Morteza Pouyan
Abstract
There is no doubt that both Mulla Sadra and Allame believe that philosophical necessity holds in external world; they begin their philosophy by necessity as well. Necessity is actually the origin and basis of all beings and truths in external world, one can even argue that it is the same as the objectivity ...
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There is no doubt that both Mulla Sadra and Allame believe that philosophical necessity holds in external world; they begin their philosophy by necessity as well. Necessity is actually the origin and basis of all beings and truths in external world, one can even argue that it is the same as the objectivity of things. It is, whatever being devoid of necessity, is devoid of objectivity and reality. But Mulla Sadra and Allame differ in the origin of such necessity. Each of these philosopher’s abstract necessity from one thing. Whereas Mulla Sadra takes necessity from being, Allame takes it from reality as such. In other words, for Mulla Sadra the basis of philosophical necessity of things lies in the being and for Allame in reality as such. Mulla Sadra, therefore, begins his philosophy from being and Allame from the reality of things. In this paper, we consider first the question of how they differ in the origin of abstraction of philosophical necessity and then the question of which philosophical and practical consequences follow from these two views.
milad omrani; Fereshteh Nabati
Abstract
To Avicenna, the relation between the subject and the predicate is of three kinds: possibility, necessity, and impossibility. Impossibility is the same as necessary non-existence. The word ‘modal’ in modal logic refers to these three. Avicenna has dealt with different types of modal propositions ...
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To Avicenna, the relation between the subject and the predicate is of three kinds: possibility, necessity, and impossibility. Impossibility is the same as necessary non-existence. The word ‘modal’ in modal logic refers to these three. Avicenna has dealt with different types of modal propositions in his logic books. However, in his philosophical books he has limited himself to propositions with the predicate of existence. In a merely structural division, based on the predicate of propositions, there are logical necessity and philosophical necessity. If necessity is not looked upon from a structural viewpoint, there would still be two types of necessity. Logical necessity based on the principle of contradiction. Predicates which have this property are the essentials in the Isagoge. In addition to these, Avicenna considers the ‘required essential accidents’, from Borhan, as necessary. But he does not base them on the principle of contradiction. I’d like to call them ‘philosophical’, whose other criteria is not the principle of Identity or contraction. Avicenna labels the essential accident as ‘required’ and considers them necessary. The necessity of the ‘required’, however, does not need ‘persistence’ or the principle of contradiction.
