philosophy
Meisam Molaee; zahra khazaei; Muhammad Legenhausen
Abstract
Introduction:Jesse Prinz is known as one of the serious defenders of moral sentimentalism. Usually, sentimentalists give little role to moral reasoning in the process of producing moral judgment. But Prinz, unlike others, believes that moral reasoning and emotions both play a role in morality.In this ...
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Introduction:Jesse Prinz is known as one of the serious defenders of moral sentimentalism. Usually, sentimentalists give little role to moral reasoning in the process of producing moral judgment. But Prinz, unlike others, believes that moral reasoning and emotions both play a role in morality.In this article, after examining Prinz's view on the nature of reasoning, by examining his answers to the following questions, his view on the nature of moral reasoning is extracted:What is the relationship between moral reasoning and the traditional division of theoretical/practical reasoning? Does moral reasoning fit into this division? If so, which of the two types is it?Does moral reasoning have a deductive structure or not? If its structure is inference, which is the type of inference?What is the relationship between moral reasoning and moral generalism and particularism? Does moral reasoning require the use of general principles or not?Can moral reasoning be motivating?What is the purpose of moral reasoning? In other words, what is its function? Literature Review:In his various works, Prinz has written about moral reasoning. But it has not considered the nature of moral reasoning in a coherent way and in an integrated framework. Therefore, it can be claimed that our article is the first writing for a coherent examination of the nature of moral reasoning from Prinz's point of view. Methodology:In this article, Prinz's answers to the mentioned questions are extracted from his various writings, then each of these answers will be analyzed and finally, some criticisms that may be made to these answers will be given. Results:After analyzing Prinz's point of view, we believe that:He considers moral reasoning as a type of theoretical reasoning. Because he believes that moral reasoning is formed to justify moral judgment. So it is not like practical reasoning that leads to action/intention.Like Jonathan Haight, he believes that moral reasoning is presented after moral judgment and to justify it, but he believes that moral reasoning has another function: resolving moral disagreement.According to our analysis, he must have considered the structure of justification in moral reasoning as foundationalism. Because he believes that moral reasoning ultimately ends with fundamental norms that cannot be argued for.We think Prinz considers moral reasoning in the form of allegorical inference or case reasoning. Because he explains the process of justifying a moral judgment by comparing it to a specific example of a category.Prinz seemed not to believe that moral reasoning is based on general rules and principles. Because he does not believe in general moral rules according to the point of view of moral relativism. On the other hand, his view that moral reasoning is case reasoning is consistent with the view of moral particularists.Since Prinz is a moral sentimentalist, then, like David Hume, he must believe that moral reasoning has no motivational effect on action. Because in Prinz's view, since moral judgments are the product of emotions, they are motivating in themselves and do not require moral reasoning.Finally, unlike evolutionary ethics, he does not believe we have an innate capacity for moral reasoning. Conclusion:Contrary to what is obtained from the analysis of Prinz's view on moral reasoning, some psychological results indicate that moral agents, at least in some situations, do not use moral reasoning only to resolve moral disagreements, but use moral reasoning to create moral judgments. If this research is true, and these actors act according to this moral reasoning, then moral reasoning is sometimes motivating. On the other hand, according to Prinz's moral relativism point of view, in situations where two moral actors disagree with each other in a fundamental judgment, moral reasoning has practically no function. So, what Prinz has introduced as the function of moral reasoning is a weak function. If these criticisms are true, they suggest, Prinz's analysis of moral reasoning is not entirely without fault. Therefore, either Prinz should start to modify some of his views on moral reasoning or give stronger reasons for his claim.
Hossein Kharazmi
Abstract
Moral psychology for decades focused on reasoning, but recent evidence finds that emotions play a fundamental role in moral judgment. One of the models for explaining moral judgment is Greene’s Dual-process model of moral judgment. He believes that we can arrive at moral judgments either through ...
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Moral psychology for decades focused on reasoning, but recent evidence finds that emotions play a fundamental role in moral judgment. One of the models for explaining moral judgment is Greene’s Dual-process model of moral judgment. He believes that we can arrive at moral judgments either through reasoning or through emotions, according to which both automatic emotional responses and more controlled cognitive responses are involved in moral judgment. More specifically, utilitarian moral judgments are driven by cognitive processes while non-utilitarian judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses. Green tries to prove his point through experimental experiments and cognitive neuroscience. But according to the sample of violations and recent research, his view does not seem to provide a comprehensive and adequate explanation.
kostas kokozelis
Abstract
The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself ...
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The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (Korsgaard). According to this view, the logical inescapability of choosing alivqys already places us within the normative realm. I argue that there is a further function suppressed by this view, which can be termed as approval. This takes us to the further acknowledgement that the core of Kant's practical rationality, that is, the moral question itself, is not simply one of moral knowledge [Wissen], but a broader one of cognition in general [Erkenntnis].
