ضعف اراده و آکراسیا دو پدیده متمایزند؟

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشیار فلسفه دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران؛

چکیده

اکراسیا در ادبیات سنتی فلسفی بدین معناست که فرد با بهترین حکم خود مخالفت کند. برخی از فلاسفه اخیرا این پدیده را با ضعف اراده یکی دانسته اند، اما هولتن این دو پدیده را متمایز می داند و استدلال می کند که ضعف اراده به معنای نقض قصدهای جدی است. این مقاله نشان می دهد این دو پدیده بر خلاف ادعای هولتن، متمایز نیستند، بلکه در اکراسیا و ضعف اراده ،علت ترک فعل با دو رویکرد تبیین می شود؛ اولی ناظر به فاعل است و دومی ناظر به فعل. بر اساس این مقاله، تفسیر هولتن به رویکرد دوم اشاره دارد، در حالی که تفسیر ارسطو با هر دو سازگار است. اما اگر مؤلفه های نظریه هولتن به درستی تحلیل شوند می توانند با عناصر نظریه ارسطو سازگار باشند.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Are the Weakness of Will and Akrasia Two Distinct Phenomena?

نویسنده [English]

  • zahra khazaei
associate professor, University of Qom, Qom,Iran.
چکیده [English]

According to traditional philosophical literature, Akrasia is defined as acting against one’s best judgment. Philosophers have considered Akrasia as synonymous with the weakness of will. However, Holton considers these two phenomena to be distinct and argues that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. This study seeks to show that these two phenomena – unlike Holton's claim – are not distinct, but the accounts of Akrasia and weakness of will take two approaches to explain the reasons behind quitting actions: (1) in terms of its relationship to the agent; and (2) in terms of its relationship to the action. The researcher attempts to show that Holton's interpretation of the weakness of will refers to the second perspective whereas Aristotle approaches it from two perspectives. However, on duly analyzing the elements put forward by Holton, we can see them to be consistent with those of Aristotle.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Akrasia
  • Weakness of will
  • Intention
  • belief
  • Agent
  • action
  • Aristotle
  • Holton
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