Allameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923An Approach to the Religious and Ethical Basics about the Concept of "The Right" in the View of Kant and Allame Ja'fariAn Approach to the Religious and Ethical Basics about the Concept of "The Right" in the View of Kant and Allame Ja'fari728936010.22054/wph.2018.9360FAMohammadReayate JahromiAssistant Professor of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran;Journal Article20180527Referring to the fundamental and universal principles of human rights, Allameh Jafari believed that the divine religions, and at the top of them, Islam, are the culmination or peak of human rights. The comprehensiveness of Islam is evident and obvious in explaining rights and duties from its attitude to human being as "universal man" in the form of "universal face". Referring to natural roots of five bases of universal human rights, he believes that they believe that Islam and the West have an "eighty percent" agreement on human rights. Islam also emphasizes the principles of the right to life, human dignity, education, liberty and equality and in some cases, including Islam's specific look at the definition and value of humans, there is a twenty percent difference between Islam and the West. But in Kant's thought, the rules of human rights are “priori” rules of practical reason. Kant says fundamental rights are "universal". Allameh accepts these rights and emphasizes on the necessity of their adjustment according to the norms of other cultures. The Kantian human rights are rooted in reason, not revelation because they are derived from the text of Protestantism, which has led to the secularization of the religion. Kant's utopia in the form of the "Commonwealth Society" is the product of such an approach. Religion does not play a role in Kant's human rights and it is moral absolutely. While human rights in terms of Allameh Jafari come from the revelation and they are conformed to religion despite being ethical. The paper will present the points of sharing and differentiation between Allameh and Kant by focusing on the concept of right.Referring to the fundamental and universal principles of human rights, Allameh Jafari believed that the divine religions, and at the top of them, Islam, are the culmination or peak of human rights. The comprehensiveness of Islam is evident and obvious in explaining rights and duties from its attitude to human being as "universal man" in the form of "universal face". Referring to natural roots of five bases of universal human rights, he believes that they believe that Islam and the West have an "eighty percent" agreement on human rights. Islam also emphasizes the principles of the right to life, human dignity, education, liberty and equality and in some cases, including Islam's specific look at the definition and value of humans, there is a twenty percent difference between Islam and the West. But in Kant's thought, the rules of human rights are “priori” rules of practical reason. Kant says fundamental rights are "universal". Allameh accepts these rights and emphasizes on the necessity of their adjustment according to the norms of other cultures. The Kantian human rights are rooted in reason, not revelation because they are derived from the text of Protestantism, which has led to the secularization of the religion. Kant's utopia in the form of the "Commonwealth Society" is the product of such an approach. Religion does not play a role in Kant's human rights and it is moral absolutely. While human rights in terms of Allameh Jafari come from the revelation and they are conformed to religion despite being ethical. The paper will present the points of sharing and differentiation between Allameh and Kant by focusing on the concept of right.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9360_bf58afeeee4be8e524921073116073ac.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923Comparison of Troeltsch and Hick on the Issue of Religions RankingComparison of Troeltsch and Hick on the Issue of Religions Ranking2952936110.22054/wph.2018.9361FAMohammad MahdiFallahDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, IranMahdiAkhavanphilosophy0000-0001-7325-2303Journal Article20180428One of the main issues in explaining the phenomenon of diversity of religions in the world is the issue of religions ranking; i.e. the question of whether religions are essentially comparable or not! And if it is comparable, what is the criterion and criterion of this comparison? It seems that the border between two different positions in explaining the phenomenon of religious plurality, namely relativism and religious pluralism, comes from the accuracy of the issue of religions ranking. In this article, we will speak of two main representatives of these two trends by proposing and examining this problem and among the religious relativists we refer to Ernest Troeltsch and to John Hick from religious pluralism. This article seeks to put these two theories together and remind them of their similarities and reveal their fundamental differences. Briefly, it can be noted that the major similarity between Troeltsch and Hick is to rely on cultural categories in the consistency of religious awareness, while the fundamental difference between them is the observation of objectivity or subjectivity in their grading criteria. In the end, Hick claims that although religions are comparable in principle, but practically the result of this comparing is the equivalence of religion’s Truth-claims, while Troeltsch says it's basically impossible to compare religions, اowever, in his original statements, he clearly states that in practice, Christianity is superior to other religions. Of course, in his later remarks, he reviews this result and claims that religions are only relative in absolute terms and he claims absolute religions are relative only.One of the main issues in explaining the phenomenon of diversity of religions in the world is the issue of religions ranking; i.e. the question of whether religions are essentially comparable or not! And if it is comparable, what is the criterion and criterion of this comparison? It seems that the border between two different positions in explaining the phenomenon of religious plurality, namely relativism and religious pluralism, comes from the accuracy of the issue of religions ranking. In this article, we will speak of two main representatives of these two trends by proposing and examining this problem and among the religious relativists we refer to Ernest Troeltsch and to John Hick from religious pluralism. This article seeks to put these two theories together and remind them of their similarities and reveal their fundamental differences. Briefly, it can be noted that the major similarity between Troeltsch and Hick is to rely on cultural categories in the consistency of religious awareness, while the fundamental difference between them is the observation of objectivity or subjectivity in their grading criteria. In the end, Hick claims that although religions are comparable in principle, but practically the result of this comparing is the equivalence of religion’s Truth-claims, while Troeltsch says it's basically impossible to compare religions, اowever, in his original statements, he clearly states that in practice, Christianity is superior to other religions. Of course, in his later remarks, he reviews this result and claims that religions are only relative in absolute terms and he claims absolute religions are relative only.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9361_f36a24f08ca07329b1bcb1c8cbe3c107.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923Investigating the Roots of Dionysian and Apollonian of Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art in Schopenhauer's PhilosophyInvestigating the Roots of Dionysian and Apollonian of Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art in Schopenhauer's Philosophy5376936210.22054/wph.2018.9362FAAhmad AliHeydariAssociate Professor of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran;AliAzizianPh.D. Student of Philosophy of Art, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran;Journal Article20180426The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between Dionysian and Apollonian in Nietzsche's philosophy of art with Schopenhauer's philosophy. In this context, while expressing the history of the existing interpretations of the relation of the Dionysius and the Apollonian with the will and representation and also with sublime and beautiful, we look at their strengths and weaknesses. Then, in a complementary discussion and different from the tradition of existing interpretations, we seek the relation between Dionysius and Apollonius in Schopenhauer's philosophy of morality. In philosophy of morality, Schopenhauer considers egoism (Egoismus) the will of life to be the main basis of our moral actions. He interprets this egoism as none benefiting (Eigennutz) egoism which involves egoism the will of life and egoism in the form of mere evil. In the sense egoism the will is the same yes-saying to will, Nietzsche has put them the basis of his art philosophy by changing valuating and giving them the names of Dionysius and Apollonius. This justifies powerfully the egoism of Dionysian poetry of Archilochus and also Homer’s Apollonian Epics (The Achilles' Song of Epic). This is a solid and strong reason for linking the Dionysian and Apollonian with Schopenhauer's philosophy of morality. It also shows the deep connection between Nietzsche's philosophy and ethics and valuating in the field of art which is also seen in all fields. So, in addition to the will, the imagination, the beautiful and sublime in Schopenhauer's philosophy of morality, the various aspects of the Dionysius and Apollonius will also be revealed, and it brings us to a comprehensive definition of the two, of course, as far as they are related to Schopenhauer's philosophy.The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between Dionysian and Apollonian in Nietzsche's philosophy of art with Schopenhauer's philosophy. In this context, while expressing the history of the existing interpretations of the relation of the Dionysius and the Apollonian with the will and representation and also with sublime and beautiful, we look at their strengths and weaknesses. Then, in a complementary discussion and different from the tradition of existing interpretations, we seek the relation between Dionysius and Apollonius in Schopenhauer's philosophy of morality. In philosophy of morality, Schopenhauer considers egoism (Egoismus) the will of life to be the main basis of our moral actions. He interprets this egoism as none benefiting (Eigennutz) egoism which involves egoism the will of life and egoism in the form of mere evil. In the sense egoism the will is the same yes-saying to will, Nietzsche has put them the basis of his art philosophy by changing valuating and giving them the names of Dionysius and Apollonius. This justifies powerfully the egoism of Dionysian poetry of Archilochus and also Homer’s Apollonian Epics (The Achilles' Song of Epic). This is a solid and strong reason for linking the Dionysian and Apollonian with Schopenhauer's philosophy of morality. It also shows the deep connection between Nietzsche's philosophy and ethics and valuating in the field of art which is also seen in all fields. So, in addition to the will, the imagination, the beautiful and sublime in Schopenhauer's philosophy of morality, the various aspects of the Dionysius and Apollonius will also be revealed, and it brings us to a comprehensive definition of the two, of course, as far as they are related to Schopenhauer's philosophy.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9362_f03caea1706591cc84e0687b7542cc66.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923The Relationship of the Logical Structure of Language and the Value and Meaning of Life in Wittgenstein's ThoughtThe Relationship of the Logical Structure of Language and the Value and Meaning of Life in Wittgenstein's Thought7797936310.22054/wph.2018.9363FAAlirezaFarajiassistent professor of payamnoorJournal Article20170925The question about life and living has a history as long as human history and it is a matter that has taken various faces in the evolution of thought history. Today, this question is being pursued more seriously, to the extent that it even became a branch of philosophy of religion in universities. Also, among various contemporary philosophical methods, analytic and linguistic philosophers have analyzed with precision and specificity the various structures of language propositions that are partly based on the attitudes of Wittgenstein's philosophical logic treatise. Therefore, analyzing the logical structure of the question of the meaning of life, and the correctness or inaccuracy of its design in Wittgenstein's thinking is attractive and new or modern; for, on the one hand, in his dual thought, propositions of some sciences such as ethics, philosophy, art, religion, and metaphysics are dumb and meaningless because they are not compatible with rational standards of language, and on the other hand, his faithful and pragmatic beliefs have led to different perceptions of human life and living. Hence, our attempt in the present article is to measure the contradiction and paradoxes in Wittgenstein's thinking in proportion to the important question of the meaning of life, and to review its possible answer.The question about life and living has a history as long as human history and it is a matter that has taken various faces in the evolution of thought history. Today, this question is being pursued more seriously, to the extent that it even became a branch of philosophy of religion in universities. Also, among various contemporary philosophical methods, analytic and linguistic philosophers have analyzed with precision and specificity the various structures of language propositions that are partly based on the attitudes of Wittgenstein's philosophical logic treatise. Therefore, analyzing the logical structure of the question of the meaning of life, and the correctness or inaccuracy of its design in Wittgenstein's thinking is attractive and new or modern; for, on the one hand, in his dual thought, propositions of some sciences such as ethics, philosophy, art, religion, and metaphysics are dumb and meaningless because they are not compatible with rational standards of language, and on the other hand, his faithful and pragmatic beliefs have led to different perceptions of human life and living. Hence, our attempt in the present article is to measure the contradiction and paradoxes in Wittgenstein's thinking in proportion to the important question of the meaning of life, and to review its possible answer.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9363_d56d882dfaf6fb771f4e96c21c9b8889.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923Metaphysical Identification of Heidegger's DaseinMetaphysical Identification of Heidegger's Dasein99124936410.22054/wph.2018.9364FASeyed MasoudZamaniFaculty Member0000 0003 1590 6297Journal Article20180417According to the common sense, Dazein is the Heidegger's philosophical title on the general concept of man; i.e. man in the true sense. But a closer examination of Heidegger's works in the near future of existence and time shows that he in fact considers a particular type of human being. Thus, Heidegger attempts in various ways to clarify Determinations and existences of Dasein. One of his ways is to examine the distinction that Dasein takes from metaphysics. Dasein has a strong link with metaphysics, which Heidegger explores in detail in his works of those years. He even says that Dazean is the same as metaphysics. Thus, when Dasein is really Dasein that it is in front of metaphysics and its guidance question. On the other hand, Heidegger sees metaphysics as a completely specific and historical phenomenon that has only been realized in the West and not in any other nation or culture. But because the existence of the Dasein is definite to western metaphysics and its history, so Dasein can not be any human.The most important consequence of the current research is that Heidegger, with Dasein, in fact, considers a European man.According to the common sense, Dazein is the Heidegger's philosophical title on the general concept of man; i.e. man in the true sense. But a closer examination of Heidegger's works in the near future of existence and time shows that he in fact considers a particular type of human being. Thus, Heidegger attempts in various ways to clarify Determinations and existences of Dasein. One of his ways is to examine the distinction that Dasein takes from metaphysics. Dasein has a strong link with metaphysics, which Heidegger explores in detail in his works of those years. He even says that Dazean is the same as metaphysics. Thus, when Dasein is really Dasein that it is in front of metaphysics and its guidance question. On the other hand, Heidegger sees metaphysics as a completely specific and historical phenomenon that has only been realized in the West and not in any other nation or culture. But because the existence of the Dasein is definite to western metaphysics and its history, so Dasein can not be any human.The most important consequence of the current research is that Heidegger, with Dasein, in fact, considers a European man.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9364_e10e3d1e9de6ddc6e14ecac60e24ff9b.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923John Stuart Mill; Act or Rule UtilitarianismJohn Stuart Mill; Act or Rule Utilitarianism125153936510.22054/wph.2018.9365FAHamzeHatampouriAllame UniversityJournal Article20180131In this paper, we defend the rule-based interpretation of John Stewart Mill's utilitarianism. First, we will explain briefly this recent and new dualism in the philosophy of utilitarian ethics. In general, Utilitarianists are divided into two categories: Rule-based and action-oriented. This is a recent division, but in our opinion, Mill's Utilitarian is rule-based. He uses the principle of utility through the intermediation of rules, not direct and immediate and he uses that fundamental principle only when creating rules or contradicting the rules. In order to defend this claim, we first refer to Ermeson’s interpretation and then we will examine seven arguments of adherents and opponents of Mill's rule utilitarianism and in this review, we will amplify the words of supporters like Ermeson and criticize the words of opponents like Crisp. Then we will bring five witnesses to consolidate our claims which according to them, our interpretation of the rule-based utilitarianism of Mill is strengthened and supported.In this paper, we defend the rule-based interpretation of John Stewart Mill's utilitarianism. First, we will explain briefly this recent and new dualism in the philosophy of utilitarian ethics. In general, Utilitarianists are divided into two categories: Rule-based and action-oriented. This is a recent division, but in our opinion, Mill's Utilitarian is rule-based. He uses the principle of utility through the intermediation of rules, not direct and immediate and he uses that fundamental principle only when creating rules or contradicting the rules. In order to defend this claim, we first refer to Ermeson’s interpretation and then we will examine seven arguments of adherents and opponents of Mill's rule utilitarianism and in this review, we will amplify the words of supporters like Ermeson and criticize the words of opponents like Crisp. Then we will bring five witnesses to consolidate our claims which according to them, our interpretation of the rule-based utilitarianism of Mill is strengthened and supported.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9365_dcbe469ab70396c103d648bff742e622.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923Merleau-ponty’s Critical Approach to Husserl’s IntentionalityMerleau-ponty’s Critical Approach to Husserl’s Intentionality155176936610.22054/wph.2018.9366FASOMAYEHRafigiPHILOSOPHY OF TABRIZ UNIVERSITY0000-0002-3542-0166MuhammadAsgharihttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-3874-47020000-0003-3874-4702MahmoudSufianiAssistant professor- philosophy group-Tabriz university0000-0003-1800-8943Journal Article20180611In the phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty tries to transcend the traditional explanation of intentionality and therefore he describes the phenomenology of the body. According to Merleau-ponty, there is no separation between the world and consciousness and these two are completely tied together. Conciseness for Merleau-ponty is not a mere subject which constitute the eternal essences and natures and gives meaning to phenomena, but it is the body-subject that direct toward the world and cannot be separated from this field of action in the world. The objects of this subject-body are also in the phenomenal fielding that determined by directing the lived body toward them and it comes out of ambiguity and thus, their meaning is born. Accordingly, intentionality for Merleau -Ponty, is the orientation in the world and directedness toward the world itself, and the intentional states are realized in collisions or physical states in a physical and concrete environment. In this paper, we try to provide an interpretation of the concept of intentionality from the perspective of Merleau-ponty, which he calls it "practical intentionality", and we want to express its differences and similarities with Husserl’s intentionality. The main difference between the views of these two philosophers is in Merleau-ponty’s criticism on Husserl’s of Noesis-Noema structure. He claims that meaning is intrinsic to the phenomenal field and it is not possible to analyze it by a distinction between matter and form.In the phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty tries to transcend the traditional explanation of intentionality and therefore he describes the phenomenology of the body. According to Merleau-ponty, there is no separation between the world and consciousness and these two are completely tied together. Conciseness for Merleau-ponty is not a mere subject which constitute the eternal essences and natures and gives meaning to phenomena, but it is the body-subject that direct toward the world and cannot be separated from this field of action in the world. The objects of this subject-body are also in the phenomenal fielding that determined by directing the lived body toward them and it comes out of ambiguity and thus, their meaning is born. Accordingly, intentionality for Merleau -Ponty, is the orientation in the world and directedness toward the world itself, and the intentional states are realized in collisions or physical states in a physical and concrete environment. In this paper, we try to provide an interpretation of the concept of intentionality from the perspective of Merleau-ponty, which he calls it "practical intentionality", and we want to express its differences and similarities with Husserl’s intentionality. The main difference between the views of these two philosophers is in Merleau-ponty’s criticism on Husserl’s of Noesis-Noema structure. He claims that meaning is intrinsic to the phenomenal field and it is not possible to analyze it by a distinction between matter and form.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9366_8beb061c65765904701b685360d40a5a.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923Aristotle and the Subject of MetaphysicsAristotle and the Subject of Metaphysics177203936710.22054/wph.2018.9367FAYassamanHoshyarAssistant Professor of Islamic Azad University, Tehran North Branch, Tehran, Iran;Journal Article20170806According to some interpretations, Aristotle's metaphysics is not a coherent and unified work and does not follow a single issue; in other words, in each two or three books a subject is introduced as a subject of metaphysics. ; For example, in the fourth book, Aristotle refers to a new phrase “being qua being” and in the seventh book, he used the term “Ousia” as the subject of this episteme. In this paper, we try to clarify Aristotle's view of these terms, as well as their relationship with each other, and also with other concepts that play an essential role in Aristotle's metaphysics (such as the concept of essence and form). In this way, it becomes clear whether an alternative interpretation can be presented to show that Aristotle has been able to establish a new episteme with a new and unique subject in this book and has been able to respond to the difficulties of the Beta book (aporia of Beta) as a the guideline of Metaphysics. By concentrating on four books of Metaphysics (I, III, IV, and VII), this article tries to investigate the above items and show Aristotle's innovations in some positions, as well as some aspects of his philosophical differentiation of Plato's philosophy.According to some interpretations, Aristotle's metaphysics is not a coherent and unified work and does not follow a single issue; in other words, in each two or three books a subject is introduced as a subject of metaphysics. ; For example, in the fourth book, Aristotle refers to a new phrase “being qua being” and in the seventh book, he used the term “Ousia” as the subject of this episteme. In this paper, we try to clarify Aristotle's view of these terms, as well as their relationship with each other, and also with other concepts that play an essential role in Aristotle's metaphysics (such as the concept of essence and form). In this way, it becomes clear whether an alternative interpretation can be presented to show that Aristotle has been able to establish a new episteme with a new and unique subject in this book and has been able to respond to the difficulties of the Beta book (aporia of Beta) as a the guideline of Metaphysics. By concentrating on four books of Metaphysics (I, III, IV, and VII), this article tries to investigate the above items and show Aristotle's innovations in some positions, as well as some aspects of his philosophical differentiation of Plato's philosophy.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9367_9cab6110874cf844e1003fb1cdfa2356.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923The Problem of “Other Minds” in Heidegger's ThoughtThe Problem of “Other Minds” in Heidegger's Thought205224936810.22054/wph.2018.9368FAMehdiZakeriUniversity of Tehran0000-0003-1243-7130IlhamAbbasiUniversity of TehranJournal Article20180505The problem of "other minds" as one of the most serious epistemological problems in philosophy derives from Descartes' dualism. Since then, several solutions have been proposed for this issue. But each of these solutions faced with some problems. In contrast to the classical philosophy and the tradition of analytic philosophy, Heidegger describes the origin of this problem and the solutions, to which it has been addressed, Heidegger's inaccurate analysis of man, the world, and the relation between the two, as well as many other epistemological issues. Heidegger transmits and dissolves the problem of other minds from the scope of epistemology to the ontological domain. His approach shows how an unrealistic and illegitimate problem arising from the inaccurate analysis of man and the world, and the relationship between the two, has become an epistemic and undisputed problem. Heidegger shows that not only this issue, but any other epistemological problem, can only be found in a particular kind of ontology. Self-disciplined subject is only in traditional philosophy that wanders in determining its mission to the world and others. According to her analysis, every human being is with others and he faces others in practical life. This encounter does not leave an epistemic controversy in others.The problem of "other minds" as one of the most serious epistemological problems in philosophy derives from Descartes' dualism. Since then, several solutions have been proposed for this issue. But each of these solutions faced with some problems. In contrast to the classical philosophy and the tradition of analytic philosophy, Heidegger describes the origin of this problem and the solutions, to which it has been addressed, Heidegger's inaccurate analysis of man, the world, and the relation between the two, as well as many other epistemological issues. Heidegger transmits and dissolves the problem of other minds from the scope of epistemology to the ontological domain. His approach shows how an unrealistic and illegitimate problem arising from the inaccurate analysis of man and the world, and the relationship between the two, has become an epistemic and undisputed problem. Heidegger shows that not only this issue, but any other epistemological problem, can only be found in a particular kind of ontology. Self-disciplined subject is only in traditional philosophy that wanders in determining its mission to the world and others. According to her analysis, every human being is with others and he faces others in practical life. This encounter does not leave an epistemic controversy in others.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9368_ff21f20e2962d82fc26c45f6ef8eeccf.pdfAllameh Tabataba’i UniversityWisdom And Philosophy1735-3238145520180923Plato and the Mystery of False Belief in TheaetetusPlato and the Mystery of False Belief in Theaetetus225253936910.22054/wph.2018.9369FAAhmadAsgariMember of FacultyMaedehEslamloophilosophy, Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, Shahid Beheshti University, tehran, iranJournal Article20180701The issue of "error", along with the subject of knowledge, is very important for Plato and in the context of defining knowledge as the right belief in Theaetetus, it seeks to explain the possibility of mistaken belief. He offers suggestions to explain the issue of error beliefs. He offers two proposals, one based on the concepts of knowing and not-knowing, and the other based on the concepts of being and not-being, puts two puzzles to believe in error, and both of these are two puzzles to believe in error. Then, he presents three solutions to false belief. Each of these suggestions is carefully reviewed. But all the ways will remain in vain and the efforts are fruitless. Here, Plato seeks to show that the mere reliance on detail as what true knowledge belongs to it, leads to the impossibility of explaining false belief. In this paper, different aspects of the issue of error belief are analyzed to reach Plato's views in the Theaetetus treatise.The issue of "error", along with the subject of knowledge, is very important for Plato and in the context of defining knowledge as the right belief in Theaetetus, it seeks to explain the possibility of mistaken belief. He offers suggestions to explain the issue of error beliefs. He offers two proposals, one based on the concepts of knowing and not-knowing, and the other based on the concepts of being and not-being, puts two puzzles to believe in error, and both of these are two puzzles to believe in error. Then, he presents three solutions to false belief. Each of these suggestions is carefully reviewed. But all the ways will remain in vain and the efforts are fruitless. Here, Plato seeks to show that the mere reliance on detail as what true knowledge belongs to it, leads to the impossibility of explaining false belief. In this paper, different aspects of the issue of error belief are analyzed to reach Plato's views in the Theaetetus treatise.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9369_4eb2361c5043f6905d8bdfc3d00cbcef.pdf