

Javad Taheri / Hedayat Alavitabar

(جواد طاهری، هدایت علوی تبار)

----- . (1411 AH). *al-Ghayba*. Qum:
Mu'ssisaal-Ma'arifal-Islāmīya.
Tūsī, Sheikh. (1406 AH). *al-Iqtisād fīmā Yata'allaqbih al-I'tiqād*.
Beirut: Dāral-Aḍwā'.

- Ibn 'Aṭīya and Ḥamūd, Jamīl. (1423 AH). *Abhā al-Murād fī Sharḥ Mu'tamar Ulamā' Baghdād*. Beirut: Mu'assisa al-Ālamī.
- Ibn Manẓūr. (1408 AH). *Lisān al-'Arab*, Beirut: Dār al-Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī.
- Ibn Sīnā. (1363 AH). *al-Mabda' wal-Ma'ād*. Tehrān: Mu'assisi-i Mutālī'āt Islāmī.
- Jazrī, Ibn Athīr. (1367 AH). *al-Nihāya fī Qarīb al-Ḥadīth*. Qum: Mu'assisi-i Maṭbū'āt-i Ismā'īlīan.
- Kamareh-ei, Muhammad Bāqir. (nd). *Ganjini-yi Ma'arifi Shī'ih Imāmīyih*. Tehrān: Firdusī.
- Kulainī, Sheikh. (1362 AH). *al-Kāfi*. Tehran: Intishārāt Islāmīyah.
- McDermott, Martin J. (1978). *The Theology of Al-Shaikh Al-Mufīd*. Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq.
- Neyshābūrī Maqarrī, Abū Ja'far. (1414 AH). *al-Ḥudūd*. Qum: Mu'assisa al-Imām Šādiq.
- Rea and Crisp. (2009). *Analytic Theology*. Oxford University Press.
- Sachedina, Abdulaziz Abdulhussein. (1981). *Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdi in Twelver Shiism*. United State: University of New York Press.
- Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī. (1368 AH). *al-hikma al-Muta'ālīa*, Qum: Maktabat al-Mustafā.
- Sadr al-Muta'allihīn. (1366 AH). *Sharh Usūl al-Kāfi*. Tehrān: Mu'assisi-i Mutālī'āt va Tahqīqāt-i Farhangī.
- Sadūq. (1398 AH). *al-Tawhīd*. Qum: Mu'assisi al-Nashr al-Islāmī.
- . (1414 AH). *al-i'ṭiqādāt*. Qum: al-Mo'tamar al-Ālamī li Sheikh al-Mufīd.
- Sobhānī, Ja'far. (2001). *Doctrines of Shiite Islam*. trans. & ed. by Reza Shah-Kazemī. London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers.
- . (1412 AH). *al-Ilāhīat 'alā Hudā al-Kitāb wal-Sunna wal-'Aql*, Qum: al-Markaz al-Ālamī li Dirāsāt al-Islāmīa.
- Sumar, Afzal. (2006). "Badā: Change in Divine Destiny and Decree", in *Journal of Shia Islamic Studies*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 33-42.
- Tabātabā'ī, Allāme. (1417 AH). *al-Mizān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*. Qum: Maktabatal-Nashr al-Islāmī
- Ṭureihī, Fakhr al-Dīn. (1406 AH). *Majma' al-Baḥrain*. Tehrān: Murtaḍavī.
- Tūsī, Muhammad bin Hassan. (1403 AH). *'Iddat al-Uṣūl*. Qum: Mu'assisi-iahlal-Bait.

but it is an apparent alteration, so to speak, in His knowledge.

To those who are interested in this area of theological thinking, it is recommended to explore some issues such as the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human's free will, and the relationship between human's free will and a version of Badā that is in agreement with God's foreknowledge; two problems that need to be elucidated. In this respect, a suggestion for further study could be "Badā and human's voluntary actions".

References

- ‘Asgarī, Sayyed Murtazā. (nd). *‘Aqā’id Islām dar Qur’ān Karīm*. Āzarnoush, Āzartāsh. (1385). *Farhang-i Mu’ashir-i ‘Arabī-Fārsī*, Tehrān: Nashr-i Ney.
- al-Ash‘arī. (1400 AH). *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, part al-Naṣṣ, Germany: Wiesbaden.
- al-Baghdādī, ‘Abdal-Qāher. (1992 AC). *al-Milal wal-Nihāl*. Beirut: Dāral-Mashriq.
- . (2003 AC). *Usūl al-Īmān*. Beirut: Dārwa Maktabat al-Hilāl.
- al-Khayyāt, al-Mo‘tazilī. (nd). *Kitāb al-intiṣār*.
- al-Mufīd. (1413a AH). *Awā’il al-maqālāt*. Qum: al-Mo’tamar al-Ālamī li Shaykhal-Mufīd.
- . (1413b AH). *Taṣḥīḥ I’tiqādāt al-Imāmīya*. Qum: al-Mo’tamar al-Ālamī li-Shaikh al-Mufīd.
- al-Murtaḍā, Sayyed (1405 AH). *Rasā’il al-Sharīf*. Qum: Dāral-Qurān al-Karīm.
- al-Nuhās, Abū Ja‘far (1323 AH). *al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm*. Egypt: al-Sa‘ādah.
- al-Shahrestanī (1364). *al-Milal wal-Nihāl*, Qum: al-Sharīf al-Razī.
- Ardakānī, Muhammad ‘Alī. (nd). *Asrār al-Tawḥīd*. Tehran: Intishārāt Islāmiyah.
- Dāmād, Mīr Muhammad Bāqir. (1401 AH). *Nibrās al-Dīyā*, Qum: Hijrat va Mīrāth-i Maktūb.
- Fīrūz-Ābādī, Majdal-Dīn-i (nd). *Qāmūs al-Muḥḍ*. Beirut: Dāral-Ma‘rifa.
- Hakyemez, Cemil. (2008). "Badā and Its Role in the Debates over Shi‘i Doctrine" in *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES*, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 20-39.

weakest; hence, all the particular beings cannot be realized simultaneously. That is to say, at a certain time a certain being can be realized, but necessary being who stands on pyramid head of being observes all the particulars totally (i.e. God sees the truth as a whole); He knows all changes and also all events that will occur in the future (Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1368 AH, vol. 1, p. 122).

With regard to this view, the Badā (apparent change in God's knowledge) is not really change in His knowledge. In other words, in the hierarchy of levels and emanations (*Isdar*), whatsoever we come down from the top, the measurement of veil increases and brightness of knowledge decreases as far the observers cannot find out the real causes of events; hence, they misconceive how future events will be occurred.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have pursued two main tasks: on the one hand, the term Badā has been analyzed and clarified deeply because of its ambiguities in meaning. On the other hand, the status of Badā among some other religious ideas, and its relationship with some other theological doctrines, especially those doctrines to which Badā seems to be contradictory (e.g. God's omniscience), have been elaborated.

The literal and technical meanings of Badā when it is ascribed to Allah are very different and sometimes divergent. It is only with regard to the religious interpretations alongside rational analyses that some of them can be compromised with notion of God's omniscience.

It is shown in details that two kinds of conceptions of Badā are not acceptable: 1. Appearing something to God in a manner that He was not aware of before, and 2. Conceptions according to which Badā implies ascribing incompleteness to God. In addition, it is shown that concept of Badā cannot be reduced to the concept of abrogation (*Naskh*) because of fundamental differences between these term.

There is a relationship between God's knowledge (as immutable territory) and Badā as the mutable (if really so) territory. The proper explanation of Badā does not imply changing in God's knowledge because changing in His knowledge implies unacceptable alteration in His nature. God knows everything but not in the way that human beings know. Theories of Avicenna (knowing creature's causes), Mīr Dāmād (Dahr), and Mullā Sadrā (levels of modes of beings) demonstrate how such a relationship can be established in an admittable way. According to the mentioned theories, Badā is not really a change in God's knowledge

(*Fauqa al-Qamar*)' that directly conceives the things beneath the firmament (particulars) (Ibn Sīnā, 1363 AH, al-Nnaṣ, p. 85).

God by means of the mediators including soul of above the firmament world conceives (knows) the particulars (ibid). That is to say God knows the creature's causes by which He knows everything. Dividing the cosmos into mutable and immutable territories is an effective solution to this problem according to which the epistemology depends on cosmology.

In Mīr Dāmād's philosophy, this dualism has been exhibited through the theory of "*Dahr*". According to this theory, Badā occurs in the matters having expected modes (*Halat al-Muntaẓirah*), i.e. the creatures, because they are composed of potentiality (*Quwwah*) and actuality (*Fiʿl*): 'Badā only takes place in the knowledge of the creatures of God. New knowledge only "appears" to the creatures of God who have finite knowledge' (Sumar, 2006, pp. 33-42).

The pure actuality (e.g. God) and the pure potentiality have not any expected mode, so they are not subject to Badā. Nevertheless, all changes including Badā appear as changeless to the observer in the realm (*Zarf*) of *Dahr*. Observers within the realm of time observe created things as mutable, whereas observers within the realm of *Dahr* observe created things as immutable (Dāmād, 1401, p. 56). Hence, Badā which implies alteration has not been related to immutable territory (including God's knowledge). According to this insight, there is no Badā in the following matters: In the nature of God; in the actual beings and angels; in the realm of *Dahr* which surrounds the realm of time.

It seems obvious that if the God's knowledge is to be analyzed through the above mentioned mode of rational thinking, it cannot be said that God directly knows changeable things, but it must be said that He knows them indirectly. In this case, we can even set aside use of physics (*Tabiiyāt*) on which the doctrine of Avicenna is laid down and shift to the foundation of his theory according to which cosmos' levels parallel to the knowledge's levels. The Badā, however, must be ascribed to the world of the lowest level, i.e. the sensible world. It seems to us that the best version of such a theory can be derived from Mullā Sadrā's (d. 1640) philosophical system.

According to this version, God's knowledge of particulars before and after their realizations is one and the same. The cosmos, 'pyramid of being' (so to speak), consists of levels (orders) of modes of beings, from the highest level (necessary being) to the lowest (sensible beings) one. Among these levels of modes of beings, the level of particulars is the

on the condition that they do not face barriers or obstacles. For example, a man who is destined to be dead at the age of 30 may perform good deeds (e.g. kindness and generosity toward his relatives) that make his lifetime prolonged (*Ziyada fil Umr*).

It can be said that here there are two destinies among which the second eliminates the first one, but both exist in God's knowledge. Therefore Badā does not contradict this knowledge. Imam Reza is reported to have said: "Badā can be ascribed to God in the way that the realization of anything is conditioned with time and place circumstances unless it has been confirmed by unchangeable predestination on behalf of God" (Kulainī, 1362 AH, vol. 1, p. 149).

This matter is subject to a living discussion in Islamic theology (*Kalam*) under the title 'God's essential (*Dhati*) and actional (*Fe'i*) knowledge'. God's essential knowledge is identical with His nature; hence it is immutable. God's actional knowledge is al-Lawhal-Mahwwal-Ithbat. Mahw and Ithbat (elimination and confirmation) are emanations of God's knowledge on the level of His actions (Sobhānī, 1412 AH). When it is said that Badā is ascribed to God it means that Badā is for God on the level of these emanations.

Some theologians like Sheikh Sadūq fill the gap between the God's knowledge and realization of things as follows: God knows then measures out (provides) then wills then predestine then fates and at the end approves (performs) things. If something does not get the level of God's approval (*Imda*) it can be subject to Badā (Sadūq, 1398 AH, p. 334).

Badā in the light of philosophical explanations

A large number of Islamic philosophers intended to prove that God knows particulars. The issue of relationship between God's knowledge and particulars has raised many problems for philosophers. On one hand, God's knowledge of particulars is identical with His nature and, on the other hand, particulars are mutable. Does God know mutable as mutable? If so, then does the nature of God undergo changes? This is the same problem as that of the relationship between God's knowledge and Badā (apparent changing in God's plans). Therefore, their solution must be the same.

Famous Islamic philosopher, Avicenna (d. 1037), writes God knows particulars but not in the way that human beings know them. God does not have any senses at all. It is the soul of 'above the firmament world

If attributes of God are not identical with His nature, then
God's nature is subject to multiplicity.

Multiplicity is not possible for God's nature.

Conclusion: Attributes of God are identical with His nature.

Again, the major premise of this deduction can be proved by another deduction:

Multiplicity is neediness.

Neediness is not true about God.

Conclusion: Multiplicity is not true about God.

If one wants to continue the argumentation, he must inevitably finish this process to an axiom; otherwise he will be involved in an absurd regress. One can accept the latter premises as theological axioms.

The nature of God's knowledge is still partly ambiguous. Specifying the nature of the God's knowledge and its supposed levels requires more analysis. It should not be forgotten here that with regard to theological discussions around God's knowledge, we only have to be in agreement with those explanations that are compatible with religious rules.

al-Lawhal-Mahwwal-Ithbat

The verse 39 of al-Ra'd states: "Allah eliminates what He wills or confirms, and with Him is the Mother of the Book (al-Lawhal-Mahfuz)". With regard to this verse, many theologians believe that God's knowledge is hierarchical and has different levels; one of them is the level of al-Lawhal-Mahfuz which nobody is aware of it but Himself.

Second level is the knowledge that God discloses, totally and not partially, to His prophets and angels which definitely will be realized and undergoes no change. This kind of knowledge is called al-Qazaal-Mahtum. Badā does not ensue from this knowledge while it originates from al-Lawhal-Mahfuz (Sumar, 2006, pp. 33-42).

The other level is al-Lawhal-Mahwwal-Ithbat which the prophets and angels are aware of and which we are informed of by means of the prophets. Some matters which have been confirmed in this Lawh will be realized and some matters will not be realized because of some barriers which later may take place and prevent their realization (Sadr al-Muta'allihīn, 1366 AH, vol.4, p. 206). In other words, this Lawh contains a knowledge according to which future events are going to be realized,

Abraham writes that this is the duty of analytic theologian to investigate how an attribute of God like omniscience relates to human freedom (Rea and Crisp, 2009, p. 62).

In the case of Badā, we have seemingly the similar problem that leads us in a dilemma: whether God is omniscient or some circumstances cause Him to change His knowledge toward future events. Hakyemez summaries: "in short, the term [(Badā)] indicates possible changes in God's attributes of omniscience, will, and creation (Hakyemez, 2008, p. 21).

According to a relatively common theological view, the God's knowledge precedes His will and decision; and His will is a function of His knowledge. In addition, God's knowledge is identical with His nature. Therefore, admitting that God changes His will, Badā implies alteration in His knowledge which means alteration in His nature. This is not compatible with intellect and Islamic sacred texts; so Badā is not possible. This argument can be articulated in the following form:

Badā is alteration in God's knowledge.

Alteration in God's knowledge is not possible.

Conclusion: Badā is not possible.

The major premise of the above deduction can be proved by another deduction:

Alteration in God's knowledge is alteration in His nature.

Alteration in God's nature is not possible.

Conclusion: Alteration in God's knowledge is not possible.

The question that rises here is why the alteration in God's knowledge requires alteration in His nature. In response, it can be said that the attributes of God are identical with His nature; otherwise, the nature of God will be subject to multiplicity, whereas the multiplicity is not compatible with the concept of necessary being. Since, multiplicity implies complexity and a complex being, by itself, needs all its parts and components on which this complexity depends; whereas a needy God is incompatible with philosophical concept of necessary being and with Quran and tradition.

This argument can be formulated in terms of the below conditional deduction:

(d. 1631/1632) maintains that the status (*Manzilat*) of Badā in creation (*Takwin*) is as much as the status of Naskh in religious law (*Tashri*). Simply put, Naskh is a legal Badā and Badā is a creational Naskh (Dāmād, 1401, p. 49). This theory tries to restrict the only difference between Naskh and Badā to creational and legal affairs.

Tūsī represents two possible meanings for Badā first of which reduces it to Naskh (Tūsī, 1403 AH, vol.2, p. 29) while the second is grounded in the notion of God's knowledge of temporal and special circumstances of future events; He knows that in which circumstances and conditions an event will be occurred whereas we are not aware of these conditions, so if an event occurs on the contrary of our expectations, we may say the Badā has been occurred in this regard (Tūsī, 1411 AH, pp. 263-265).

Abu Salah Halabi (d. 1055) lays down three conditions for Badā: the enjoined issue should be the same as the prohibited one, the method and the time should be the same, and the moral obligation should be imposed upon the same person. For Halabi, in the case of Naskh, the enjoined issue is not the same as the prohibited one (Hakyemez, 2008, p. 33). Another view says that '*Amal* (act), *Wajh* (mode), *Amer* (orderer), and *Nahi* (proscribing)' must be the same in a matter in which Badā occurs (Neyshābūrī Maqarrī, 1414 AH, p. 54).

In sum, with regard to the above mentioned discussions about Naskh, it is clear that in the case of Naskh, two commands have been realized while in the case of Badā, one commands is realized and another waits for realization. The common ground in this comparison is that in both cases, nothing is to be removed but expired. Furthermore, the traditions related from Shiite Imams show that they used the Badā in a meaning different from Naskh. Therefore, some theologians try to discuss Badā independently, rather than reducing its meaning to Naskh.

Taking its differences with Naskh into account, the supposed real meaning of Badā must be specified in a way through which it will be compatible with other religious beliefs like God's knowledge.

Badā and God's knowledge: Analytical explanation

In philosophy and theology, there have been very lively discussions concerning God's knowledge, including whether the foreknowledge of God leads to determinism or not? Does the foreknowledge of God nullify man's freedom of the will or voluntary action?, and some other related issues. The above mentioned problems are not still totally resolved, and different schools of philosophy are trying to solve them.

difference between these two notions. In order to demonstrate this difference, we must at first clarify the relationship between Naskh and Badā.

The relationship between Badā and Naskh

The more we clarify the meaning of Naskh, the more we specify the meaning of Badā; hence, the different meanings of Naskh are worth discussing. Traditionally, Naskh like Badā has been evaluated from two aspects: literal meaning and technical meaning.

Literal meaning of Naskh

Three meanings have been allocated to the term 'Naskh': destroying and removing (Ibn 'Aṭīya and Ḥamūd, 1423 AH, vol.1, p. 381); conveying and transcribing (Ṭureihī, 1406, vol.2, p. 444); transferring from a situation to another, such as changing in time and life circumstances or transferring the legacy from one to another person (Jazrī, 1367 AH, vol. 5, p. 47). Allāmah Tabātabā'ī (d. 1981) uses the first meaning to explain Naskh. He writes: "Naskh means 'destroying and removing', so when it is said *Nasakhat Al-Shams Al-Zill*, it means that the sunlight removed shadow" (Tabātabā'ī, 1417 AH, vol. 1, pp. 249- 250).

Technical meaning of Naskh

Abu Jafar al-Nuhās offered a technical definition for Naskh which derived from views of many scholars like Abu Bakr Hassas, Abu Bakr al-Baqilani, Abdal-Qahir al-Baghdadi, Abul Hasan al-Basri, Ibn Hazm Zaheri, Ibn Hajib, Qadi al-Beydavi and 'Abdal-Vahhab al-Subki: removing (divesting) time and credit from a previous religious command (edict) due to a new command in a condition that the latter must be more recent in its time than the former (al-Nuhās, 1323 AH, p. 2).

Another definition says: Naskh is abolition of a religious command when its credit time is over. This is due to that some liturgies (commands) are obliged to fulfill special purpose; and whenever the purpose will be fulfilled the command will be removed too (al-Baghdādī, 2003 AC, p. 180). Tūsī (d. 1067) believes that Badā is command expiring instead of command removing (Tūsī, 1406 AH, pp. 236,237).

Although Naskh and Badā are of two separate categories, many scholars believe that they are similar in many aspects. Mīr Dāmād

change of mind on the part of God due to what He earlier did not foresee and hence a denial of divine omniscience” (Sachedina, 1981, p.154).

Leaving aside the verbal meaning of the word, some scholars added another meaning for *Badā* as ‘change of destiny’. God has power and authority over His servants and His actions are not out of wisdom and rectitude. Based on this wisdom, He replaced one destiny by another while both of them “are contained within His foreknowledge, and there can be no kind of alteration in respect of His knowledge” (Sobhāni, 2001, p. 160).

In addition, there is another idea which says that a person to whom new ideas occur and for whom any act is possible is mightier than a person who cannot add to or remove anything from his own act (McDermott, 1978, p. 332; al-Khayyāt, nd, p. 129). The simplest explanation about *Badā* which may attract our attention is: God brings a creature into the existence before another one and annihilates it then begins another work (Sadūq, 1398 AH, p. 335). As for divine commands it may be said: God orders something and then He proscribes it, or the contrary.

Ibn al-Rāvandī is mostly inclined in a conception of *Badā* which reduces it to *Naskh* (McDermott, 1978, p. 331), as if he believes in the identity (unity) between two concepts. Yet some theologians cannot neglect the literal meaning of *Badā* or involve themselves in technical one. This attitude propels them to merging literal meaning with the technical one. In this regard, al-Mufid theorized as follows: “According to Arabian rules *badā li fulanin* (appears to so-and-so) can be changed into *badā min fulanin li fulanin* (appears from so-and-so to so-and-so). Particle *li* was replaced by particle *min*. Therefore the meaning of *Badā li-llah fi kadha* ultimately turns into ‘appears from God in so-and-so’.” (al-Mufid, 1413b AH, p. 65).

For al-Mufid, a satisfactory result which may be derived from this explanation is that the above mentioned appearance occurs to men instead of God. In other words, *Badā* means “Zahara” for people and “Izhar” for God. If someone yet insists on the literal meaning of *Badā*, he has to talk about it metaphorically in the case of God just as in the case of ‘anger’ when it is attributed to God in Quran (ibid).

There are those who intend to solve the problem of attributing *Badā* to God by reducing *Badā* to *Naskh* (ibid, p. 80). But others like Halabi (d. 1055) (Hakymez, 2008, p. 33), and Maqarrī (Neyshābūrī Maqarrī, 1414 AH, p. 54) do not accept this reduction because of fundamental

1) Badā is knowing after unbeknowing.

Knowing after unbeknowing is impossible for God.

Conclusion: Badā is impossible for God.

2) Badā – in the case of God – is ‘the occurrence of the new idea’ to God.

Occurrence of new idea’ to God is impossible.

Conclusion: Badā is impossible for God.

According to the religious beliefs, God is omniscient (*wallahu bi-kulli shay-'in 'Alim*) and is aware of everything even oncoming events; hence we do not have permission to say something appears to God in a manner that He was not aware of.

Occurrence of new idea to God has two implications: first, God's repentance of His previous ideas; second, His passivity (*Infi'āl*). The passivity implies poverty. Whereas, God as defined herein possesses all the supposed perfections and lacks of imperfections; hence Badā that implies ascribing incompleteness to Allah must be rejected.

Many Sunnite theologians such as al-Baghdādī (1992 AC, p. 52), al-Khayyāt (nd, p. 127) have limited Badā to its literal meaning and have blamed Shiites as advocates of a heretical belief. Nevertheless the Imamites refuse Badā in such a connotation and admit the results of the above mentioned deductions. But, at any rate, the twelvers maintain an interpretation on which they believe that the acceptable meaning of Badā is based. In order to discover this interpretation, the technical denotations of Badā must be illustrated.

Technical meanings of Badā

Badā in relation to God may bear some meanings in mind:

First, changing in His knowledge; when the different position from what He knew occurs to Him. Second, changing in His will; God decide to do something different from what He decided to do before. Next, changing in His command (injunction (*Amr*)); God orders something and afterwards orders another command or the opposite (Kamareh-ei, nd, vol.1, p. 272; al-Shahrestanī, 1364, vol.1, p.171).

Theologians can hardly accept the two first alternatives, and here in our discussion, we regard them not acceptable. The third one seems to be some sort of Abrogation. The Ash'arites, followers of one of the two main branches of Sunnite theology, take Badā in the sense of changing in God's knowledge; thus they talk about it as an unacceptable notion: “the Ash'arites rejected the doctrine because it was interpreted as implying a

his time (McDermott, 1978, p. 329). According to al-Ash'arī (d. 936), not all the Shiites are unanimous in defining Badā. In this regard, they are divided into branches one of which forbids Badā for God (al-Ash'arī, 1400 AH, p. 39).

Al-Mufid (d. 1022), Shiite theologian (*Mutakallim*), focused on the views of critics of Badā. He believes that the only cause of the disputes among theologians is their carelessness about semantic complexity of the term (al-Mufid, 1413a AH, p. 80). Sayyed al-Murtazā (d. 1044), after al-Mufid, raised discussions about the doctrine of Badā (al-Murtazā, 1405 AH, vol.1, p. 117); and some of their discussions are similar and others are different (For further information about his thoughts, see his work, *al-Shafi fil-Imamah*). Two prominent Sunnite theologians, al-Baghdādī (d. 978-9) and al-Shahrestānī (d. 1153), believed that the first person who used the concept of Badā was Mukhtār (al-Baghdādī, 1992 AC., p. 48; al-Shahrestānī, 1364, vol.1, p. 171). Mukhtār used it in order to justify losing a battle in which he had claimed that God had promised him the victory. They believed that the first who entered the doctrine of Badā into Imamiyye tradition was Imam Sadiq, whose story with his son was cited above.

Etymology and literal meaning of Badā

Badā is the verbal noun of *badāva*. The root word (its past basic triliteral) (*Thulathi Mujarrad*) is *badā* and the simple present form of the verb is *yabdū*. Badā has three infinitives: *badāva*, *badāwā*, *badā'ah*. The past form of the verb always precedes the particle *lām* but when used as intransitive verb, *lām* is omitted from the end of the word (Dāmād, 1401, pp. 22-23).

Badā means to appear, to disclose, to seem, to become manifest, to show itself, to verify, to be certain, to seem good (to someone) (Āzarnoush, 1385), and the arising of knowledge after being absent (Hakymez, 2008, p. 21). The word also means "the occurrence of a new idea to the mind" ('Asgarī, nd, vol.2, p. 503). Ibn Manzūr (d. 1312) states that Badā is "the new knowledge leads to the new idea" (Ibn Manzūr, 1408 AH, vol.1, p. 347). Apparently, the main version of literal meaning of the word is "the occurrence of a new idea to the mind" (Fīrūz-Abādī, nd, vol. 4, p. 302).

Regarding the literal meaning of Badā it is clear that it cannot be ascribed to God. We propose the following deductions to prove this claim:

(Hakyemez, 2008, p. 20). His findings could best lead us through our work and so is followed in this paper.

A brief chronological note

Badā appears several times in Quran (*al-Jathiyah* 33, *al-'Anam* 28, *al-Zumar* 47 and 48, *al-'Araf* 22, *Taba* 121), however none of these verses has ascribed it to God (McDermott, 1978, p. 329). In some traditions, especially those which reported from Shiite Imams, Badā is ascribed to Him. Imam Jafar Sadiq is narrated to have said: "if people know what a reward there is for mentioning Badā, they will never get tired of speaking about it" (Ardakānī, nd, p. 377). In other traditions, reported from Imam Sadiq, Badā of repentance and Badā as God's change of mind are both blamed (ibid). He points out that Badā cannot be found in the matters which have been set as destiny by God's decision. In addition, it is reported from Imam Reza that he said: "God never sent a prophet without first obliging him to forbidding wine and confessing to Badā" (ibid, pp. 386-388).

McDermott writes: "the occasion when *Badā li-llah* enters definitely into Immamite tradition is an awkward situation caused by premature death of Ismail". He points to the tradition reported from Imam Sadiq which raised many controversies in later times: "God has never been so led by a new consideration (*ma Badā li-llah*) as in the case of son Ismail" (McDermott, 1978, pp. 330, 331). Sheikh Sadūq (Ibn Bābway) (d. 991), who is one of the famous figures in the Shiite school also points to the same tradition: "Nothing ever occurred to Him in the case of my son Ismail" (Sadūq, 1414 AH, p. 41). Imam Sadiq had already said: "God has designated Ismail as the successor and next Imam after me", but Ismail died before Imam Sadiq's martyrdom. There was a similar situation later in the case of Imam Hadi's son, Muhammad, who was replaced by another of Imam's sons, al-'Askarī (Kulainī, 1362 AH, p. 327).

Many theologians from the first centuries of Islam have been discussing the doctrine of Badā, among whom some are well known. Discussing this issue seriously, Ibn al-Rāvandī (d. 911), believed that occurrence of new ideas to God is not possible. al-Khāyyāt (d. 902), the Sunnite scholar, in his *al-Intisar* (al-Khāyyāt, nd, p. 127) writes: "the idea of Badā has been infused to Rafizites (the Imamites), by people who have been associated with Mu'tazilites". He noted that all the Rafizites accept Badā even in revelation (*Wahi*). Sheikh Sadūq pursued this issue seriously so that the meaning of Badā turned into a controversial issue in

Introduction

The so called 'Badā doctrine' is one of the most hotly disputed doctrines in Islamic theological sources. The Imamites believe that the meaning to which Badā refers is compatible with '*Aql* and *Naql*' (Intellect and Narrations (*Sam*)). The majority of the Sunnites have refused to ascribe Badā to God (*Allah*) as we will see in the case of al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrestānī; the signs of Badā, however, can be traced in their works. The twelvers have the current disputations about the meaning of Badā among themselves, but their discussions in this arena are nominal.

There is a tradition in Sunni literature in which Badā is ascribed to God where He decides to test the bald, leper and blind men: "it so appeared to God (*Badā li-llahi*) that He should inflict a trial upon three men...." (Sumar, 2006, pp. 33-42). Relating Badā to the principle of *Aslah* (the most salutary), which states that God does the best for His creatures, the Mu'tazilites (*'Adliyya*), a Sunni sect, had accepted the doctrine before the Imamites (Sachedina, 1981, p. 154).

Theological investigations into Shiite and Sunnite sources indicate that controversies on this issue are mostly due to different attitudes toward Badā. Trying to remove misunderstandings and resolving ambiguities concerning Badā, are basic motives for conducting the present study. Proposing analyses which conceptualize Badā through a rational and appropriately deductive manner is the research methodology of the project. This style, apparently, is known as the analytic theology in Western world.

There is also an attempt to clarify those interpretations in which the term Badā can be accepted through religious terms. This paper is not a narrative research of Badā which focuses exclusively on contents of traditions narrated from Imams; rather, according to the most appropriate interpretation of narrations in this regard, it engages in debates which demonstrate how these traditions can be rationalized. This alleged method differentiates present paper from some of its counterparts (such as Afzal Sumar's, 2006), which are mostly based on narrative explanation of Badā. For example, Hakyemez investigates, historically and narratively, the doctrine of Badā and its conceptual transformations, and then he concludes: "In addition, the latest position regarding this concept proves that it is necessary to prefer rational methods over narrations and reports while elaborating upon theology"

An Analytical Approach to the Concept of Badā in Islam

Javad Taheri*

Main Author

Hedayat Alavitarab**

Abstract

The rationally and theologically analyzed meaning of Badā, as one of the most fundamental theological doctrines of the Imamites (Twelver Shiism), is not heretical but is compatible with Intellect and Narrations. The Sunnites disapprove Badā in their narrative and theological works and regard it as a heresy. On the contrary, the Imamites believe that if the real meaning of the term is clarified, which is the main purpose of the present paper, all Muslims will accept it. This paper briefly reviews the views of famous Sunnite scholars regarding Badā, and then by using analytical method discusses in detail the idea of Shiite theologians about this concept. Critical issues such as literal and technical meanings of Badā, the difference between Badā and Naskh (Abrogation), the relationship between Badā and God's knowledge will be discussed. The article concludes that Badā is a concept compatible with the two most important sources of Islamic doctrines, that is, 'Aql (Intellect) and Naql (Narrations); we are drawing on these two sources because of their relationship with Shiism and Sunniism as two Islamic sects.

Keywords: *Badā, Naskh, the Imamites, analytic theology, divine omniscience, the Shiites, the Sunnites.*

*. M.A of philosophy of religion; Allameh Tabatabaei University.

E-mail: javadtaheri1982@gmail.com

** . Assistant Professor of Allameh Tabatabaei University.

E-mail: alavitarab@yahoo.com