mohammad ali abbasian
Abstract
One of the most important, and at the same time, popular discussions within the realm of epistemology in the last five decades, is about the issue of “the nature of knowledge”. According to the current accepted view among epistemologists, there would be no “propositional knowledge” ...
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One of the most important, and at the same time, popular discussions within the realm of epistemology in the last five decades, is about the issue of “the nature of knowledge”. According to the current accepted view among epistemologists, there would be no “propositional knowledge” if there exist no “true believing”. So S knows p, only if S is in th state of having true belief that p. Epistemologists' conception of true proposition and true belief, and accordingly knowledge, is result of a semantic and epistemic notion void of any pragmatic element or condition. In this paper, I try to show that this conception is not correct, and knowledge is not only a matter of semantics and epistemology but further it is subjected to pragmatic considerations. For propositions, as the content of our de re/de dicto beliefs, and their truth or falsity, are dependent upon pragmatics and its psycho-social principles.
lotfollah nabavi; mojtaba amir khanluo
Abstract
Actualism is an ontological thesis according to which the domain of existent objects and the domain of actual ones are the same. According to this thesis, we do not need to commit to any non-actual objects for solving any philosophical problems. The approach of Bernard Linsky, Edward N. Zalta and Michael ...
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Actualism is an ontological thesis according to which the domain of existent objects and the domain of actual ones are the same. According to this thesis, we do not need to commit to any non-actual objects for solving any philosophical problems. The approach of Bernard Linsky, Edward N. Zalta and Michael Nelson is one of the current approaches to the actualism which is known as “New Actualism”. They offer a new presupposition about existent objects according to which a concrete object is in fact contingently concrete object and a non-concrete object, if not be (unlike the number 11) an abstract one is (like the Masaya’s child) contingently non-concrete object. So, by supposing contingently non-concrete objects, they can present a model with fixed domain and not-world-restricted quantifiers which can validate formulas like Barcan Formula, Conversion of Barcan Formula, Necessary Existence and Iterated Modality and offer a suitable explanation for intuitions which support the formula of Possibility of Aliens. However, some critics like Karen Bennett believe that in this approach, some non-actual entities have enumerated as actual objects and consequently New Actualism is a kind of Proxy Actualism. In this article, by adopting an opponent position to Karen Bennett’s one, we try to describe New Actualism and some criticisms about it and to show that New Actualism is not a kind of Proxy Actualism.
ali akbar ahmadi afar majani
Abstract
The central issue of this paper is the semantics of the modal propositions, with emphasis on the necessary and permanent propositions. First, the writer offers a short explanation of the modal propositions according to the traditional logic, then describes their temporal analysis, and finally, criticizes ...
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The central issue of this paper is the semantics of the modal propositions, with emphasis on the necessary and permanent propositions. First, the writer offers a short explanation of the modal propositions according to the traditional logic, then describes their temporal analysis, and finally, criticizes such an interpretation. However, the whole perspective of the paper is not merely negative, and the writer tries to reread and recognize the traditional views and comments on the semantics of the modal propositions.
