عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
Multiple realization is one of the central topics in analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science. After a short exposition of the notion of realization, one of the arguments against reducibility of special sciences, based on the notion of multiple realization, will be reviewed. The next step is to introduce the causal account of properties and realization. Based on this account, the author has two main claims. Firstly, it will be argued that the mentioned argument against reduction will lose its credibility if we consider different realizers of a multiply realizable property homogeneous, which is a plausible assumption under the causal account. Secondly, even if we reject reducibility of special sciences, we can still defend a moderate version of the unity of science. According to it, the nomic content of a special-science law is a coarse grained version of the content of the associated basic laws.