عنوان مقاله [English]
This paper examines Nelson Goodman’s position on the ontological problem of value of art, in other words, the question of ‘what kind is the relation between valuable feature(s) of artworks to them, in Goodman’s aesthetic cognitivism. In the first place, by examining several issues about (1) the types of the relations between valuable feature of an object to it, (2) the types of the relations between valuable feature of a work to it, and (3) Goodman’s position on the normative problem of value of art, provides the rudiments to solve the above question. In the next place, it suggests that although Goodman is a cognitivist, in the normative issue of value of art, and cognitivism is an anti-essentialism position, it is not that his anti-essentialism is entirely consistent with cognitivists’ anti-essentialism. Goodman and cognitivists are partners in the beliefs that cognitive value attributed to art is (1) plural and (2) is not unique to art. But, do not share the biliefs that (3) the value is common in all works of art and (4) the relation between the value to artworks is intrinsic. However, he does not violate anti-essentialism, although 3 and 4 makes him close to essentialism, Because Goodman’s common cognitive value is not unique to works of art.