Mehdi Assadi
Abstract
Ibn Sina says that if we have a piece of knowledge about the past or the future, then our knowledge is “potentially” about the external world. But he does not clarify the meaning of this “potentiality”. We show that if we take Ibn Sina's “the potential” view as the ...
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Ibn Sina says that if we have a piece of knowledge about the past or the future, then our knowledge is “potentially” about the external world. But he does not clarify the meaning of this “potentiality”. We show that if we take Ibn Sina's “the potential” view as the potentiality of the object of truth and then return it to the material causes, then by means of considerable modification and reconstruction we can obtain a reasonable kind of minimalist holism resolution: the object of knowledge to a future thing is its all material causes in the present time and the object of knowledge to a past thing is its all material effects in the present time. We will prove this presentist resolution by means of a kind of determinant reason of comparison with Ibn Sina's definition by a description of comparison with Ibn Sina's phrase that a thing can be distinct by its all causes and of the comparison between the validity of the Minimalist Holism Resolution and our knowledge about the past and the future in the ordinary situations (i.e. without considering the riddle of the intentionality to the nonexistent). In the end, we will have a glance at the degree of the correspondence between knowledge and its object in this resolution and then we show that this resolution can be provable even outside Ibn Sina's philosophical system without necessarily accepting such issues as the four causes and the potentiality.
mahdi assadi
Abstract
The present paper evaluates Ibn Sina's view about the intentionality and the truth of declaration in the case of the future and the past, the object of which is nonexistent. The paper strives to demonstrate that there is a close relationship between the well-known intentionality and the truth of the ...
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The present paper evaluates Ibn Sina's view about the intentionality and the truth of declaration in the case of the future and the past, the object of which is nonexistent. The paper strives to demonstrate that there is a close relationship between the well-known intentionality and the truth of the declaration (khabar), and that both can be used to elucidate certain unclear points in Ibn Sina's reasoning. Furthermore, an inconsistency in Ibn Sina’s view of intentionality is pointed out: He first states that regarding the knowledge of the nonexistent entities of the future, the mental forms we have of the entities in our mind have no relation to reality. However, he sets out to prove such a relation a few lines later. The paper tries to resolve the inconsistency as much as possible, and lastly, it criticizes the view(s) of Ibn Sina, i.e. the pure mentality of knowledge and the potentiality of knowledge about nonexistent entities in the future and the past.
SOMAYEH rafigi; Muhammad Asghari; Mahmoud Sufiani
Abstract
In the phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty tries to transcend the traditional explanation of intentionality and therefore he describes the phenomenology of the body. According to Merleau-ponty, there is no separation between the world and consciousness and these two are completely tied together. ...
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In the phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty tries to transcend the traditional explanation of intentionality and therefore he describes the phenomenology of the body. According to Merleau-ponty, there is no separation between the world and consciousness and these two are completely tied together. Conciseness for Merleau-ponty is not a mere subject which constitute the eternal essences and natures and gives meaning to phenomena, but it is the body-subject that direct toward the world and cannot be separated from this field of action in the world. The objects of this subject-body are also in the phenomenal fielding that determined by directing the lived body toward them and it comes out of ambiguity and thus, their meaning is born. Accordingly, intentionality for Merleau -Ponty, is the orientation in the world and directedness toward the world itself, and the intentional states are realized in collisions or physical states in a physical and concrete environment. In this paper, we try to provide an interpretation of the concept of intentionality from the perspective of Merleau-ponty, which he calls it "practical intentionality", and we want to express its differences and similarities with Husserl’s intentionality. The main difference between the views of these two philosophers is in Merleau-ponty’s criticism on Husserl’s of Noesis-Noema structure. He claims that meaning is intrinsic to the phenomenal field and it is not possible to analyze it by a distinction between matter and form.
Ahmad Rajabi
Abstract
In the lecture History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena Heidegger levels an immanent phenomenological criticism at Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In the lecture, Heidegger accuses Husserl that he neglects to raise two fundamental questions for the phenomenology: the question concerning ...
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In the lecture History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena Heidegger levels an immanent phenomenological criticism at Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In the lecture, Heidegger accuses Husserl that he neglects to raise two fundamental questions for the phenomenology: the question concerning the specific manner of being of the intentional acts in particular and the manner of being as such in general. By his criticism, Heidegger returns to the starting point of Husserl‘s phenomenology, i.e. the shift from natural attitude to transcendental attitude, and thereby reaching his own understanding of the matter of phenomenology. As is well known, Heidegger substitutes the Dasein for the transcendental consciousness and refuses the Husserl’s epoché and his transcendental reduction. In the following paper, on the contrary, we attempt to interpret Heidegger’s criticism in another way, which is that Heidegger adopts not only the transcendental reduction but also the absolute transcendental subjectivity. To put it more precisely, Heidegger radicalizes the absoluteness of the absolute transcendental subjectivity in Husserl’s Philosophy so much that he will be able to eliminate the Husserl’s natural attitude as a non-phenomenological and dogmatic starting point for the phenomenology. Accordingly, we claim that Heidegger’s Dasein is substituted for the absoluteness of subjectivity and the finitude of human existence simultaneously.
reza soleiman heshmat
Abstract
This brief essay is aimed at making clear the necessity of considering the two meaning’s of the Arabic word» Valy« in respect to Valayat (philia) and Velayat (politeia) in correlation with together as interiority (boţun) and manifestation (zohur) of one another and thus not in separation ...
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This brief essay is aimed at making clear the necessity of considering the two meaning’s of the Arabic word» Valy« in respect to Valayat (philia) and Velayat (politeia) in correlation with together as interiority (boţun) and manifestation (zohur) of one another and thus not in separation manner with each other. Since as it will be followed the origin of most misunderstandings in this subject refers to such separation between these two meanings of the word» Valy« and to be adopted them as equivocal,if we hold them relevant in respect of both letter and meaning such as in hikmat and Islamic philosophy is done,the feature of the matter will be changed and then it will appear for us some unfoldings on understanding of the meanings of the verses of Quran(included 59 of An-Nissaa and 55 of Al-Ma 'idah) and the respective revayat. This inquiry will also show that the famous view of Fakhr al-din Razi concerning knowledge as the category of relation cannot be considered as so-called the relation-possessed attribute in the soul of the knower and thus his conception seems to be referred just to mere relation that of course which in turn needs an independent inquiry in his philosophical and theological woks.