عنوان مقاله [English]
Subjectivism as an epistemological schema is a fundamental element of modern thought. This schema was based on the Cartesian cogito and considering human as the “thinking substance”, and with Kant’s transcendental Philosophy and granting human a self-grounded role in the act of cognition, it gained unique importance in the Human Knowledge of the New Age. However, with the beginning of the 20th century and the paradigmatic changes that occurred in Philosophy, thoughts appeared that strongly challenged the schema of subjectivism, this substantial foundation of modern thinking. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein is one of the philosophers who has made the most of his efforts to overcome this schema in his Philosophy. The present paper tries to measure the relation between Wittgenstein’s early and later thought with regards to modern subjectivism, and at the same time, strives to demonstrate the degree to which Wittgenstein's efforts have been successful toward transitioning past subjectivism in each period. On this basis, the first part of the article, with a transcendental reading of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus will show that Wittgenstein, while attempting to abandon the schema of subjectivism, continues to adhere to Kant's subjective approach. And in the second part, while referring to Wittgenstein's novel way of inquiring regarding philosophical issues, the paper will investigate how to transition from subjectivism in his later thought.
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