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effects are special characteristics, which in their own right, are constant for each one of them. That is any of corporeal archetypes, in the matters that they have, possess special effects specific to each one of them, and in the creation of these characteristics they are not self-sufficient and cannot have such effects, because the corporeal archetypes are material beings, and if they have any effect, it is in conjunction with the matter, in addition to the special situation which would be necessary for the occurrence of that effect. That is, any action which is done by corporeal forms must be in tandem with matter and the specific situation needed for the realization of the action. This is while, if the corporeal form has an effect in its own matter, none of these two conditions would be realized.

Because: **First**, no entity has a position in relation to itself. Second, form must have its effect without the conjunction of the matter, and would be independent from the matter in its own activity. This is while the corporeal form needs matter both in activity and in the origin of existence.

Hence, the archetypes do not hold sway over their own matters. Therefore, for the manifestation of characteristics and effects they are dependent on others, which either soul or intellect must accord them with the characteristics. But the soul cannot accord it with the effects of the forms, because the soul is similar to other natural forms at the level of action and the dependence on the body, and it belongs to, and is dependent upon, the body.

Hence, the intellect is the only being which can accord these effects to natural forms and all effects which are manifested from different bodies, like heat, coldness, color, taste, etc. are not from the archetypes but are from a subject on which archetypes rely, and the principle of the existence of archetypes belong to Him, and this subject is a rational substance which has co-extensive relations to all of the instances of that species, and the corporeal forms are nourished by Him in the source of existence and their activities (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1360, p.161).

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subsisting being, which the soul observes it during the perception (p.161).

Seventh Proof

This proof, too, like the previous proof, is postulated through perception and processes which take place during perception. In this reasoning, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin utilizes the issue of the Unity of the Intelligent and the Intelligible, which he has proven earlier. After discussing the preliminaries which was discussed in the previous proof, and the acceptance of the fact that in existence, a rational being exists which is actually perceived by the soul, and in the mind of man there are rational beings which, due to the fact that they are in the intellect, are rational in actuality:

Since it has been proven in the issue of the Unity of the Intelligent and the Intelligible, the sensible being is in fact the being of the sense and the senses, and the rational being in actuality is the same rational being of the Intelligent, and the Intelligent and the Intelligible are united, and it has become clear that the Intelligent is a being which in actuality is an immaterial substance. Therefore, the Intelligible is like the Intelligent, and the Intelligent which is united in existence with such a substance is a separable substance like it. Hence, if someone considers the quiddity of man, and understands it, and imagines its rational and intelligible meaning in the mind, it becomes clear that man has a rational instance in the world of intellect, and also any one of the natural beings, instead of its own sensible existence in the material world, has a rational existence in the world of intellects (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1386, vol.3, p.506).

Then Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin points to the fact that, of course, from each quiddity in the world of intellects and abstractions, only one instance can be realized, and the exposition of that reasoning would not be within the scope of this article.

Eighth Proof

In this proof, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, based on the actions and effects of natural beings, concludes that Platonic ideas and accidental intellects, whose relations to instances of their species would be co-extensive, exist. His reasoning is as follows:

We know that the corporeal archetypes, such as plants and trees, each have effects that are special to them, and what is intended by these

substance and accident?

In this proof, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin refers to this problem, and it is as if there is no response for this question, and it is an accepted question in the discussion on mental being, and based on this question, he bases the foundation of his reasoning.

He explains that among the beings some are natural and exist, along with its matter and accidents, in the world of senses, and some are physical universals, which exist, along with their instances, through accidents in reality. In addition to these two types, there are also intellectual concepts which are separate from the matter, and its accidents, and the intellectual concepts which are shared by instances, and are predicated upon the instances, that is why they are co-extensive in relation to all the instances, and at the same time that it is devoid of situation, material characteristics and instances, it is characterized with the rational individuation, because rational individuation and sensible individuation are not mutually exclusive.

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says after these explanations:

The rational being which is separable from matter, is either self-sufficient or self-subsistent, which is the same as immaterial Platonic ideas, or it subsists in the soul, and when the soul perceives it, it is realized in the soul, and is predicated upon the soul, then in this case it becomes necessary that the substantial quiddity which has been imagined (and because it is the constant truth and essence of the instances, one can refer to it as substance, more so than the sensible instances) would be an accident and a quality predicated upon the soul, i.e. a being would be both an accident and a substance.

In responding to this question, it has been said that a universal substance such as an animal, is a substance because if it is realized in reality, is Not-in-the-Subject, and it does not negate the possibility that it would be In-the-Subject in the mind, because that which In-the-Subject in the mind is true about it, which if realized in reality, it would be independent of place, but this response which has been mentioned in the works of philosophers such as Ibn-e Sina's *Asb-Sbjfa* has been criticized (and Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has refuted it in the discussion on mental being).

At this point, he says: What is realized in the soul, is not the rational form of that quiddity, rather it is a mental quality, which prepares the soul to have a rational observation which would show its universal reality. According to what has been mentioned in this proof, the universal reality of any quiddity would be a self-sufficient and self-

Second Way

In the discussions on movement, it has been proven that a subject must remain constant so that it would maintain continuity and unity of movement because the characteristics are in the process of change and transformation, and it is necessary that a subject would not change from the beginning to the end of movement. On the other hand, this constant subject cannot be prime matter, because the prime matter has generic unity, and would be transformed and renewed with the changes of the form. This cannot be nature either, because according to transubstantiation, the material natures are in the process of change. Hence, this constant issue, would be the maintainer of the unity of movement, maintainer of the cognition of the nature, an issue which is a non-material, rational issue.

Hence, the nature has an essence which is composed of renewed substance which is of prime matter, and a constant rational substance, and in this manner the essence of nature is united with the essence of that rational substance, in such a manner that the essences and their actions are united, while one of them is material and the other is rational (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1359, p.159/ 1360, p.374).

In our discussion on transubstantiation, we have mentioned in our article that Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, because of the occurrence of the movement in the issue of substance, says that Platonic ideas exist, and he has discussed this in the treatise called *Al-Hodouth* (1361, p.35).

Sixth Proof

This proof, too, like the fourth proof, is through the perception of rational concepts, but with a different exposition:

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin in this proof points out to the forms of mental being, which shows that he has not accepted the issue of primary predication which he had diligently discussed in the issue of mental being, and had considered it as a solution to the problem. In the book *Asb-Shawahid-ur-Ruboubiya*, his change of mind is quite evident (1360, pp.31-33).

In the discussion on mental being, this problem has been discussed that if man conceives of substantial quiddity and during the conception, that quiddity becomes present in the mind, on the one hand that quiddity is the essence, and has a self-subsistent existence, and on the other hand it has been present in man's soul, and is knowledge, and is an accident of the soul, and has an accidental existence, and how can a being be both a

Hence, the rational forms are not subsisting in others. Rather, they are self-subsistent, and this is what is meant by the Platonic ideas that there are rational forms which are self-subsistent, separate from the matter and its accidents (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1386, vol.2, p.70).

Fifth Proof

In this proof, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin undertakes to prove the Platonic ideas through the issue of transubstantiation (*Harakat-e Jowhari*). He expounds on it in two ways:

First Way:

It has been proved that in the transubstantiation of material beings, as a subject undergoes changes in quantity or quality, there are changes in its substance, and the truth and essence of any material being is transforming all the time. What is meant by the substance is its new differentia, existence and being, which is changing and transforming at any given moment, and other accidental changes also occur in beings following this transubstantiation.

Moreover, it has been proved that the substance of material beings is self-renewing, i.e. its essence is in the process of transformation, and this transformation is due to its essence, and is not imposed on it, rather transformation is among the essential characteristics of any material being. Hence, the cause of the existence of the substance of a material being is a constant issue, and it is not necessary that the being would be renewed, because the principle that "the cause of the renewed is [itself] renewed" applies to cases in which renewal is an accident, whereas the material substances are such that renewal is identical with their essence. In this case, their cause is rational issues, because the soul, which in action is dependent on matter, is viewed as material nature.

Hence, the cause of each material being and each material nature is rational substance which has the same relation to the instances of that species, and its ranks and limits. That substance, while being the sustainer of existence of the instances of that species, is the essence (*Mohassal*) of species, the sustainer of the matter (of course, along with nature) and perfecter of its genus. These characteristics all show that this species of which that rational substance is a immaterial form of this nature.

therefore, they are self-existent.

The Proof Expounded

Undoubtedly, we have a chain of rational issues, i.e. we have issues which are understood by us and other members of human community. We are aware of these issues and have a general understanding of them, for example, the intelligible man, the intelligible tree, and intelligible animal, and these forms do not have the characteristics of material beings and are abstract. Now, the following question is posed: Are these rational and universal forms self-existent or subsisting in the other? and what is *the other*?

If the other is one of the material parts of our body, in which rational forms subsist, in this case, one must accept that an abstract rational form, is subsisting in a material part, and this is impossible.

If that other, in which rational forms subsist, is the reasoning soul, then those rational forms must never disappear before the soul, and lack of attention does not make any sense. Moreover, since the soul is aware of itself, and as a result, it is aware of its own accidents, then how would it be possible that a person would forget the rational forms? Hence, these forms are not subsisting in the soul either.

Someone might say: These rational forms are subsisting in an abstract substance, an abstract substance which is independent and outside our soul, and that is **reason** and its treasure-house of sciences and the intellectual concepts, to which whenever the soul is connected, is able to perceive those rational forms, and whenever it is not connected, it forgets it.

We say in response that this theory has a number of problems:

First, all the problems that exist about the emergence of the rational forms in the soul, also exist in their emergence in the abstract reason as well.

Second, if the rational principles accept these impressions (*Enteqashat* and *Ertesamat*) of the matter, it would mean that the lower has influenced the superior, and it would be impossible that the material world, which is the lower, would influence the world of intellects. If these impressions are emanated from the world superior to intellects, it would mean that the multiplicity has emerged from One (*Wahed*), which is also impossible.

Third, when the soul ponders on these forms, it should also ponder on their place and the way in which are manifested, whereas the soul does not have such a perception about the rational forms.

differentia in matter, the strength and effects of that nature would emerge from new differentia in the same manner that action would be undertaken by an agent, or emanation would emerge from the source of emanation. Hence, matter, and that which accompanies it, i.e. the middle differentiae and the remote differentiae, would be the image and derivative of natural form and new differentia, and the natural effects and actions, too, have a natural form.

The natural form is the act and the emanational effect of form, and is its derivative. An instance, whose natural form is realized in it, is the image of that source of emanation. Also any one of the middle differentia and remote differentia which pave the way for the realization of new differentia, they themselves, too, are in the same content (*Maddeb*) of new differentia, and a source of emanation in the world of intellect has created them, and has made them in its own matter. These new differentiae are the acts of that agent and its derivative.

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says: As was said before, in the world of intellects there are origins of emanation, each being a source for a previous differentia, and the source of its realization. In the same manner that the new differentia in the world of material beings is simple and forms the essence and truth of material instances, its agent and source of emanation in the world of intellect is simple and possesses the perfections of this form. Since it is devoid of accidents and additions of matter, it is an abstract rational being. We have thus far established that the truth of any one of the natural instances would be the same as its form and new differentia. The source of this form is a truth in the world of intellects, whose essence is united with the new differentia, and it is the cause of realization, which is called the archetype or Platonic idea.

Fourth Proof

The Summary of Proof

The rational forms definitely exist, because man has rational perceptions and universal perceptions, and this is something self-evident. If the rational forms are not self-existent, there might be three cases, all three of which are impossible. **First**, they would be dependent on a material part of our parts. **Second**, they would dependent on our soul. **Third**, they would be dependent on a separate, independent, rational being, i.e. an immaterial substance which is the treasure-house of intellectual concepts, and because all three possibilities are impossible,

of that quiddity.

Of course, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has mentioned this proof for proving the rational being and world of intellects, but since the content of the proof included proving immaterial forms and the Platonic ideas, the author of this article has utilized it at this stage (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1363, p.444).

Third Proof

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has called this proof as Oriental Theosophy and has not mentioned it during presentation of other proofs for proving forms. He says:

"If you want to conduct further investigation, then listen to Oriental Theosophy on the proof for the immaterial forms of these physical species, and that [means], as you have understood from our Oriental sciences, that the truth of all the natural forms, is their immediate differentia (1359, p.373).

As it is understood from the beginning of this quotation, this part of this statement is a proof for immaterial forms, while in continuing the same discussion, he has mentioned three proofs for proving the existence of Master of Species which shows that this aspect in his writings has been merely a commentary on the Platonic ideas, and cannot be construed as a proof, and those three proofs that he has later mentioned, are acceptable reasonings, but one can somehow pay attention to these statements, and interpret them so that they would serve as a separate proof for Masters of Species.

The proof is as follows:

Any natural being that we may consider, although it may have genus and differentia, and would be composed of proximate genus and immediate differentia (*Fasl Akbeer*). The proximate genus would be composed of genera and other differentiae, until it would reach the genus of generum, and the remote differentia. However, the whole truth of that being is its *Fasl Akbeer*, and the other differentiae and genera only pave the way for the presence of *Fasl Akbeer*. This means that its content of mode (*Maddeh Sha'n*) is predisposition and potential, and the forms and qualities and other constituent parts of definition, i.e. the middle differentiae and the remote differentiae, would prepare the matter for accepting the form and immediate differentia, so that Emanation of the Origin and the Agent would reach the recipient, and immediate differentia would be realized. Following the realization of immediate

in the mind, and you confirm that quiddity has rational existence in the mind. Hence, the rational existence for physical quiddity is established.

2 – The rational being must be self-existent, whereas the existence of physical instances is dependent on matter, and this dichotomy in being is not possible for a quiddity.

Response: It is possible in existence that the instances of one of its species would be different, some would be manifested in matter, and still some others would not be manifested, and the strength and weakness of beings, does not lead to their differences from the standpoint of quiddity.

3 – The rational being is simple, whereas the physical beings are composite.

Response: Any manifold, and composite being which is found in natural beings, its totality and reality is in its form, because it is actualized through its form, and whatever has unity in actuality, its multiplicity is in potency, and natural man is, for example, one unified entity whose unity is directed towards the form of his unity, and not his organs. Hence, composite physical beings or rational, simple beings have one common truth. The composite-ness of the corporeal beings does not make the rational beings composite as well.

Second Proof

Sadr-ul-Muta'allchin in this proof has utilized the characteristics of sensible beings. His proof is as follows:

If we study the reality and the essence of sensible species which has multiple instances, we realize that the principle of truth and essence does not have contingency of accidents and additions. For example, the truth of the mountain necessitates a specific size, or occurrence in a specific site, or special circumstance, otherwise mountain must not have more than one instance, whereas different instances exist for mountain with different accidents and additions.

The presence of these accidents and characteristics of sensible beings shows the qualification of the object for allusion to sense. If a being does not have the contingency of any one of these sensible accidents, it would be intelligible, and would be outside the world of senses. Since the essence and truth of sensible beings do not have the contingency of sensible accidents, hence, the essence of sense impressions is intelligible. Since the truth of each object precedes the additions and accidents, therefore the rational being of each quiddity precedes the sensible being

statements, and finds a contradiction between the implementation of the said principle with the language that Suhrawardi has used in his philosophy (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1386, vol.2, pp. 58-62/ 1360, pp.169-171).

What we want to discuss here are the views and explanations by Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin on how to use the principle of Superior Principle. We have to take note of the fact that Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has used this principle once in order to prove the world of intellects (1363, p.443). He has also utilized this principle in order to solve the immaterial ideas. Since in one of his critiques of Suhrawardi he says that Sheikh Ishraq, through utilizing this principle, has not been able to prove any thing more than the world of intellect in general, and at the same time he views the proof by Suhrawardi as the most probable aspect (*Aqrab-ul-Wojouh Madhkour*) in his discourse on proving Masters of Species (1360, p.169). Hence, it is necessary to pay more attention to his language in utilizing this principle (1359, p.373).

According to Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, the principle of Superior Possibility is first a proof for proving rational forms for each species, and much less a proof for rational principles for any physical species and for the activities of the intellects on material species. This means that for each material species, there is a rational instance and immaterial form.

The reason that such rational form exists is that all physical species have a quiddity existing in the mind, and this mental quiddity is a possible being. There are no doubts that the realization of such a quiddity in reality, in such a way that—like mental quiddity—it would have equal relations to the instances of that quiddity, and would also be separate from matter and its additions (*Lavahiq*), is possible. If such a being is realized in reality, it is superior to the beings in the physical world, and the rational being of this quiddity in the mind and dependent on the mind has been realized. Therefore, it is superior and must be pre-existent because it is realized in reality in a self-existent manner.

Now we have to see whether it is possible for a physical quiddity to have an abstract existence? Is there any obstruction on the path of realization of such a physical quiddity.

In response, he says: Abstract existence is possible for physical quiddities, because the quiddity itself is possible and there is no obstruction for the realization of that being, except for some barriers which have been mentioned, but all of them can be explained:

1 – The rationality of a being is not possible for a physical quiddity.

Response: The rational existence of this quiddity can also be realized

God's attributes, does not necessitate that there would be a multiplicity of pre-eternals, nor does it make the unitary and impermeable essence of God in need of perfection, because these rational forms are independent and distinct entities from the Being of God, and their truth and being is no different from the Truth and Being of God. (p.216)

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has raised the same theme in *Mafatih-ul-Ghayb*, (p.436) as he has said somewhere else:

The immaterial forms are not at all part of the world, and they are not either part of all-other-than-God. They are, in fact, forms of God's knowledge and perfect words which have yet to be completed and will not wither away. As the Almighty says: "What is with you vanishes: What is with Allah will endure." (16: 96) And He also says: "Say: If the ocean were ink [wherewith to write out] the words of my Lord, sooner would the ocean be exhausted than would words of my Lord." (18: 109) " (1386, vol.1, p.198)

Summary of Views of Mulla Sadra

From what was said above, we conclude that: According to Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin the Platonic immaterial forms are divine sciences, sciences which are from pre-eternity to eternity. The beings of the material world have an essence similar to that of the immaterial forms. Moreover, these beings are shadows of the immaterial forms, in such a way that they have called those immaterial forms as **ideas**.

Therefore, the Platonic ideas are rational beings and forms of God's knowledge, which are among God's attributes. They are annihilated in the essence and depend on the permanence of his essence. Moreover, they are not part of all-other-than-God. These illuminated ideas are the truth and origin of sensible beings, and have a quiddity similar to them. They are also the cause and organizer of sense impressions.

Second Discourse: Mulla Sadra's Proofs for Ideas

First Proof

In this proof, a philosophical principle called Superior Possibility is used. Before Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, Sheikh Ishraq has resorted to using this principle in order to prove immaterial ideas. After expounding on the views of Sheikh Ishraq, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin finds problems with his

Almighty's innovation. In his writings, we also come across other themes, some of which will be presented in this part of the article.

An Explanation

In explaining the difference in his references, as in the previous section, we can refer to the following point: The relationship of causality in the writings of that sage has been discussed with different expressions and titles. Sometimes following the views of the Stoic philosophers, he refers to cause and effect as two separate beings, one of which depends on the other for its being. Sometimes the relationship between them has been explained in a deeper and more precise language until gradually he reaches to the viewpoints of the Islamic mystics and their interpretation of the relationship of causality and the relationship of God and the created beings, in the same discussion where he completes a project started by Islamic philosophers by explaining the truth of relationship of the Necessary Being and all-other-than-God (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1386, vol.5, p.229).

The separable divine forms, which are present before God, are not aware of their own essence, and except for God, no one is aware of them. The reason for this, according to Plato and Stoic philosophers, is that these immaterial forms do not take notice of their own illuminated essence, and they are annihilated in God due to their total obedience, and survive based on the permanence of God, and they are realized through the true being of God (1363, p.436).

He also says:

God's essence has rays, luminosity, light and effects, and how can It be otherwise whereas the whole existence is illuminated by His Light and shines with His manifestation? Plato and his followers had called those lights and rays as luminous ideas and divine forms. (1386, vol.5, p.204)

Because the Platonic forms are divine sciences and are the treasure-house of Lord's knowledge, and because the attributes of the Almighty is the same as the essence, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has said:

Those rational forms are in fact God's attributes, and divine sciences, which are obedient to his Being, whereas the Exaltation and Majesty of God is due to His Own Essence, and not because of these rational forms. The fact that these rational forms are

Muta'allehin, and it seems that the way to find a synthesis of these theories would be the following: Since Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says that the connection between cause and effect goes back to actualization (*Tasha'on*), and he says that effect is among the states (*Sbo'oun*) of the cause, in this discussion, too, according to different stages, he considers Platonic ideas as cause, innermost part and the shadow-caster for material beings. He says: Any one of the physical species has a perfect instance in the world of creation, which is the source and origin of other instances of species. This is while the instances branch out from it as its effects (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1360, p.163).

(The Platonic ideas) are the rational substances and spiritual ideas which belong to physical species, and are present before God. As compared to physical species, these rational substances are the organizer of the inner mysteries, the sustainer of physical life, the medium for creation, guarantor of survival, and repetition of instances (1363, p.447).

They are rational forms which are the innermost part of natural, sensible forms (p.424).

"The ideas are the existing truths, whose relationship to sensible forms which have disappeared is the same relationship between the origin, and shadow and idea. And those [ideas] are the origin of these existing and renewing shadows, because they are in one sense the agent, the telos and the form, because the above principles are intellects in actuality, and are not devoid of possibility and potentiality (1386, vol.5, p.202).

Because potential rational beings and the material beings (*Maddiyat*) have potentiality and possibility, and ideas are the subject, *telos* and the form of material beings, therefore their relationship is similar to that of the source and [its] shadow.

D – Relationship between the Ideas and the Necessary Being

This section is the most important section we have discussed in the introduction to this article, because we can easily observe the similarity between the theory of ideas and the theory of Immutable Essences (*A'yan-e Thabeteh*) in the writings of Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin on the relationship between the ideas and the immutable essences (Qeisari, 1375, p.61).

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin also uses quite different expressions to refer to the relationship between the ideas and the Necessary Being—Glory be to his Majesty. The most basic expression is the relationship of **innovation**, which means that Platonic ideas have been created through the

The form of beings of the world of bodies is the same as the form of beings of the rational world—which has been created with the initiative of the God Almighty. Because reality of each being is its form, therefore those two beings have the same reality. (1386, vol.5, p.191)

B – Rational Existence of Ideas

As was said in the response to Mohaqqueq-e Davani, the divine Platonic ideas, according to the views of Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, are rational beings, and not beings from the world of ideas. Hence, in many cases, he has referred to them as rational ideas or immaterial idea.

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says about *Kbaza'in-i Ashya'* in the verse "And there is not a thing but its [sources and] treasures [inexhaustible] are with Us..." (Qur'an, 15:82):

These treasures are the immaterial forms, and rational ideas which are present before God for these natural sensible species. All natural species have a form separate from the material entities as viewed by Plato. (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1363, p.418)

About the natural forms, he says:

The natural forms can be realized in reality in a rational form, [separate from matter, and its accidents], and Plato and his followers had the same views about divine immaterial forms. (p.518)

The natural forms can be realized in reality as rational beings, and separate from matter, and its accidents. The views of Plato and his students on the divine immaterial ideas are the same.

C – Relationship between Species and Ideas

There are different and diverse references to the connection between the ideas and the physical species in the writings of Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin. On the one hand, he introduces ideas as **the cause** and sustainer of material beings, and on the other hand, he says that their simile is that of a shadow and the **shadow-caster**. He also views them as the **innermost part** of the material beings.

We will make reference to a number of statements by Sadr-ul-

intellects. Hence, the world of ideas is a world similar to the material world, and the beings of that world have the same attributes of the bodies. The difference between them is that the beings of the material world have a material being, and the beings of the world of ideas, have a being separable from the matter, not from its accidents. With these descriptions, it is clear Plato, his masters and followers, maintain that he divine ideas are from the world of intellects, and not from the world of ideas.

Critique of Mirdamad's Views

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says in critiquing the interpretation of his master, Mir Mohammad Baqer Damad: "Based on what he [Mirdamad] has said, it is necessary that there would be the same number of rational Platonic ideas as there are individuals and beings in the world of matter, because the fixed visage of each material being is specific to it, and it is distinguishable from the fixed visage of another material being. This is while based on the statement of Plato, for any species of material bodies, there is only one rational idea. There is not one rational idea for each instance and individual of the material beings.

Interpretation of Mulla Sadra

After reviewing Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin's critique of the interpretations of divine Platonic ideas by the great Islamic philosophers, it is appropriate to review his views about these rational beings.

The theory of Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has a number of components:

A – Unity of Reality of Species and Ideas

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says that Platonic ideas, the species and bodies have the same reality, and their manner of being is different from one another; one is material and the other is rational. But their essence and reality are the same. That is, any species of bodies in the material world has material instances, and in the world of ideas it has an ideal (rational) instance. This point is the main pillar of the difference of his perception from that of Sheikh Ishraq, because Sheikh Ishraq does not openly accept the unity of reality of physical species, and its Platonic idea. But Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says:

presented in *Asb-Shifa* for the Platonic ideas, which says that all natures have an instance in the world of intellects--in the same manner that they have instances in the sensible world-- is the essence of Plato's world. Plato and Socrates have not made mistakes in this area, and it should not be ascribed to them that any rational universal which exists in the mind has a rational existence. This common sense, predicated on sensible beings, has a rational existence, because there is no doubt that Aristotle and his master, Plato, with their stature, are much greater in stature to have made such mistakes in the rudimentary issues of philosophy.

Critique of Suhwardi's Views

On the other hand, it is not clear in the writings of Sheikh Ishraq whether the Masters of Species have, in his view, the same essence and reality as the sensible beings? (Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, 1386, vol.2, pp.53-62/ Suhwardi, 1397a, p.154/ 1397c, p.453/ 1397d, p.191). From the proofs of Sheikh Ishraq one can only understand that any type of physical species has an archetype which belongs to that species, and is not only the designer (*Modabber*) of instances of that species, but also the cause of their occurrence. But do the archetypes and the instances have the same reality or not?

The proofs and writings of Sheikh Ishraq do not deal with this issue. Hence, the Masters of Species which appear in the writings of Sheikh Ishraq are different from the divine ideas in the writings of Plato.

Critique of Davani's Views

About the views of Mohaqqeq-e Davani, one must be cognizant of the fact that the ancient philosophers—those who discussed the divine ideas—themselves believed in the world of ideas, a world which ranks, from the standpoint of system of existence, lower than the world of reason and higher than the material world. The beings of this world, although separate from the matter, are not immune from their accidents. Moreover, they are spirits that have the same quantity and quality and all other accidents of the matter.

It is said in the detailed perceptions of human beings, the perceiver is connected to the world of ideas at the time of perception, in the same manner that at the time of perception of universals—based on the theory of the unity of the Intelligent (*'Aqel*) and the Intelligible (*Ma`qoul*)—the Intelligent is connected to the world of universals and

Hence, from this aspect, none of these beings have renewal, decay or contingency. In this intuition, they do not have a need for prime-matter predisposition or physical conditions, and from this aspect they are viewed as abstractions. What Plato meant by Separated Exemplary Ideas is this aspect of beings (Mirdamad, 1367, p.150).

Then Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin critiques these interpretations as follow.

Critique of Farabi's Views

The Platonic idea, despite the perception of the Second Teacher, Abu Nasr-e Farabi, is independent, self-existent entities which exist in external reality. They are not like forms of knowledge and acquired knowledge in others. Plato has been quoted as saying: "In the state of immateriality, I saw luminescent spheres" (Sadr-ul Muta'allehin, 1386, vol.2, p.50).

Also Hermes has been quoted as saying: "A spiritual being presented me with the knowledge. I asked him: "Who are you?" He said: "I am your perfect and complete nature."

Hence, it has been asserted in the statements of ancient philosophers and Plato that the divine ideas are independent and "not in the subject".

Critique of Ibn-e Sina

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin criticizes Ibn-e Sina's interpretation of Platonic ideas, and maintains that Plato could have never stated such theories. As Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says:

Undoubtedly, Plato, one of whose pupils is the First Teacher [Aristotle], with his superior status, is so great that one cannot attribute to him that he does not distinguish between disassociation based on intellect and disassociation based on being. (p.47)

The Best Interpretation

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, however, maintains that Ibn-e Sina has presented the best interpretation of Platonic ideas (1359, p.251), and the error on the part of Ibn-e Sina is caused by his interpretation of the positions based on which Plato has issued his theory of ideas.

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says that: "The very theory which has been

1 - Farabi's Interpretation

The Second Teacher says in the book *Al-Jam` bayn Ra'y-il-Hakimayn* that the beings in God's knowledge have forms which are in the manner of empirical knowledge, and although the individuals and beings in time and space change and disappear, those forms remain (Farabi, 1405, p.106).

2 - Ibn-e Sina's Interpretation

According to Ibn-e Sina, what Plato meant by ideas in the world of intellects (*Alam-e `Oqoul*) was that the universals and essences, which can be found in *Kathirin* (multiplicity), and in the world of matter have numerous instances (*Afrad*), they are themselves available in the world of intellects, and exist as universal form. These rational beings are the cause of their own instances in the sensible world, and precede them" (Ibn-e Sina, 1405, vol.8, p.204/ p.311/ p.318/ vol.3, p.188/ 1371, p. 370).

3 - Sheikh Ishraq's Interpretation

Any simple species, such as spheres and elements, or composite such as plants or animals in the world of intellects have an intellect independent from matter which is the possessor of that species and is an archetype. The relation between the archetype and the natural instances is that it dominates the instances (*Afrad*) and oversees them. Each one of the intellects, since they are at the end of the latitude of chains of intellects, is as if it were an accidental intellect. These intellects are numerous based on the degree of the multiplicity of physical species. Hence, any one of material species has its own corresponding intellect, and a self-existent idea which becomes the source of these species (Suhrawardi, 1397a, p.92/ 1397b, p. 68).

4 - Mohaqqueq-e Davani's Interpretation

Platonic ideas are the same as suspended beings in the world of ideas, in which other philosophers believe as well (Davani, 1411, p.187).

5 - Mirdamad's Interpretation

All the temporal and material entities are in need of time, place and condition, but in relation to the knowledge of the Almighty, Who has an absolutely illuminationist and intuition-based knowledge, they are all in the same rank, and there no superiority among them in this regard.

area. He says; Individuals such as Abu Nasr-e Farabi have attempted to assay the issue of Separated Exemplary Ideas (*Muthul-i Mufariqa*) with rational demonstration, but have not succeeded in this matter, and Farabi has gone wrong in the very understanding of this theory.

In this article, I will point to different viewpoints among the Islamic philosophers, and will point out the fact that according to Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin the best interpretation is that which Ibn-e Sina has made, but even Ibn-e Sina has not been able to explain the theory of ideas and its essence.

According to Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, the theory of ideas has not been an issue open to [rational] demonstration. Rather, the ancient philosophers have discovered the existence of ideas through their intuition (1363, p. 447).

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin also has discussed a number of verses of the Holy Qur'an which prove the Separated Exemplary Ideas (*Ibid*).

In the final analysis, according to Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin none of the Islamic philosophers have been able to truly understand the theory of Separated Exemplary Ideas, and only he, based on "Divine Aid", has been able to succeed in this area (Sadr-ul Muta'allahin, 1359, p. 251, p. 375).

First Discourse: Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin on Ideas

Critique of Viewpoints

In order to better clarify the issue of divine Platonic ideas (*Muthul-i Ilahi-ye Aflatouni*), Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin first critiques the perception of others on these ideas. Then, while critiquing and reviewing the views of Islamic philosophers, he presents his own perception of ideas.

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin briefly quotes Plato in this manner: "It is said of divine Plato that many of his views, are compatible with those of his Master, Socrates. As he says: The beings (*Monjoudat*) have abstract forms (*Sourat-hay-e Mojarrad*), and it is possible that those forms would be called divine ideas. These forms neither disappear nor decay. But that which disappear and decay are the existing beings (*Monjoudat-e Ka'eneb*) in the world of objects, and the abstract forms remain" (1386, vol.2, p. 46).

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin says: There are different interpretations about what Plato intended by ideas and their manner of existence. He refers to some of these interpretations.

things and many good things, and also other things, of any form, of whatever type, each of them having their own boundaries and definitions.

He said: Of course.

I said: On the other hand, for every one of these multiple species, we believe in an abstract being, i.e. the abstract beauty, abstract good, and abstract anything else which is found in the world of multiplicity. These are the unified form and absolute existence of those multiplicities."

I said: That is so.

I said: I must add that multiplicities are visible rather than rational, whereas the cognitive forms are rational rather than visible (Plato, 1368, p.380).

These statements are quoted from Plato's master, Socrates, who has uttered them in his debates with Adimantos and Glaucken, the two elder brother of Plato. They show his views on *Sunar-i Mufariqa* (immaterial forms), which later came to be known as Platonic ideas.

Aristotle, Plato's pupil, has critiqued this theory, and has referred to a number of problems in his *Metaphysics* (Aristotle, 1366, p. 251). Throughout the history of Islamic philosophy, the students of the Aristotelian school, have expounded on these problems.

The issue of Platonic ideas have been discussed among Islamic theosophists, and has been a source of disagreements. Farabi and Ibn-e Sina (Avicenna) rejected the theory of ideas (I will point their viewpoints of the theory). However, the adepts of illuminative wisdom, most notably Sheikh Shahabeddin Suhrawardi has accepted the theory of ideas—based on the interpretation that he himself had.

About the background of this theory, we would like to point out that before Plato and Aristotle, too, there was a gravitation towards this theory among the Greek philosophers, and Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has referred to it in one of his books (1359, p.251/ p.375).

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin attributes this theory to Empedocles, Pythagoras, Agathadimon and Hermes (1386, vol.5, p.163). The point that the theory of ideas had existed before Socrates has also been discussed in the works of Ibn-e Sina (1405, p.310). Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin has even attributed this theory to the Stoic philosophers and ancient Iranian philosophers (1363, p.436/ 1362, p.141/ 1360, p.171).

But what is of importance here is that according to Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, after the theory of ideas was discussed among Islamic philosophers, each one of the philosophers have tried to have a better understanding of the theory of ideas, but they have not succeeded in this

philosophy that he had in mind is more transcendental than the one that Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin developed. The late Imam never gave up on mystical claims and tried to bring the mystical pantheism into philosophy, and to follow the discussion of God's attributes based on the approach of the mystics.

He also made a synthesis of mysticism and theology, and explained theological discussions such as determinism and delegation, and the discourse of the soul with mystical teachings. Among the most important concerns of His Eminence, was to explicate revealed theology (*Kalam-e Naqli*) based on speculative mysticism and transcendental theosophy. With a quick review of his numerous books, we realize how his mystical approach has influenced his exegesis of the verses of the Holy Qur'an, and commentary on the Hadiths of the Blessed Household of the Prophet (AS).

But the third point that needs to be discussed is the issue of "Platonic ideas". The "Platonic idea", regardless of the special significance that it has in transcendental philosophy, is among the discussions that Mulla Sadra has transferred from mysticism to philosophy, and has used the same simulative method to develop it in transcendental theosophy. This theory is among the rejected theories in the Islamic peripatetic philosophy, which Mulla Sadra has revived, and has mentioned 8 proofs for it.

In the second part of the article, we plan to review the proofs of Platonic ideas, and now we think it is necessary to stress that the theory of ideas, in the sense which has been discussed in transcendental philosophy and the writings of Mulla Sadra, has a mystical root, which is the same as the immutable essences. The characteristics that Mulla Sadra enumerates for "ideas" is similar to characteristics of immutable essences.

Therefore, in our opinion, Mulla Sadra, with his background in Islamic mysticism, has taken a new step in philosophy. First, he has interpreted the meaning of Platonic ideas based on mystical thoughts. Second, while relying on mystical intuitions, he has used a language based on proof.

The present article deals with the views of Mulla Sadra on "ideas", and the reader who is well-versed in mysticism finds out by himself to what extent the characteristics of "ideas" are similar to "immutable essences".

An Introduction to Plato's Ideas:

I said: We, however, believe in multiplicity, i.e. we say many beautiful

of divine theosophy. He did not approach philosophy like mystics, so that he would view it as an ordinary, and not-so-important, discipline, nor did he coin new terms, which would be foreign to philosophical discourse, as Sheikh Ishraq did. He presented a new philosophy out of philosophical claims and the discarded sayings of the theosophists. This philosophy includes such discussions as analogical gradation of being, transubstantiation, the unity of the Intelligence and the Intelligible, and the immateriality of the faculty of imagination. Hence the divine theosophy did not adopt any other path except for that of the prevalent philosophy and its methods.

When we briefly compare Mulla Sadra's divine philosophy and the Islamic mysticism, we see that he has approached philosophy while being assisted by mysticism, and at the same time has not transferred *all* that has been discussed in mysticism into philosophy. Here there are three important points to be discussed:

First, the issue of the Primacy and Unity of the Truth of Being (*Esalat va Vahdat-e Haqiqat-e Vojoud*), which Mulla Sadra has discussed in his own philosophy in an unprecedented form, but it is far apart from the mystical pantheism.

Second, the issue of the relationship of causality which he has defined as actualization (*Tasha'on*), and that "the effect has no independent reality from the cause but it is among the states (*Sbo'oun*) of the cause" has been transferred from mysticism to transcendental theosophy.

In these two discussions, Mulla Sadra has extensively used the very terms that the mystics such as Qaysari and Qounavi used. He, too, admits that the foundations of these two discussions have been explicated in mysticism. He has shown his gravitation towards mysticism in the book *Mafatih-ul-Ghayb*, more so than *Asfar* and *Asb-Shawabid-ur-Ruboubiya*.

It seems that the weak point of Mulla Sadra's theosophy lies in the fact that he has made changes in mystical principles, and has replaced them with similar concepts and themes. There are deficiencies in this transition from mysticism to philosophy, which has failed to achieve excellence in scholarship, although it has blazed the path before the transcendental theosophy towards mystical understanding.

It is befitting here to make a reference to my esteemed father, and the liberated mystic of our era, His Eminence Imam Rouhollah Khomeini (RA). It was he who, with the mastery that he had achieved in Islamic mysticism, tried to provide a new interpretation of transcendental theosophy suitable for speculative mysticism (*Erfan-e Nazari*). Hence, the

Throughout the history of Islamic civilization, there have always been thinkers who have had a deep commitment to bridge the gap among all fields of the Islamic sciences. Among the most important activities of the past scholars include the establishment of connection and harmony among Islamic disciplines and methods of research. That is why at certain points there have been an overlap of issues of different sciences and the methods of one field have influenced those of other fields. Natural science, philosophy, theology, mysticism, exegesis of the Holy Qur'an and even jurisprudence are considered among such disciplines. For example, there have been scholars whose specialty was philosophy and have made forays into theological debates, or vice versa. There have also been thinkers who have delved into mysticism, before turning towards philosophical discourses. Long ago, there existed quite a number of Muslim scholars who specialized in, and wrote treatises on, different disciplines. This was not done because different fields of knowledge were not developed. It was done out of the motivation to connect these fields.

Among these scholars, Khwajeh Nassir-ed-Din Tousi made impressive achievements in establishing a solid connection between philosophy and theology. He is distinguished from such personalities as Ghazzali, Taftazani, and Imam Fakhr-e Razi in that he did not go to war against philosophy with the weapon of Islamic theology, and did not mix the valuable achievement of human sciences such as philosophy with theological discourses. Rather, using the weapons of philosophy and human reason, he attempted to solve theological riddles. He established the Shi'a theology based on theosophical thoughts, and in this manner he blazed a new path before seekers of knowledge.

Once again, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin worked towards restructuring of the Islamic sciences. He spent his utmost efforts in connecting the three disciplines—i.e. mysticism, philosophy and theology. Mulla Sadra not only established theological debates based on philosophical thoughts, as Khwajeh Nassir had done, but also took another great stride in enriching philosophy. With his familiarity with Islamic mysticism, he strove towards fashioning the [themes of Islamic mysticism] in a philosophical language and theosophical method, and presented a philosophy based on mystical findings.

In order to reach this noble goal, Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin gave up mystical terminologies and claims. By creating a similar language within philosophy, he set out to achieve this important goal, and perhaps this was the key to his success and his incomparable influence on the process

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin on Platonic Ideas

Zahra Mostafavi Khomauni*

Abstract

Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, a prominent figure among Islamic philosophers, spent his utmost efforts to connect Islamic philosophy, mysticism, theology and exegesis of Holy Qur'an in some of the different discussions such as the Primacy and Unity of the Truth of Being (Esalat va Vahdat-e Haqiqat-e Vojoud), the relationship of causality which he has defined as actualization (Tasha'on), analogical gradation of being (Tashkik-e Vojoud), transubstantiation (Harekat-e jobari), the unity of the Intelligence and the Intelligible (Ettehad-e 'Aghel va Ma'ghoul), and the immateriality of the faculty of imagination (tajarrod-e kbial), and Platonic Ideas.

He interpreted the meaning of Platonic Ideas on one of the mystical theories, i.e. "immutable essences" (A'ayan-e Sabetah).

The present article elaborates different viewpoints among the Islamic philosophers and the critiques of Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin of their perceptions such as Farabi, Ibn-e Sina (Avicenna), Subrawardi, Davani, and Mirdamad, and commenting on interpretation of Mulla Sadra and also plans to reviews his eight new proofs of Platonic Ideas.

Keywords: *Sadr-ul-Muta'allehin, Plato, Platonic Ideas, immutable essences, world of intellects.*

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