abbas yazdani
Abstract
Does belief in God require the arguments of natural theology to be rationally justified? Some Reformed epistemologists hold that the arguments of natural theology are not necessary for belief in God to be warrant. Moreover, in responding to the question of whether the arguments of natural theology can ...
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Does belief in God require the arguments of natural theology to be rationally justified? Some Reformed epistemologists hold that the arguments of natural theology are not necessary for belief in God to be warrant. Moreover, in responding to the question of whether the arguments of natural theology can confirm or strengthen theistic beliefs, they maintain that since none of the traditional theistic arguments is true, they cannot confirm or strengthen theistic beliefs. However, in this paper, I will argue that although belief in God is properly basic, this belief - at least, in some circumstances - is still in need of the evidence and arguments of natural theology. Hence, natural theology still is inescapable in some contexts. I shall argue that in spite of what has been contended, Reformed thinkers endorse a kind of natural theology. I shall also argue that it is not true to say that all theistic arguments are flawed and useless; as we shall see, some arguments could be sufficient evidence for theistic beliefs. Accordingly, there is no conflict between basicality of belief in God and inferential arguments of natural theology.
reza akbari
Abstract
Taking the first-person approach to the problem of consciousness, the plan of conceivability, explanatory and knowledge arguments is to show an epistemic gap in the first step and to prove a metaphysical gap in the second between mental and physical. The soundness. of these arguments shows the correctness ...
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Taking the first-person approach to the problem of consciousness, the plan of conceivability, explanatory and knowledge arguments is to show an epistemic gap in the first step and to prove a metaphysical gap in the second between mental and physical. The soundness. of these arguments shows the correctness of Chalmers task who divides the problems of consciousness into easy problems and difficult ones. Objecting the first• person approach to the problem and insisting on the third-person approach, materialism denies the soundness of these arguments. In this approach we should take the scientific researches seriously and desist from our liar intuition as a basis for theorizing mental experience. But from where does this big "should" come? This "should" shows the deontologistic aspect of materialism in the study of consciousness which is wrong in the light of reformed epistemology. If the use of scientific researches is acceptable why not religion? In the light of Islamic, Christian and Judaic sacred texts we can accept a kind of substance dualism despite lack of the exact and complete knowledge of the properties of the soul.
