by using a sign like “S” and to write it in his diary and then he cannot register its repetition in his diary. There are many interpretations of this argument. Some consider it as an argument against the validity of memory and some others consider it as an emphasis on the necessity of rules for using the words in a language. Skepticism in the validity of memory sometime is related to the ability of memory in keeping the first sensation and sometime is related to the ability of memory in correct remembering of using of a sign in the past. The commentators mostly accepted the first part and according to their view, since there is no objective criterion for assessment of use of a sign, the possibility of assessing the correctness of memory function in private language is denied. In this article, some interpretations of diarist argument are investigated.
�Q�ҁQ�ӁQ�ӁQ�ӁQ�ӀQ�ӁR�ӀR�ӀQ�ӀQ�ҁQ�ҀQ�ӀQ�یشتر شق نخست را برگرفتند و به هر حال امکان احراز درستی عملکرد حافظه را در زبان خصوصی به این دلیل منتفی دانستند که معیاری عینی برای بازسنجی کاربردهای یک نشانه وجود ندارد. در این مقاله برخی تفاسیر از استدلال خاطرهنویس بررسی شدهاست.
mostafa hosseini golkar; mohamad mohamad rezaii
Volume 10, Issue 39 , October 2014, , Pages 59-94
Abstract
Abstract
Regarding Wittgensteinian view towards fideism, two questions have been left unanswered: Firstly, has Wittgenstein explicitly defended fideism? And secondly, can fideism be deducted from his thoughts? In the present paper, after a research into the nature of fideism, it has been shown that ...
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Abstract
Regarding Wittgensteinian view towards fideism, two questions have been left unanswered: Firstly, has Wittgenstein explicitly defended fideism? And secondly, can fideism be deducted from his thoughts? In the present paper, after a research into the nature of fideism, it has been shown that relating fideism to Wittgenstein has mostly been based on a special interpretation of part of his Philosophical Investigations. Attention to and reflection in Wittgenstein’s collection of ideas, especially in Culture and Value and Lectures and Conversations shows numerous reasons and evidence exist which reject Wittgenstein’s fideism and can be substituted for the common existing hypothesis. Moreover, it should be remembered that inducing fideism from the distinction between language-game of religion and that of other entities is somehow the mixing of the language-game as meaning and understanding hypothesis and the induction and judgment hypothesis, and, eventually, following the path of religious thinking of Wittgenstein somehow challenges the view of dividing his realms of thought into two periods.
Stephen Palmquist
Abstract
The surprising comment U7ittgenstein malees at the end of his Tractatus suggests that, even thot(f!,h the analysis of tuords is the proper method of doint philosopy, philosopf?fs ultimate aim mqy be to experience silence. Whereas I:Vit(!!,enstein never explains 1vhat he meant kY his C'l)'ptic conclusion, ...
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The surprising comment U7ittgenstein malees at the end of his Tractatus suggests that, even thot(f!,h the analysis of tuords is the proper method of doint philosopy, philosopf?fs ultimate aim mqy be to experience silence. Whereas I:Vit(!!,enstein never explains 1vhat he meant kY his C'l)'ptic conclusion, Kant provides numerous clues as to bo». the same position can he understood in a more complete and systematic 1vqy. Distin,rz,uishin,_rz, betiueen the meani,zrz,s of "silence," "noise" and "sound" provides a helpful 1vqy of understandinrz, hon; philosophers can devote so much effort to anctfyzjng nerds even thot(rz,h their quest is ultimate!J fu!ftlled onb1 in a deep experience of reali-t_y that is most adequate!J expressed in silence.
