Roqayeh Mazaheri; Shahin Aawani
Abstract
From Kant’s view, freedom is the universal property of humans as the autonomy of will. He established morals on the ground of freedom through legislation of Practical Reason. In Kant’s philosophy, freedom is a ground, based on which humans have dignity as an individual and human beings. The ...
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From Kant’s view, freedom is the universal property of humans as the autonomy of will. He established morals on the ground of freedom through legislation of Practical Reason. In Kant’s philosophy, freedom is a ground, based on which humans have dignity as an individual and human beings. The concept of freedom is conjunct with moral law and practical reason and is not found in the scope of nature. The moral law being freedom in a sense elevates humans from the scope of nature and gives them value and dignity, which is based on freedom and autonomy. A moral human creates value for the world, and human is the end of creation. The Intermediator of human relationship as a moral being and the end of nature is the freedom concept. This article is written concentrating on Kant’s view of “The relationship between dignity and humans freedom”. Freedom is neither an objective matter nor the subject of cognition because the concept of freedom is related to the rational world and is realized in the behavior and disposition of humans. Everything has a price or dignity in the land of ends. Whatever has a price could be traded, but what is more valuable than any value and has no equivalent whatsoever is dignity. The humanity of humans is the only being that has “dignity” as long as it is capable of having morality.
Atieh Zandieh
Abstract
Since Wittgenstein is known for his two philosophies, one of the concerns of interpreters of his thoughts is to understand the relation between his two philosophies. Hutto is one of the interpreters who have endeavored to identify a reliable relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophies in order ...
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Since Wittgenstein is known for his two philosophies, one of the concerns of interpreters of his thoughts is to understand the relation between his two philosophies. Hutto is one of the interpreters who have endeavored to identify a reliable relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophies in order to present a coherent and consistent interpretation of these philosophies. In his view, this approach results in resolving superficial and profound conflicts in Wittgenstein’s philosophies. In Hutto’s words, an integrated basis that relates Wittgenstein’s two philosophies is Wittgenstein’s “end of philosophy”, and his attitude towards “nature and meaning of language”. Based on Hutto’s interpretation, in two of Wittgenstein’s intellectual periods, the end of philosophy was ‘description’, but Wittgenstein’s philosophical attitude towards the nature of language was evolved: an evolution from logical form to form of life. Hutto attempts to show that this evolution was not Wittgenstein’s main intention and it emerged through the method he applied for offering his thoughts. In Hutto’s view, Wittgenstein’s attitude in his second philosophy is correct, based on the ‘functional attitude’ and his attitude in his first philosophy is faulty, based on the ‘picture theory’, and this fault results from Wittgenstein’s confusion. He intends to extend the second philosophy method to the first philosophy in order to interpret the whole philosophy by one end and attitude. Although his conclusion is exquisite, it results in the conclusion that in Tractatus, there is no substantial point worth keeping.
