Mozhgan Khalili; Ali Akbar Ahmadi Aframjani
Abstract
Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s investigations separates into two parts: “Skeptical paradox” and “Private language argument”. The investigations focus on a Semantic Skepticism Paradox tied with Rule-following, and its other important problems should be interpreted ...
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Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s investigations separates into two parts: “Skeptical paradox” and “Private language argument”. The investigations focus on a Semantic Skepticism Paradox tied with Rule-following, and its other important problems should be interpreted in the same way. The subject of this research is the analysis of Kripke’s unrealistic interpretation of meaning through grammar interpretation of the word “skepticism”. Kripke shows that an unrealistic view of meaning is in the ordinary of language games and related to its creative nature within an unlimited variety, and meaning arises from a special relationship between language and realism that exists inside the form of life under specific conditions. And this gives different dimensions to the grammar of meaning base on its place and nature inside. As a result of this analysis, the meaning has many different dimensions in the course of our active life and can only in one of its uses be used as a realistic view of meaning and we cannot generalize the grammar of this specific use to the other grammars and uses.
hamidreza mohammadi; mohammadreza abdolahnezad
Abstract
Saul. A. Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language reads Wittgenstein’s private language argument as an inference from the idea of rule following. He presents a sceptical paradox about rule- following, which purports to show all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, ...
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Saul. A. Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language reads Wittgenstein’s private language argument as an inference from the idea of rule following. He presents a sceptical paradox about rule- following, which purports to show all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible. In this paper we will examine one of the most important outcomes of Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution, namely “The Community view” according to which, the concept of a private language is inconsistent, because using language entails following rules, and following rules entails being a member of community. This view believes that solitary or private rule-following is impossible and language is essentially social; hence it’s impossible for someone isolated from birth to follow a rule or use language. At the end we will attempt to settle this longstanding and significant dispute, by shedding some lights on the terms used by these antagonists such as Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language, essence and Crusoe.
