Mojgan Ahmadi
Abstract
What do we mean when we talk about cogito sum? What do these words refer to in their use? How did they appear for the first time? How have they progressed and at the same time the progress of which concepts they are? This paper aims to research cogito sum’s form and concept. Therefore, it asks ...
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What do we mean when we talk about cogito sum? What do these words refer to in their use? How did they appear for the first time? How have they progressed and at the same time the progress of which concepts they are? This paper aims to research cogito sum’s form and concept. Therefore, it asks about the formal and conceptual structure of cogito sum in order to move towards the questionable aspect of the cogito sum question, ie “Being”. Hence this paper is a step towards providing the possibility of dialogue with this philosophical concept, that is, the possibility of answering it on the way of necessity aspect of philosophical questioning. The aim is to find a set of contributions to this philosophical concept, through the texts that significate the questioning aspect of Cogito sum. Based on tradition, the subject is gathered by Martin Heidegger. Thus, it makes this step possible with respect to a part of Heidegger's encounter with this question.
mostafa Abedi jighe; Mohsen Bagherzadeh meskibaf; mohammad Asghari
Abstract
To realize human autonomy, Descartes establishes the dialectical relation between consciousness and freedom through the three essential elements of understanding, will, and divine power. Through the free will of negative, as methodic doubt and the destruction of all presuppositions, the basis of consciousness ...
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To realize human autonomy, Descartes establishes the dialectical relation between consciousness and freedom through the three essential elements of understanding, will, and divine power. Through the free will of negative, as methodic doubt and the destruction of all presuppositions, the basis of consciousness is referred to the human being and releases it from external authority. By building a knowledge based on the innate concepts that come from within and without mediation consciously re-establishes knowledge. In this way, human beings not only gain autonomy of understanding but also freedom through the effort of a systematic and restrictive understanding. Because with the entry of the limiting of understanding in the area of the will, freedom is no longer meant to be nonchalance and lawlessness. But freedom within the limits of certain judgments of understanding and its legislation and divine power are enclosed. Through this process, it is promoted to positive freedom. Descartes, by declaring that the natural imaginations are verifiably confirmed by divine confirmation, relied on God to guarantee the knowledge of the understanding and in this way, he describes freedom as God's guarantee. Therefore, in Descartes' philosophy, the realization of positive freedom under dialectical conditions form on the basis of the complex relationship between will, intelligence, and divine power, and all of the elements that constitute a whole will only have meaning with each other.
Mahdi Behniafar
Abstract
This essay deals with Descartes' Provisional Morality and some of its epistemic requirements. Here, we shall introduce two rival readings of these principles, one of which does not give a plausible position to these principles and does not consider them to be an essential part of Descartes's system, ...
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This essay deals with Descartes' Provisional Morality and some of its epistemic requirements. Here, we shall introduce two rival readings of these principles, one of which does not give a plausible position to these principles and does not consider them to be an essential part of Descartes's system, and the other assumes these principles to be both permanent and universal, and then present our explanation to the epistemic realm and also the human realm of these principles. First, we have presented our account of the relation between these Maxims with Cartesian key elements, namely Doubt and Method. Then we discuss the basic nature of Provisionality of these Maxims; a concept that is apparently normal but has relatively different results and requirements. I argue that the moral code has an epistemic character, not a time; time also depends on the events of Reason. Also, while we argued that these principles cannot be considered temporary, we have shown that the idea of some Descartes commentators that these principles, from the very beginning, were permanent and universal is a misconception that can't be imposed on Descartes. Based on our argument, these principles can be transformed into permanent principles in certain epistemic conditions that we have explained, but at the same time, in certain circumstances, they may also be disaffirmed and, as a result, become temporary principles. When these maxims count as the product of an argumentative process, then a non-argumentative description such as the conservatism of these principles will be an abnormal description that is unrelated to Descartes' will.
Jafar Mazhabi; Mohammad Meshkat
Abstract
This article is an attempt to address a main question: is there any connection between Wittgenstein’s way and Descartes’ one in overcoming the problem of dualism? The discussion of the position of Wittgenstein on Descartes’ dualism here begins with the private language argument. For ...
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This article is an attempt to address a main question: is there any connection between Wittgenstein’s way and Descartes’ one in overcoming the problem of dualism? The discussion of the position of Wittgenstein on Descartes’ dualism here begins with the private language argument. For understanding Descartes’ position on the issue, one of his correspondences with Princess Elisabeth, and also the concept of the nature in his book the Meditation are examined so as to be shown this connection, regardless of many central differences between them. Moreover, it is shown here that the relatively similar ways of these two philosophers for facing the problem of dualism are in fact the ways for dissolving the matter, rather than solving it. It means that there seems to be no way to solve the problem of Descartes’s dualism on the basis of his own works, and this problem can only be overcome by getting out of his philosophy- the thing that both Wittgenstein and Descartes actually did. This article, therefore, takes this reading as its main idea that the Wittgenstein’s attack on Descartes’s dualism in particular, and on Descartes’s philosophy in general, is a fundamental criticism that comes from his critical point of view about the nature of philosophy itself; and the Descartes’s way which was mentioned above can be justified only in such a this context.
Seyyed Mostafa Shahraeeni; Seyyed Mohsen Azadikhah (Bize)
Abstract
Despite being accused of scepticism in his own and later times, Descartes was not a sceptic at all but he used doubt as a means to reach an end. In every instance he speaks of true philosophy and metaphysics, he invites the audience to dismiss from their minds anything which can be the subject of the ...
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Despite being accused of scepticism in his own and later times, Descartes was not a sceptic at all but he used doubt as a means to reach an end. In every instance he speaks of true philosophy and metaphysics, he invites the audience to dismiss from their minds anything which can be the subject of the slightest doubt. What we need to take into account is that doubt and scepticism can be of use only to the level at which we succeed to establish a solid ground, and that after that level only an analytical method will help us in building a solid construction of knowledge. The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate that, unlike prevalent beliefs, doubt is not Descartes’ method but is his procedure for employing his method, which is indeed analytical. The role doubt plays for the Cartesian thinker is to provide a ground of certainty which can support the new construction of knowledge he intends to build. Descartes in fact uses doubt as a helpful tool for implementing analytical methods in the area of metaphysics.
