mahdi ganjvar
Abstract
The problem of "immortality" - as an innate thing - can be studied from various aspects: revelatory, mystical, intellectual and philosophical. In this paper, Spinoza's conception of soul and immortality is critically analyzed while drawing on the principles of transcendental Philosophy. Spinoza, like ...
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The problem of "immortality" - as an innate thing - can be studied from various aspects: revelatory, mystical, intellectual and philosophical. In this paper, Spinoza's conception of soul and immortality is critically analyzed while drawing on the principles of transcendental Philosophy. Spinoza, like Sadr al-Muta'llehin, believes in immortality of soul; but they differ by the fact that Spinoza denies, on the one hand, the substantiality of the soul and, on the other hand, believes that immortality is non-inclusive and acquired. Therefore, the acquisition of immortality for Spinoza is conditioned by gaining some qualifications and removal of some obstacles. Accordingly, only those souls experience immortality who are qualified by certain terms. Mulla Sadra, however, believes that immortality is genetic and essential for the soul, and therefore includes every single one.
The conception and explanation of how immortality is acquired and how it relates to human happiness in Spinoza, compared with the view of Mulla Sadra, constitutes the most part of the paper. The method of this research is descriptive-analytic with critical approach.
musa dibaj
Abstract
In his philosophical theory of space (and time), Immanuel Kant distinguishes between the relation that exists between things to each other in space (Verhaltnis) and the one that exists between space (and time) to us (Beziehung). He holds that space cannot be manifested by the mere experience of relations ...
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In his philosophical theory of space (and time), Immanuel Kant distinguishes between the relation that exists between things to each other in space (Verhaltnis) and the one that exists between space (and time) to us (Beziehung). He holds that space cannot be manifested by the mere experience of relations between spatial manifestations of things. Rather, space results solely from the possibilities of representation of space/place. However, our awareness of the reality of space/place does not depend on the experiential recognition of things. Human beings are engaged in space without having any primary experience of space, whereas Kant somehow reduces space to some external spatial aspect of things. Nevertheless, space amounts to more than what Kant considers to be the grasping/understanding of the pure form of space. The origin of space lies primarily/essentially beyond the human subjectivity and the boundaries of cognitive recognition of space/place. Kant regards space as the condition of the appearance of things that exist in the external world and become available to our perceptions, though there would be no relation between space and the determinations of things themselves. Therefore, one may ask where that space/place is where things in themselves exist. On the one hand, Kant does not provide any positive argument in order to dismiss the space itself that maintains the thing(s) in itself. On the other hand, if space is not a characteristic of a thing in itself, it cannot be said that the thing in itself is contained in space itself. If space is not given to us as a primary reality that is irreducible to the mere characteristics of things in themselves, things in themselves, as substances, would have nothing in common with space, whether substantial or not. If we do not accept that space is a place where things in themselves are, then where would those things in themselves be located? Moreover, where would we and our world be situated?
reza akbarian; amili novo egliza
Abstract
The fact that Corbin left the realm of Western philosophy to devote himself to Islamic philosophy and Iranian theosophers has usually been considered as a radical "rupture" in Corbin's philosophical thought. This article aims at showing that in reality, there is no contradiction but rather a deep continuity ...
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The fact that Corbin left the realm of Western philosophy to devote himself to Islamic philosophy and Iranian theosophers has usually been considered as a radical "rupture" in Corbin's philosophical thought. This article aims at showing that in reality, there is no contradiction but rather a deep continuity in his philosophical path, which was guided by a unique quest of being. Corbin was therefore deeply influenced by Heidegger's main issue of "being qua being" as well as his hermeneutical methodology, but reached another apprehension and level of being through his acquaintance with Mullâ Sadrâ's transcendental philosophy. This crossed-approach led to the transformation of the Heideggerian "Being-towards-death" into the Sadrian "Being-beyond-death", and revealed the deep correspondence between the mode of being and the mode of comprehension as well as the complementary nature of philosophy and mysticism; the latter being the essential and only true realm in which, through presential knowledge, "the fundamental reality of being" may be grasped.
