عنوان مقاله [English]
Saul. A. Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language reads Wittgenstein’s private language argument as an inference from the idea of rule following. He presents a sceptical paradox about rule- following, which purports to show all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible. In this paper we will examine one of the most important outcomes of Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution, namely “The Community view” according to which, the concept of a private language is inconsistent, because using language entails following rules, and following rules entails being a member of community. This view believes that solitary or private rule-following is impossible and language is essentially social; hence it’s impossible for someone isolated from birth to follow a rule or use language. At the end we will attempt to settle this longstanding and significant dispute, by shedding some lights on the terms used by these antagonists such as Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language, essence and Crusoe.