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the new way of thinking that is evolving with it, which has made Humean notion of causality inadequate. This is because the description of natural phenomena in the present day science is no more based solely on space and time. The smallest indivisible particle of an element is no longer atom. Science has now recognized the existence of certain waves, electrons, protons and neutrons which are not physically observable, thereby lending credence to the African mystical conception of causality.

The African conception has overcome the limitations of Humean conception by not seeing causality has necessary conditions but has sufficient conditions, not just physical but also spiritual, mystical and psychically. The point I have been belabouring is that a straight jacketed rationalist conception of knowledge is inadequate to explain causality as Hume did, we have to look at a wider or broader horizon of human experience.

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however, that the natural setting for extended analysis of causal relation is provided by classes of events rather than individual events.

Conclusion

Let us harvest our thoughts. From the above analysis and exposition, we can see that the African view enables a better understanding of causality by positing that beyond the physical, mechanical and chemical interaction of forces there are also the psychical, mystical and metaphysical interactions. There are 'secret', 'unknown' forces between cause and effect, making the effect to deviate from their intended goal—even things that have been consciously planned can be disrupted by strange forces. Thus, causality cannot just be explained in terms of space and time or material and mechanical causes as being done by the Humean mind. To the African, we can know things beyond space and time.

Secondly, an African concept of causality which locates cause-effect relationship beyond the regularities and order which underline natural phenomena has been further buttressed by Jack Goody's identification of three levels of causation in African societies. These are: the immediate, the efficient and the final causation. He writes:

The immediate is the technique used to kill the deceased, like snake bites, sickness, or other 'natural' causes, as well as forms of mystical aggression.

The efficient, is to be found among the members of the community itself, that is, the person who was behind the act of killing.

The final cause is an ancestor, the guardian spirit or the Gods.
(1962, p.210)

So, when viewed objectively, the Esan explanation and approach to the concept of causality is still more acceptable in terms of the evidence available. For 'the phenomena of life and death, of dreams, of possession by evil spirit, of sickness and madness, of seeing, of consciousness, and of multiple personality are conducive to the belief that man is composite, a body that is inhibited and a soul that inhibits (Munn, 1960, p.31). That is why we view causality beyond space and time or the sensible world. A final point to note with regard to the primacy of an African causal theory, especially with respect to the evidence available is the landmark in the present evolution of science and

responsible for his or her actions. Responsibility is inseparable from freedom. In Esan cosmology, man's freedom is, however, often obstructed by various factors of physical, psychological, social, spiritual and environmental nature. It is these factors that have rendered the exercise of freedom difficult, if not impossible. Hence, man is said to be also determined (Azenabor, 1998, pp.160-161).

Discussions of causality usually go hand in hand with the discussion of Freedom and Determinism. It is generally believed in Western philosophy that if there is causality then determinism is true and if determinism is true then it is believed that there is no room for human freedom and moral responsibility. But many advocates of determinism, as pointed out by J.I. Omoregbe, confuse causality with determinism. To say that an action is free, they argue, amounts to saying that it has no cause, meaning it is the product of mere chance. But to say that an action is free is by no means to say that it has no cause, for it is true that every action has a cause. But a cause does not determine an action. A cause is the situation which makes a person takes a decision as to what he should do or how to act in a given circumstance. If, for example, I am hungry and I decide to eat, my action of eating has a cause; this cause is hunger, yet my eating is a free action; for I can as well decide not to eat in spite of the hunger, I can go on hunger strike or starve. So, my eating is not determined by hunger, though caused by it (Omoregbe, 1979, p.29). The point is that 'actions are not determined by their causes, between a cause and an action, there is free will (*Ibid*). In fact, the concept of causality is mainly concerned with events as they occur in nature, whereas Determinism is concerned with both events and human actions. Prediction is another area of distinction or difference that readily comes out between causality and determinism. The latter has prediction as its characteristic, which the former has not. And a final distinction is in the area of morality. "Since man is also a causal agent, Determinism does not negate the effectiveness of human being as causal and therefore moral agents ... Moral failures then, which are in fact spiritual defects, can be rectified (Gyekye, 1995, p.121).

Now does it mean the African conception has no limitations? There are. One of the most puzzling and difficult aspects of the analysis of mystical causality, however, is the problem of how to handle the background that serves as a framework for the occurrence of a particular event. If, for example, we attribute the cause of a child's death to a Witch, to what extent must we consider lightening or darkening conditions, the favorable atmosphere and the presence of an insider? It is suffice to say,

more. Here a divination is necessary to determine the force(s) responsible. If one must depend on science, then the same medicine should cause the cure of the same disease or sickness. It is only when there is a systematic contravention of such laws that the Esan man looks for reasonable explanation of a cause.

The Humean or scientific mind needs not describe the above concept of mystical causality as superstitious. Considering the problem which Hume himself has posed to science and philosophy, and the fact that science has no solution to it, one can also conclude that the scientific mind is as superstitious as the Esan's.

Moral/Ethical Causality

For one to be vulnerable to the mystical forces, however, one's 'Ehi' must concur. The question of 'Ehi' brings us to moral or ethical causality. 'Ehi' is man's guardian spirit and moving force, the bearer and determinant of one's destiny and moulder of one's future. It is man's personal God, who in conjunction with the Supreme Being determines man's fate on earth. 'Ehi' is a moral causal factor in Esan metaphysical thinking. If one's Ehi has no knowledge of a thing or approves of it, the thing would not happen. This is also the personalistic theory of causality. This theory has to do with moral conduct and it a derivative of the principle of retribution. The underlying conception is that effect follows cause as reward or punishment follows good or evil action. This explains why to the Esan man it is thought essential that the cause should precede the effect. A man's past actions have bearing on, and determine his or her present. This is backward-looking causation. Whatever happens to a man is an inevitable outcome of what he was, and is a necessary consequence of his action, which is now the cause of his other predicament.

Esan ideas of moral causation can be described as a theory, which sees an essential connection between causation and human action. The theory of moral causation has to do with the question of explanations and predications in the realm of human action. Explanations here are not experimental like in science, rather they are often teleological, and they are given in terms of intentions, motives and reasons. Here, cause and effect are not logically independent. Once the truths of explanations are known we can then predict the actions. But action has to do with choice and choice entails freedom, that is, freedom from compulsion. Hence, to the Esan man, man is free and since man is free he is

only shifts it; it is very unsatisfactory to the Esan mind. The answer to the “why” can be found by the principle of synchronicity – a mental attitude, “which takes full account of that particular interdependence of objective events among themselves as well as with the objective (psychic) state of the observer or observed” (*Ibid*).

From the above exposition and analysis, it becomes clear that the mystical concept of causality in an African metaphysics satisfies partly emotional and aesthetic needs – it is an answer like this that can explain why the thing happened here, now and to me in particular (Sodipo, 1973, p.18). After all man is not just a rational being, he is also an emotional, spiritual and even irrational being. It may be true, for example, that physicians who had tried a medicine on over 500 cases and has seen the patients get better the 500 times may feel pretty confident that his remedy was the cause of the recovery of his patients. But the real problem or puzzle begins when:

a) A patient suffering from the same sickness with others gets well without the medicine.

b) The same kind of medicine is given to an identical twin; suffering from the same ailment and in the same circumstances or condition and we discover that one of them lives, while the other dies. In other words, the desired result fails on a particular occasion in the case of one patient under the same condition.

c) The whole members of Okosun’s family die on their birthdays.

These problems are not such that can be solved with rationality or the knowledge of scientific facts. This is why Hume may be correct when he said that we cannot talk confidently about causality precisely because chance can take over-chance being a negation of causality. So the best we can say perhaps, according to Hume, is that the taking of the medicine was followed by the recovery of the patient. But then, a physician, who has had complete success with a cure in 99% cases but failed in the hundredth case, will by no means give up his belief that his treatment has been the “cause” of the 99% cases of recoveries. He would rather explain that in the negative case there must have been a circumstance which intervened to prevent the desired effect.

It is here precisely that the Esan man has a point. The said intervention, he would argue, could be spiritual or natural. Natural because in the negative case the cause may not be “A” any more but A + B, while B is the intervening circumstances. Thus A + B does not and cannot have the effect which “A” alone would have had. Spiritual, because certain forces might have intervened to complicate matters the

mystical forces exert on life processes and causal relations; hence the Esan man seeks the favor of these beings through sacrifices and worship.

Let us illustrate how the Esan and Humean or scientific conceptions of causality differ by leaning heavily on the example given by Prof. J.O. Sodipo. According to Sodipo, when an accident occurs the Western mind may attribute it to chance, bad luck, or the cause may even be known and analyzed. But this, Sodipo maintains, only answers the question of 'how' leaving the 'why'? It is in answering the 'why' that the mystical beings take over. Sodipo argues that the African man who sacrifices before traveling is not denying or trying to frustrate any of the general laws by which the motor-vehicle operates:

He knows as well as any scientific man, that if the brakes fail while the vehicle is moving at high speed there could be a serious accident. He is aware too that if the accident is serious enough, some of the passengers could die. But the general laws cannot answer for him the question: where and when the brakes will fail, whether they could fail when the lorry is traveling at high or low speed and should that happen, who of all the passengers will be fatally wounded. The scientific man will push the application of the general law as far as it can go; after that chance takes over – Even if a general law says that only one person out of a hundred passengers in a lorry involved in an accident would be saved – the Gods not chances decide who that lucky one shall be... (p.19)

There is also the example given by Oruwaiye which equally supports Sodipo's proposition:

Think of a house falling on some one, who is passing by. From the European point of view the explanation is simple; the house is old; may be there is an earthquake, or a breeze blows and the house falls. The African does not leave it like that. He wants to know why that man, why that day, why that particular house of so many houses is involved ... (Anyanwu, 1983, p.67)

The Humean or scientific mind may not consider the above problem quite important. From his point of view, the house fell, of all houses, and in a particular time and day, and on a particular man because it had to be a house that would fall and if a house falls, it has to be a particular day and time and a man – any man – could be involved anyway. So to the question "why me"? The Humean mind would answer: because it has to be someone. But the above answer does not solve the problem, it

of the “post hoc ergo propter hoc” invalid arguments? After all, no event could be regarded as the proper cause of say ‘E’ unless it occurred in the immediate spatial and temporal vicinity of ‘E’. So the causal relation between two events ‘C’ and ‘E’ is thought to imply their contiguity in space and time. Action-at-a-distance (temporal as well as spatial) was considered impossible. There must be a functional relation. Even the sun which transmits heat and light to the earth has a causal relation between it and the earth (Hosper, 1953, p.39). This stance is necessitated by the fact that causal notions in classical physics are deterministic; they are determined by the fundamental physical laws of phenomenon, whether they are mechanical, optical, spatial or electromagnetic in nature. In many scientific investigations, causal relations are thought of in terms of properties, especially quantitative properties, other than events, whereas in our ordinary experience we associate cause intimately with the concepts of events. In fact nothing in the strict sense can be spoken of as a cause or an effect except an event. Objects are not spoken of as cause or effect but as agents. The criteria of causality in science are successful prediction, logical connection and generalization.

It must be pointed out that logical connection is not causality. When we begin to look for logical connection between events, it would amount to a faulty process of thinking; we will be transcending the region in which a word makes sense and then find ourselves in the region of nonsense. No one denies that any fact which can be tested, observed and reproduced at will by experimental methods of science takes on an enormously increased reality. But then, the inability to test or check with the method of science does not mean the non-existence of what is being studied, rather it could mean the inadequacy of the method of experimentation. Witchcraft and other mysterious phenomenon seem to defy immediate scientific explanation but this does not rule out the possibility of it having a metaphysical reality (like redness, we only have instances of red things; we cannot see redness as a reality). Four hundred years of scientific endeavor in a universe with a time span of four million years could not have discovered all reality yet (Oluwole, 1978, pp.23-32). The point is that we should not be so prejudiced as to deny the occurrence of something just because we have not ourselves experienced it or been able to corroborate it. The rationale behind the Esan conception of mystical causality is explainable within their context of experience. The greatest aspect of human knowledge does not come from science but from personal experience. It is from personal experience that the Esan mind has learnt the important influence that the

knows that a snake bite can cause a man's death. But the point is that, a factor of this type is seen not as a final, but only as an intermediary agent – there could be something or person(s) associated with the snake at the moment it struck. So there is always the function of the network of spiritual and human relationships. There is no need to explain how the cause produces the effect before we are entitled to assert a causal relation. The Esan mind looks for “sufficient conditions”, while the Humean mind looks for “necessary conditions”. To say that a given set of conditions are “sufficient” for the occurrence of a given event which was their effects, is only to say that these conditions were such that all of them having occurred the effect in question could not fail to occur, for example heat, fuel and oxygen are sufficient conditions for fire. On the other hand to say that a set of conditions are “necessary” for an occurrence, is to say that any of them must occur for the change in question to have occurred, for example, in the absence of oxygen we can never have fire, because its presence is a necessary condition for fire, although not a sufficient one.

By causality, the Esan mind means the standing in a particular relation of one thing to another – that A and B have a relation is sufficient (not necessary) to affect each other or bring each other into being. A and B are not only co-existent or successive, but one is the ground for the other, without one the other would not and could not be. For example, if a witch cried yesterday night and a child died this morning, the Esan mind usually assert: ‘who does not know that the witch was the cause of the child's death?’ This is because there is already sufficient condition, even if it is not necessary. There is logical sufficiency, which even falls within the realm of symbolic logic:

$$\text{If } A \supset B$$

$$A$$

$$\therefore B$$

To an observer or critic operating within the scientific or Humean model of reality, the above example may appear strange, especially when we bear in mind Hume's advice about why it is not reasonable “to conclude, merely because one event in one instance precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause the other the effect. The conjunction may be arbitrary ...” (Sodipo, 1973, p.19). This Humean position is of course a possibility. The question then might be: why have the Esan elders not accepted this, satisfied to say, for example, that the witch cried and the child died independently of each other, instead of falling victim

causality can be known through the faculty of human understanding that has to do with synthetic a priori judgment or knowledge, not just sense perception or habit as Hume wants us to believe.

An African Causal Theory

The limitations of the Humean causal explanations could be better brought out when situated in the context of an African causal theory. In examining an African causal theory, the division made by R.G. Collingwood of cause into three senses will be more in the temper of an African conception of causality. R.G. Collingwood identifies three senses of cause: "the first being the causality of a voluntary act by an agent, the second being something which can be used by a man to bring about or prevent something in nature and the third being a condition or set of conditions in nature which are invariably accompanied by some change, whether these conditions are within man's control or not" (Taylor, 1967, p.57).

The second distinction is more at home with Esan concept of causality. The Esan community lays in Esan South West, East and Central local governments of Edo state, to the North- East of Benin Kingdom, in the South Western region of Nigeria. It is a population of peasants, still having some elders (sages) yet unpolluted by Western education or ideas. Issues in Esan conception of causality shall be discussed under the following heads:

1. Mystical Causality
2. Moral/Ethical Causality.

Mystical Causality

The concept of causality is central to Esan metaphysics. In this metaphysics, nothing happens by chance. Every event has a cause; there is always something associated with things which accounts for their occurrence. The concept of causality in Esan metaphysics goes beyond the physical. The mystical, comprising of the powers of fellow human beings, supernatural forces like witchcraft, ancestors, spirits, Gods, and many others are all elements in Esan mystical conception of causality.

Appropriate manipulations of things, words, gestures or even thoughts can influence the behavior of other objects even at a distance. Thus, to the Esan mind, 'natural causes' do not by themselves provide a sufficient explanation to happenings in the universe. The Esan man, for instance,

General Limitations of Humean Causal Explanations

It may be true that in our everyday life, if event 'B' always occurs after event 'A' had occurred, and if 'A' never occurred without being followed by 'B', then we do not hesitate to call 'A' the cause and 'B' the effect. In fact, 'causality', as used in our everyday life, is partly the regularity and uniformity in events. If 'A' is regularly followed by 'B' then 'A' is said to be the possible cause of 'B'. But if 'B' only happens to follow 'A' now and then, the sequence is a mere chance, not causation. It has however been argued that, "even" the most unprejudiced observer never thinks that the regularity of sequence constitutes the whole of causality; he regards it only as a sign or as the consequence of something else, of some "real connection" or some peculiar "intimacy between cause and effect ..." (Schlick, 1949, p.517).

Perhaps the best known objection to Hume's position of the identification of causality as regularity is the assertion that nothing is more regular than the succession of day and night, yet we do not call one the cause of the other. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the alternation of the traffic light from yellow to red, green, and back, occurs in constant conjunction, yet none of them is said to be the cause of the other.

Furthermore, Patrick Suppes, in his *A Probabilistic Theory of Causality* maintains that one event is the cause of another if the appearance of the first event is followed with a high probability by the appearance of the second, and there is no third event that we can use to factor out the probability relationship between the first and second events (1970, pp.9-10). It is this omission of probabilistic consideration that "is perhaps the single greatest weakness in Hume's famous analysis of causality" (p.10). As further objection to Hume, it is often argued that:

He misconceived the initial situation by treating a cause and its effect as two distinct events. What we observe, it is said, in the case of a particular causal sequence, is not just two separate events in relation by spatio-temporal contiguity, but a unified complex, we observe that one event is as it were, 'glued' to the other, and it is suggested that this gives us reason to believe that the connection is necessary and universal. (Ayer, 1963, p.192)

Immanuel Kant, on his part, agrees with Hume that we cannot know causality by experience but disagrees that causality cannot be known or can be inferred only through habit or custom. According to Kant,

is no more called an egg but a chicken. It is in the light of this that it has lately been doubted whether an analytical distinction can be drawn between cause and effect without reference to such notions as power or efficacy to produce certain changes in other things.

3) The Idea of Time

A third way of viewing the relationship between cause and effect is through the idea of time. Most scholars have supposed that causes can be distinguished from effects in terms of time: the cause always occurring before its effect. G.R. Von Wright makes this point when he writes:

What makes P a cause-factor relative to the effect-fact q is, I shall maintain, the fact that by manipulating P, i.e. by producing changes in it 'at will' as we say, we could bring about changes in q – in the normal cases, the effect brought about by the operation of the cause occurs later. In such cases time has already proved the distinction. (Wright, 1975, p.107)

A.J. Ayer, in line with this, also argues in his *Freedom and Necessity* that:

All that is needed for one event to be the cause of another event is that, in the given circumstances, the event which is said to be the effect would not have occurred if it had not been for the occurrence of the event is said to be the cause, or vice versa – in short, there is an invariable concomitance between two classes of events (Kenner, 1984, p.236)

The question whether causes must precede rather than follow their effects has been raised several times in recent literature. It has been doubted whether the mere accident of temporal gap or position is enough to distinguish causes from their effects. This view is further buttressed by the fact that some causes and their effects appear to be contemporaneous, neither occurring before the other.

From the above analysis, it is clear that the main philosophical problem of causality, in Western philosophy, does not yield to any easy solution. If however, one professes not to find any difference between cause and its effect, then it appears that one is contradicting common sense experience. Causality viewed in the Humean way presents a difficult problem and a source of much metaphysical controversy due to limitations in its causal explanations.

One event is only being followed by another and whenever 'A' appears and 'B' follows, we say that 'A' is the cause of 'B'. So cause, to David Hume, may be defined as "an object followed by another and where all the objects, similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed" (Lewis, 1973, p.556).

Hume maintains that there is never any tie between events. They seem only 'conjoined never 'connected'. And the fact that things have been constantly conjoined on many occasions does not mean they will be so on all occasions or that they are causally connected. Hume maintains that we have no necessary reason to suppose that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has risen yesterday and today. This is the problem of induction – the validity of inferences from past to future. So, to Hume, we only infer cause from effect as a result of habit and custom. There is no spatial contact or connection by chain of intermediate things in contact between cause and effect. Hume has consequently set the main problems of causality as being that of the relationship between cause and effect, which borders on the idea of a necessary connection between them.

The logic of the Humean stance is that since there is no necessary connection between cause and effect then a cause can occur and its effect may not follow. In other words, things may fail to happen the way they have been happening in the past. In sum, by Humean understanding, the problem of causality is that of Induction. The problem in focus here is 'how empirical sequence of events, however frequently observed, can validate or even give rise to the concept of necessity, which, moreover, is unobservable' (Milmed, 1957, p.5). So Hume is only reminding us of the old rule formulated long ago in scholastic philosophy, which warns against "post hoc ergo propter hoc" invalid argument, that is, fallacy of false cause. This means that from the fact that an event 'B' occurred after event 'A' we must not infer that 'A' is the cause of 'B' or 'A' is the cause and 'B' follows 'A' and 'B' is the effect of the cause 'A'.

2. The Idea of Power or Efficacy

A second way of viewing the relationship between cause and effect is through the idea of causal power or efficacy. The most general idea of a cause, in this regard, is that which produces and accounts for some changes in such a way that a new name is applied to what results. For example, an egg results in a chicken; the change is so striking that the egg

analyzable” (Gyekye, 1995, p.11).

One may be tempted to say that Hume’s philosophy is private/individual aspect whereas the African is public - what then is the basis of comparison? First, the line between private and public philosophies may be difficult to draw. This is because individualized philosophy stems from general experience and problem facing a given culture. And public philosophy was initially started by an individual and alter shared by others. The point is that an individual philosophy can be public and a public philosophy or world-view has an individual origin. So the line between public and private philosophies is not to be drawn rigidly; for they shade into one another by insensible degrees.

One more point to note. Each philosopher is a child of culture, epoch and milieu. The basis of this comparative work therefore is to “exhibit philosophy as an integral part of social and political life: not as the isolated speculations of remarkable individuals” (*Ibid*).

It is hardly disputable that the idea of causality is not only indispensable in the common affairs of life, but in all philosophical issues as well. Man continues to see the causes of various unwanted events, such as violent deaths, accidents, diseases, and so on. In fact the concept of causality is fundamental to our conception of the world. I argue that the causal relation, when correctly defined is as directly observable as many other facts and that the alleged mystery or Humean denial of the causal ties is a myth.

Humean Causal Explanation

Levison and Thalberg Opine that causal explanations are the species that relate a particular occurrence to other events and circumstances that preceded or accompanied it (1969, p.91). Causal explanations have been variously presented as:

1. The idea of Necessary Connection

The Humean mind looks for necessary connection between cause and effect. According to Hume, there is no necessary connection between cause and effect because there is no corresponding impression. Rather, the relationship between cause and effect has three essential characteristics, namely:

- a) Contiguity
- b) Constant succession in time, and
- c) Conjunction (Hume, 1988, pp.86-87)

cannot come from reason because reason can only tell us of logical relations or entailment and if the cause and effect logically entail each other, they would be the same. Neither can causality come from observation, because observation can only tell us that something is regularly followed by another thing, it cannot reveal a 'necessity' that we feel a causal relation must have. Hume maintained that we have no notion of causality, all that we know about 'A' causing 'B' is just 'B' succeeding or following 'A'. For 'A' to be the cause of 'B', according to Hume, 'B' must resemble 'A' and if 'B' resembles 'A', 'A' may not be the cause of 'B'. This is the paradox of causality. Aristotle had distinguished between four kinds of causes, namely: material cause (the stuff with which a thing is composed), the formal cause (the form or shape that a thing takes) the final cause (the purpose for which a thing is made) and the efficient cause (the agent responsible for bringing a thing into existence). It is in this last sense that Hume now uses the word.

Our aim in this paper is to critically examine the Humean idea of causation in relation to an African causal theory in order to fully establish the limitations of the Humean position. The aspect of an African philosophy that is involved here is the public aspect. One of Prof. William Abraham's methodological recommendations (in *The Mind of Africa*) for studying African philosophy entails the distinction between private and public aspects of African philosophy. The former is synonymous with the individualistic and critical views of some elders, which differ from the uniform views of the community. The later is the world view of the community, which is public property, which is supposed to be known by every Tom, Dick and Harry in the community. Along this line of thought, Odera Oruka in his book, *Sage Philosophy*, also distinguishes between sagacious philosophy and cultural philosophy – the former is private, while the latter is public.

The absence of a written tradition has obstructed researches into African philosophy especially in its ancient setting. The propelling factor of this research is to establish that writing is not a criterion for philosophic ability and practice. The inability of a people to read and write does not mean the absence of a conscious reflection of their world. In fact writing is irrelevant in the process of fruitful thinking; we think before we write. This is precisely why we can compare a written tradition, like that of Hume with an African system of thought – the absence of writing in the latter notwithstanding. This fact even makes it much easier to investigate; both are interpretative and critical in orientation and "nevertheless both kinds of system are interpretable and

Humean and an African Causal Theory: A Comparative Study

Godwin Azenabor*

Abstract

The concept of causality is fundamental to our understanding of the world. The idea of causality was made popular, in Western Philosophy, by David Hume; one of the best-known British empiricists. This paper examines critically the Humean idea of causality – that of a necessary/physical connection - in juxtaposition to an African causal theory - that of a sufficient/mystical condition. It establishes the limitations of the Humean position and argues for the primacy of an African theory.

The thesis is that the causal relation, when correctly defined, is as directly observable as many other facts and that the alleged mystery of Humean denial of a causal tie is a myth.

Keywords: *Causality, Hume, African, Collingwood, Mystical, Moral, Esan, Science, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions, Synchronicity.*

Introduction

The concept of causality became an important subject of study in Western Philosophy, since it was made popular by David Hume, one of the best-known British empiricists. David Hume claimed that our idea of causality cannot be gained from either reason or observation. It

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