نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه معارف اهل‌البیت(ع) دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران

چکیده

«علوم شناختی دین» شاخه‌ای نوظهور از علوم شناختی است که با استفاده از یافته‌های علوم شناختی به مطالعه باورها و رفتارهای دینی می‌پردازد. اغلب محققین این حوزه معتقدند که باورها و رفتارهای دینی، محصولات فرعی معماری شناختی ذهن ما انسان‌ها هستند. بر اساس این رویکرد غالب که اصطلاحاً «مدل استاندارد» نامیده می‌شود، ذهن انسان یک سیستم پردازش یکپارچه نیست، بلکه دارای ابزارهای اختصاصی متعدد برای پردازش اطلاعات ورودی به ذهن است. این ابزارهای ذهنی، در فرآیند تکامل، سوگیری‌هایی پیدا نموده‌اند که روی اطلاعات ورودی به ذهن تأثیر می‌گذارند و آن‌ها را به نحو سیستماتیک جهت‌دهی می‌کنند. ازنظر مدافعان مدل استاندارد، این ابزارهای ذهنی و سوگیری‌های شناختی آن‌ها، در شکل‌گیری بسیاری از باورهای ما ازجمله باورهای دینی نقش اساسی ایفا می‌کنند. ما در این مقاله، از منظر فلسفه علم، سه شاخص اصلی برای نشان دادن اعتبار این رویکرد را موردبررسی قرار می‌دهیم: شواهد تجربی در دفاع از آن، قدرت تبیینی و ساختار نظری آن و همچنین پیش‌فرض‌های روش‌شناختی آن. ما در این مقاله نشان می‌دهیم که مدل استاندارد به لحاظ شواهد تجربی، نامتعیّن؛ به لحاظ قدرت تبیینی، ضعیف؛ و به لحاظ پیش‌فرض‌های روش‌شناختی، دچار چالش است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Analysis and Philosophical Critique of the Standard Model in the Cognitive Science of Religion

نویسنده [English]

  • Sayyed Mahdi Biabanaki

Assistant Professor, Department of Ahl-al-Bayt Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

چکیده [English]

"Cognitive Science of Religion" is the emerging branch of cognitive science, which uses the findings of cognitive science to study religious beliefs and behaviors. Most scholars in this area believe that religious beliefs and behaviors are the byproducts of the cognitive architecture of our minds. Based on this predominant approach, known as the "Standard Model", the human mind is not an integrated processing system, but has multiple proprietary tools for processing input information. These mental tools, in the process of evolution, have found biases that affect the input information and systematically guide them. For the Standard Model defenders, these mental tools and their cognitive bias play an essential role in shaping many of our beliefs, including religious beliefs. In this paper, from the perspective of the philosophy of science, we examine three main indicators for demonstrating the validity of this approach: the empirical evidence to defend it, its explanatory power and its theoretical structure, as well as its methodological presuppositions. In this paper, we show that the Standard Model is underdetermination in terms of empirical evidence, weak in terms of explanatory power, and challenged in terms of methodological presuppositions.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Cognitive Sciences of Religion
  • Standard Model
  • Mental tools
  • Agency Detection Device
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